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Essays on Environmental Economics and Policy
W. Reed Walker
A central feature of modern government is its role in designing welfare improving policies
to address and correct market failures stemming from externalities and public goods. The
rationale for most modern environmental regulations stems from the failure of markets to
efficiently allocate goods and services. Yet, as with any policy, distributional effects are
important there exist clear winners and losers.
Despite the clear theoretical justification for environmental and energy policy, empirical
work credibly identifying both the source and consequences of these externalities as well as
the distributional effects of existing policies remains in its infancy. My dissertation focuses
on the development of empirical methods to investigate the role of environmental and energy
policy in addressing market failures as well as exploring the distributional implications of these
policies. These questions are important not only as a justification for government intervention
into markets but also for understanding how distributional consequences may shape the design
and implementation of these policies.
My dissertation investigates these questions in the context of programs and policies that
are important in their own right. Chapters 1 and 2 of my dissertation explore the economic
costs and distributional implications associated with the largest environmental regulatory pro-
gram in the United States, the Clean Air Act. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the social costs of air
pollution in the context of transportation externalities, showing how effective transportation
policy has additional co-benefits in the form of environmental policy. My dissertation remains
unified in both its subject matter and methodological approach – using unique sources of data
and sound research designs to understand important issues in environmental policy.
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2 CHAPTER 1. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LABOR REALLOCATION
Abstract
This paper uses newly available data on plant level regulatory status linked to the Census Lon-
gitudinal Business Database to measure the impact of changes in county level environmental
regulations on plant and sector employment levels. Estimates from a variety of specifications
suggest a strong connection between changes in environmental regulatory stringency and both
employment growth and levels in the affected sectors. The preferred estimates suggest that
changes in county level regulatory status due to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments reduced
the size of the regulated sector by as much as 15 percent in the 10 years following the changes.
1.1 Introduction
Environmental regulations limiting emissions of harmful ambient air pollution are designed
with health benefits in mind. Associated with these benefits are the costs of abating pollu-
tion.The Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditure Survey suggests that regulations per-
taining to the Clean Air Act in the United States account for almost $5 billion in capital
expenditures and $20 billion in annual operating costs within the manufacturing industry
alone (United States Census Bureau 2008). As a result, manufacturers often argue that these
regulations place plants and industries at a competitive disadvantage, forcing plants to down-
size or close. Implicit in this argument is that environmental regulations lead to job loss
associated with industry wide reductions in output.
Accordingly, various papers have looked at the implications of environmental regulation for
regulated industries, generally finding negative effects of regulations on industry employment
(Henderson 1996, Greenstone 2002). However, regulation typically affects the distribution
of employment among industries rather than the economy wide employment level (Arrow,
Cropper, Eads, Hahn, Lave, Noll, Portney, Russell, Schmalensee, Smith, and Stavins 1996).
As a result, the appropriate measure of regulatory costs to the workforce should not be
characterized by jobs lost but by any transitional costs associated with reallocating production
or workers (Arrow, Cropper, Eads, Hahn, Lave, Noll, Portney, Russell, Schmalensee, Smith,
and Stavins 1996, Greenstone 2002). To the extent that workers simply transition from one
employer to the next without losses pertaining to job specific human capital or unemployment,
it is not clear that job loss should be a net cost when evaluating regulations. Even though this
fact has been pointed out in numerous papers, little to no work has attempted to understand
the magnitudes of these frictions in the context of environmental regulation.
The goal of this paper is to begin to understand the degree to which changes in regulatory
stringency over time from the Clean Air Act (CAA) have contributed to costly job transitions
to the affected workforce. Recent work linking plant level job flow statistics to worker level job
turnover surveys has found a strong link between plant level job destruction and involuntary
worker level job loss (Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2006), where layoffs are likely to
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result both in significant non-employment spells and earnings losses (see von Wachter, Song,
and Manchester (2009) for recent evidence). Thus, the margins of adjustment at the firm
level have important distributional implications for the affected workforce. To the extent that
firms adjust labor demand by increasing firing rates (job destruction), decreasing hiring rates
(job attrition), reducing plant entry rates, or increasing plant exit rates, workers will be more
or less affected in terms of job loss and/or losses pertaining to job specific human capital.
This is the first paper to decompose net changes in employment due to environmental
regulations into job flow components, offering new insight as to the distributional impacts of
regulation on the affected workforce. In doing so, I draw upon the most detailed and compre-
hensive data available on plant level regulatory status over time; a confidential establishment-
level, longitudinal database from the United States Census Bureau that I am able to link to
a plant level regulatory database from the Environmental Protection Agency. I can explicitly
observe plant level regulatory status over time and observe how these plants respond to en-
vironmental regulatory changes. Previous work inferring regulatory stringency is based on 2-
and 4-digit, nationwide industry classifications.
A further contribution is that no research has evaluated the most recent amendments and
changes to the CAA on employment. Previous work estimating the costs of the CAA focuses
on earlier time horizons, when pollution levels were much higher and technological constraints
greater. Thus, previous estimates of the cost of regulation may no longer be applicable in
today’s economy. I exploit changes in regulations following the CAA Amendments of 1990, in
which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted new and more stringent pollution
standards. My estimates from these most recent revisions are arguably more applicable to
current policy debates, and are particularly important in light of the EPA’s recent proposal
to further strengthen emissions standards (Environmental Protection Agency 2010).
The results suggest that the recent strengthening of emissions standards in the early 1990’s
led to a persistent decline in employment in affected sectors. Sector level models suggest the
size of the newly regulated, polluting sector fell by more than 15 percent in the 10 years
following the change in regulation. These changes in employment are driven primarily by an
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increase in the plant level job destruction rate, suggesting that these plant level downsizings
are associated with significant worker-level adjustment costs pertaining to involuntary job
loss.
1.2 Environmental Regulations in the United States
Air pollution regulation in the United States is coordinated under the CAA, where regulatory
stringency varies at the county level. Regulations primarily affect densely population areas
where people live and work and where the potential benefits from abatement are larger. While
regulation varies across counties, it also varies across 7 “criteria air pollutants”. Areas with
high levels of a specific air pollutant are regulated only for that pollutant. The threshold for
excessive pollution varies for each pollutant but is applied uniformly across the United States.
In any given year, some counties find themselves over these thresholds, while others do not.
Ambient air pollution is measured by EPA pollution monitors that take hourly/daily
pollution readings for various pollutants. Monitor location is not subject to manipulation by
local authorities. When a county is out of attainment for one of the regulated pollutants, the
EPA forces local plants that emit that pollutant to adopt “lowest achievable emission rates”
(LAER) technologies without regard to costs. Furthermore, the EPA forces any new polluting
plants that wish to locate in that particular county to offset their emissions from another
polluting source within the county. In contrast, in areas designated as “attainment”, large
polluting plants must use “best available control technology” (BACT), which is significantly
less costly than LAER technology (Becker 2005). In summary, in nonattainment areas, firms
are subject to regulations designed to reduce emissions without regards to costs; counties in
attainment are more lightly regulated.
In 1990, Congress passed a set of amendments to the Clean Air Act. The 1990 Amend-
ments created a new criteria pollutant class for particulates, PM-10.2 Furthermore, the EPA
formally reviewed all county nonattainment designations for all criteria pollutants. As a
2Previously, the EPA regulated particulates in the form of Total Suspended Particulates (TSP’s) which are
larger and thought to be less pernicious than the smaller forms of particulates.
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result, 177 counties and 3915 plants switched into nonattainment in 1991.
1.3 Longitudinal Plant Level Employment and Regulatory Data
The primary source of data for this project is the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD), an establishment-level, longitudinal database that covers the universe of
U.S. establishments. Annual information on employment, payroll, and firm age, detailed
industry, location, and entry/exit years for the respective establishments are all included. I
linked the LBD to plant level regulatory and permit data from the EPA, formally known as
the Air Facility Subsystem (AFS) using a name and address matching algorithm.3
The AFS provides permit information detailing the regulatory program(s) for which the
plant is regulated as well as the specific pollutants for which the permit is issued. A limitation
of the AFS is that it does not provide any information as to when these permits were issued.
Fortunately, the regulatory structure of the CAA allows one to infer the timing based on
county nonattainment status. Specifically, I define a plant as regulated if the plant has an
operating permit in the AFS database and resides in a county that is in nonattainment for the
specific pollutant on the permit. This is the first longitudinal, national dataset that includes
plant level regulatory status. Previous research proxied regulation by 2- and 4-digit SIC level
national pollution estimates (Greenstone 2002, Becker 2005).
I limit the sample to establishments within the manufacturing and utility sectors.4 I
also exclude establishments with a maximum employment of less than 50 employees over
the sample frame and any establishments with a lifespan of less than 3 years. Since EPA
regulations primarily apply to major sources with potential to emit of more than 100 tons per
year, excluding these smaller establishments has little effect on the estimates.
I create a second dataset that aggregates this plant level micro data to the county by sector
(i.e. polluting or non-polluting) by year for the years 1985-2005. This eases the computational
burden as well as providing aggregate statistics that reflect both changes in employment for
3See Walker (2011b) for details.
4Specifically, 1-digit and 2-digit 1987 SIC code categories 2 (manufacturing), 3 (manufacturing), and 49
(electric, gas, and sanitary services). These are the most widely represented sectors in the AFS.
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continuing plants as well as any changes pertaining to plant entry or exit.
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
Since the CAA is administered on a county by year basis and only polluting plants are
regulated in that county-year, there is a tremendous amount of regulatory variation in the
data. It is therefore instructive to understand the degree to which these sources of variation are
orthogonal to plant or county observables. If there are significant differences across counties or
plants pertaining to pre-regulatory observed differences, then the nature of these differences
should motivate the choice of a proper empirical specification. Table 1.1 presents sample
Table 1.1: County and Plant Characteristics By Prior to CAA Amendments (1990)
Polluting Sector Non-Polluting Sector
Attain Nonattain Switch Attain Nonattain Switch
A: County Characteristics
Employment 1249.6 6421.1 6041.2 1798.2 13522.6 17514.5
B: Plant Characteristics
Plant Employment 281.3 289.7 285.2 152.0 132.2 137.4
Employment Growth (1985-1990) 0.408 0.280 0.333 0.199 0.107 0.170
Job Creation Rate (1985-1990) 0.511 0.433 0.456 0.581 0.553 0.592
Job Destruction Rate (1985-1990) 0.104 0.153 0.123 0.382 0.446 0.422
Plant Age 9.874 10.74 10.63 8.257 8.492 8.075
N 8507 9488 3915 38692 59755 34599
Note: Plant level growth rates and labor reallocation rates are constructed using definitions from (Davis and
Haltiwanger 1992), and are described further in section 1.5. Number of counties per category: Attain 2265,
Nonattain 392, Switch 177.
statistics by polluting and non-polluting sectors for both county and plant samples, where
each column shows the characteristics for attainment counties, nonattainment counties, and
counties that switch nonattainment status in 1991. Nonattainment counties tend to be more
urban and economically larger, and relying on cross sectional variation alone might confound
regulations with other sources of heterogeneity across counties. Similarly, purely relying
on time series variation in regulated plants is suspect given that the recession in the early
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1990’s occurred at the same time as the 1990 CAA Amendments. Within county comparisons
between plants in the same county rely on the fact that polluting and non-polluting plants are
similar except for regulatory status. Table 1.1 shows that polluting plants tend to be older
and larger than their counterparts, and have slower growth rates ex ante. Failing to account
for these differences might lead to confounding regulation with plant age or plant vintage
effects, a point not addressed in the previous literature.
Credible identification requires accounting for all these sources of observed and unobserved
confounders. Fortunately, the richness of the data permit me to flexibly control for most
unobserved shocks, while still being able to recover precise estimates.
1.4 Sector Level Dynamics
In order to understand the dynamic effects of CAA regulations on sector level employment, I




βk(Nck × Pjc) + δjc + ζct + ujct (1.1)
where yjct represents the log of sector j employment in county c for year t. Nck are indicators
for county level nonattainment in years k before and after the regulatory change, and Pj
is a sector level indicator for the polluting sector. Also included are county by sector fixed
effects (δjc) so that all the estimates are based on within sector comparisons before and after
nonattainment designation, and county-by-year linear trends (ζct) to account for unobserved
county trends that might confound estimates. Lastly, regressions are weighted by the total
employment for each county/sector in 1985.
The parameters of interest are the βk’s which provide an estimate of the semi-elasticity of
employment with regard to changes in environmental regulations. Estimates of the βk’s are
identified by within sector comparisons over time for those sectors that experienced changes in
regulatory stringency. This specification controls for any observed or unobserved permanent
county by sector characteristics as well as any county level trends that affect the polluting
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and non-polluting sector similarly. To account for potential correlation across sectors within
the same county, standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Figure 1.1 plots the coefficients from a version of Equation 1.1 for the 5 years prior and
10 years after the changes to the 1990 CAA amendments. Specifically, the plotted coefficients
are the difference in event time indicators for the polluting sectors in counties that switched
nonattainment status in 1991 relative to those counties that did not switch, controlling for
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Years Before and After Regulation
Figure 1.1: Sector Level Employment Estimates Before and After Regulation
Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of Equation 1.1. See text for details. The dashed
lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
There are two important features from this figure. First, the trends in employment in the
polluting sectors for the years prior to the change are remarkably similar (as reflected by the
zero pre-trend differences). Secondly, beginning with the year of the regulatory change, the
employment of polluting sectors in newly regulated counties begins to fall for the next 8 years
to 15 percent below 1990 employment levels. Recall that these estimates are all relative to
polluting sectors in counties that did not switch regulatory status in 1990, and thus any cyclical
differences pertaining to the recession in the early 1990’s should be accounted for (conditional
5The appendix presents the estimated parameters and standard errors as well as employment trends for
each sector rather than the difference in trends presented here.
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on the control group evolving similarly). Figure 1.1 summarizes the paper’s primary finding:
namely that there is a strong and persistent relationship between nonattainment designation
and sector level employment.
I next turn to plant level data to look at differences in employment growth and labor
reallocation rates over 5-year intervals for affected plants. The focus on medium to long
run differences abstracts away from the short run dynamics while allowing me to compare
my estimates to the previous literature using the Census of Manufacturers (Henderson 1996,
Greenstone 2002).
1.5 Plant Level Labor Reallocation Rates
In keeping with the literature, I define plant employment growth as the difference in em-
ployment between t and t − 5 divided by the average employment in those two periods. To
better understand the margins of firm adjustment, employment growth is decomposed into
two separate components: one measuring the growth rate from expanding establishments (i.e.
the job creation rate) and the other measuring the rate at which contracting establishments
are shrinking (i.e. the job destruction rate).6 I estimate various forms of the following plant
level model:
yijct = α+ θ(Nct−5 × Pi) + δjt + ηi + ζct + γit + uijct. (1.2)
where Nct−5 is a lagged indicator for whether or not county c is in nonattainment five years
prior and Pi is a plant level indicator for polluting status. The parameter, θ, provides an
estimate of the effect of plant level nonattainment designation on the 5 year plant employment
growth and labor reallocation rates. Equation 1.2 also controls for annual fluctuations by
industry with 2-digit SIC×year fixed effects (δjt); any permanent observed or unobserved
plant characteristics with plant fixed effects (ηi); and any local economic shocks to plants
6These statistics are created using the standard job flow definitions from Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
Importantly, all of these measures account allow for entry and exit at the plant level, whereas measures using
log differences are not defined for plants entering or exiting the sample.
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that affect both polluting and non-polluting plants similarly by including county by year
fixed effects (ζct). Since plant age is an important determinant of growth rates and job flows,
I also include a set of plant age indicators (γit). Lastly, estimates are weighted by plant-specific
median employment over the sample.
Panel A of Table 1.2 presents regression estimates pertaining to Equation 1.2. Similar to
the findings in the previous literature, plant level employment growth declines with changes
to plant level regulatory status. Interestingly, the results suggest that most of this adjustment
is occurring through increases in the job destruction rate (i.e. the rate at which plants with
negative employment growth shed jobs). The job destruction rate nearly doubles for newly
regulated plants, suggesting there may be significant costs to the affected workforce from these
plant level reductions in employment.
Table 1.2: Effect of Nonattainment Designation on Plant Level 5-Year Labor Reallocation
Rates
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
Growth Rate Rate
A: Model 1
Nonattainmentct−5× -0.142∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
Polluteri (0.043) (0.014) (0.039)
B: Model 2
Nonattainment(CO)ct−5× -0.031 -0.012 0.019
Polluteri (0.076) (0.023) (0.063)
Nonattainment(O3)ct−5× -0.099∗∗∗ -0.035∗ 0.064∗
Polluteri (0.035) (0.019) (0.033)
Nonattainment(PM10)ct−5× -0.133∗∗∗ -0.007 0.126∗∗∗
Polluteri (0.030) (0.013) (0.024)
Nonattainment(SO2)ct−5× -0.246∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ 0.132∗
Polluteri (0.118) (0.044) (0.077)
Note: This table reports several estimates pertaining to Equation 1.2, where each column of each panel
is a separate regression. See text for details. Dependent variables are constructed using definitions from
Haltiwanger and Davis (1992). N= 470958. All regressions include plant, 2-digit SIC×year, and county×year
fixed effects. Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors that are clustered at the county level.
Since counties can be regulated for various sources of pollution, and the regulations are
applied such that only plants emitting the pollutant in question are regulated, I can estimate
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a model that jointly identifies the regulatory effects for each pollutant (Greenstone 2002).
I estimate a version equation 1.2 where there are four parameters of interest, θp for p ∈
{CO,PM10,O3, SO2}, conditional on the respective nonattainment indicators, Npct−5 being
equal to 1.7 Thus, the regulatory effects are identified off of changes to the plant level
regulatory status for each pollutant p, conditional on that plant emitting pollutant p. Panel
B of Table 1.2 presents results from the joint pollutant estimation. Changes in the plant
level regulatory status have significant effects on plant level employment growth and labor
reallocation rates across all pollutant classes.
1.6 Conclusion
Evidence here suggests that firms primarily respond to regulatory pressure by destroying jobs
rather than reducing their hiring rates. Importantly, recent work by Davis, Faberman, and
Haltiwanger (2006) shows a clear link between high levels of plant level job destruction and
high percentages of involuntary layoffs from these plants. Their work combined with the
results from this paper suggest that the adjustment costs of reallocating the workforce after
a policy shock could be significant.
Future work should try to explicitly estimate these costs. Specifically, longitudinal micro
data could yield considerable insight as to the magnitude of the earnings losses pertaining
to reallocation for the affected workforce in both the short and long run. Since most of
these regulations occur in relatively thick labor markets (i.e. more urban areas), and since
these shocks are very sector specific, the actual costs to the workforce could potentially be
quite modest. See Walker (2011b) for evidence using matched employer-employee data in the
United States.
7 Only the pollutants CO, PM-10, O3, and SO2 experience significant amounts of regulatory variation in
the sample.
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Figure 1.2: Sector Level Employment Trends for Regulated and Unregulated Polluting Sectors
Note: Plotted are the time series coefficients for the regulated and unregulated polluting sector controlling
for linear county time trends, a time trend for the polluting sector, and 2-digit SIC×year fixed effects. The
difference between these two lines is reflected in Figure 1.1.
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Regulated Unregulated Col.(1) - Col.(2)
t = −5 -0.138 -0.147 0.009
(0.043) (0.010) (0.045)
t = −4 -0.108 -0.126 0.017
(0.034) (0.009) (0.036)
t = −3 -0.099 -0.067 -0.032
(0.033) (0.008) (0.034)
t = −2 -0.024 -0.023 -0.001
(0.026) (0.007) (0.027)
t = −1 - - -
t = 0 -0.056 -0.033 -0.023
(0.025) (0.007) (0.026)
t = 1 -0.048 -0.027 -0.020
(0.025) (0.008) (0.027)
t = 2 -0.066 0.002 -0.068
(0.030) (0.008) (0.031)
t = 3 -0.058 0.034 -0.092
(0.034) (0.009) (0.036)
t = 4 -0.047 0.062 -0.109
(0.042) (0.010) (0.043)
t = 5 -0.027 0.053 -0.080
(0.032) (0.010) (0.034)
t = 6 -0.043 0.065 -0.108
(0.033) (0.010) (0.035)
t = 7 -0.066 0.075 -0.141
(0.045) (0.011) (0.047)
t = 8 -0.096 0.062 -0.158
(0.050) (0.011) (0.052)
t = 9 -0.078 0.068 -0.145
(0.041) (0.011) (0.043)
t = 10 -0.121 0.019 -0.140
(0.042) (0.011) (0.044)
Note: All reported coefficients come from the same regression. Column 3 is simply the difference between
columns 1 and 2. See text for details.
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Abstract
New environmental regulations lead to a rearrangement of production away from polluting
industries, and workers in those industries are adversely affected. This paper uses linked
worker-firm data in the United States to estimate the transitional costs associated with real-
locating workers from newly regulated industries to other sectors of the economy. The focus
on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to examine previously
unobserved economic outcomes such as non-employment and long run earnings losses from
job transitions, both of which are critical to understanding the reallocative costs associated
with these policies. Using panel variation induced by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA), I find that the reallocative costs of environmental policy are significant. Workers in
newly regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than $9 billion in foregone earnings
for the years after the change in policy. Most of these costs are driven by non-employment
and lower earnings in future employment, while earnings of workers who remain with their
firm change little. Relative to the estimated benefits of the 1990 CAAA, these one-time tran-
sitional costs are small. However, the estimated costs far exceed the workforce compensation
policies designed to mitigate some of these earnings losses.
2.1 Introduction
Environmental policy pertaining to air pollution has been estimated to have large health
benefits (Environmental Protection Agency 1999, Chay and Greenstone 2003c, Currie and
Neidell 2005). However, these policies also come with costs. Production is typically reallo-
cated away from newly regulated industries to other sectors and locations (Henderson 1996,
Greenstone 2002), and this creates a broad set of private and social costs. In terms of labor
inputs, this reallocation is often framed in terms of “jobs lost”, and the distinction between
“jobs versus the environment” is one of the more politically salient aspects of these regula-
tions.2 However, workers often find new jobs elsewhere, perhaps in different locations and/or
industries. If workers simply transition from one employer to the next without significant
earnings loss, then job loss should not be considered a cost when evaluating policy. If workers
lose job or industry specific skills and/or experience long periods of unemployment following
job transitions, the cost of reallocating the workforce could be quite large. There also may be
costs to workers who remain in these potentially less productive industries.
This paper uses newly available longitudinal data on workers and firms to estimate the
incidence of regulation-induced worker reallocation stemming from the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. In doing so, this paper offers an approach to characterizing the costs and conse-
quences of external labor market innovations when production and workers are not instantly
reallocated elsewhere within the economy. Using the confidential Longitudinal Employer
Household Dynamics (LEHD) dataset from the United States Census Bureau, I am able to
follow workers across their jobs over time to explicitly incorporate two substantive features of
labor market adjustment: the wage costs borne by workers who remain in the newly-regulated,
now less productive, sector and the long-run earnings losses for those who leave the sector.
The 1990 CAA Amendments created a new class of pollution standards and strengthened
existing standards so that many areas of the United States fell under a new regulatory regime.
Polluting firms in these areas were forced to reduce emissions and install new pollution abate-
2For representative examples from the popular press see the Wall Street Journal (July 26, 2011) op-ed
entitled “The Latest Job Killer from the EPA”, “Smoke Signals” from The New Republic (April 7th, 2011), or
“A Debate Arises on Job Creation and Environment” from The New York Times (Sep 4th, 2011).
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ment technologies, increasing the cost of production and lowering productivity (Greenstone,
List, and Syverson 2010). These regulations led to a sectoral shift in production and employ-
ment away from newly regulated, polluting sectors (Walker 2011a). The empirical framework
estimates the impact of this regulatory shock on the evolution of earnings for the workers in
newly regulated plants.
While the empirical setting pertains to environmental regulations, the analysis relates to
a large literature on the costs and incidence of labor market adjustment to external factors
such as trade, immigration, or innovations in labor demand.3 Traditionally, work in this
area examines how prices in industries or regional labor markets respond to external labor
market shocks, and then the estimates are used to back out a measure of welfare or incidence.
This approach is sufficient if labor markets are competitive, workers are perfectly mobile, and
labor markets are in continuous equilibrium. However, in the short and medium-run, this
is unlikely to be the case. Disequilibrium in the labor market and/or non-competitive wage
setting implies that external shocks may also contribute to changes in non-wage outcomes such
as increases in sector-specific unemployment through short-run job rationing. These labor
market outcomes are typically unobserved with existing local labor market data. The novelty
of this paper is that the baseline earnings estimates explicitly incorporate both worker-specific
non-employment durations and any long run earnings changes associated with the reallocation
of production and workers. In doing so, this is the first paper to jointly estimate the long run
earnings changes for workers who remain in a sector and the long run earnings changes for
workers who leave the sector when measuring the total wage costs of labor reallocation in the
context of external labor market shocks.
This paper departs from the existing literature in four important ways. First, prior re-
search on the labor market impacts of environmental regulation has primarily focused on
3The empirical literature on labor market adjustment to external factors is vast. For related work studying
the impact of international trade on labor markets see: Borjas and Ramey (1995), Menezes-Filho and Muendler
(2007), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2011), Feenstra
(2010), Topalova (2010), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2011), and Dix-Carneiro (2011); related work on immigra-
tion and labor markets includes: Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), Card (2001),
Borjas (2003), and Ottaviano and Peri (2006); lastly, work looking more generally at labor market adjustment
to innovations in labor demand includes: Topel (1986), Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and
Holzer (2000), Moretti (2011), Notowidigdo (2011).
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employment in manufacturing industries (Berman and Bui 2001, Greenstone 2002, Deschenes
2010, Kahn and Mansur 2010, Walker 2011a).4 For example, Greenstone (2002) finds that
the Clean Air Act Amendments of the 1970’s led to a loss of more than 500,000 jobs in reg-
ulated sectors relative to unregulated sectors. However, it is difficult to monetize the effects
of job loss without knowing the long-run earnings losses associated with these job transi-
tions. Numerous papers have highlighted the lack of credible estimates pertaining to the
costs and economic incidence of environmental regulations for workers in these industries (see
e.g. Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins (1995), Arrow, Cropper, Eads, Hahn, Lave, Noll,
Portney, Russell, Schmalensee, Smith, and Stavins (1996), Greenstone (2002), Environmental
Protection Agency (2005), Fullerton (2008), Congressional Budget Office (2009)).
Second, it is widely acknowledged that industry level wage and employment data are likely
to be misleading in terms of labor market incidence, especially when labor markets are not
fully competitive and/or are not in continuous equilibrium. A large literature has documented
barriers to the short-run adjustment of wages to productivity or labor market conditions.5
These barriers may constrain wages to remain above market-clearing levels, leading to a
shortage of jobs. In such a case, industry wages may respond minimally to external shocks,
while a large fraction of workers in these industries may now be without jobs. Moreover,
industry wages do not reflect the long run costs of job loss for affected workers, since workers
are often unemployed between jobs and/or transition to other sectors of the economy (see
e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2009)).6
Lastly, if firms and industries respond to shocks by laying off their least able or least senior
workers (Abraham and Medoff 1984, Gibbons and Katz 1991), then industry wages will be
biased by these compositional changes in the workforce (e.g. more productive workers remain
4There is a large literature examining industry responsiveness to regulatory changes stemming from the
Clean Air Act. While not explicitly interested in labor demand, other research has found that plants on the
margin of production may opt to close or relocate in response to these regulations (Henderson 1996, Becker
and Henderson 2000). Other work suggests that regulations may increase barriers to entry, reducing plant
entry rates, increasing market concentration, and reducing output (List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone
2003, Ryan 2011).
5The literature on wage rigidity is vast. Examples include Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), Camp-
bell III and Kamlani (1997), Altonji and Devereux (1999), Bewley (1999), Fehr and Goette (2005).
6Involuntary job separations accounted for almost 45% of all job separations in the manufacturing industry
from 2001 to 2008 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
(JOLTS).
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ex-post) (Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994).
I exploit detailed longitudinal data to follow workers over time and across jobs. The use
of longitudinal data on workers overcomes many of the existing limitations outlined above.
The primary estimation framework follows cohorts of workers in newly regulated counties and
sectors over time, before and after plant-specific regulatory changes. The cohort-style analysis
is meant to address concerns pertaining to compositional biases (i.e. the composition of
workers is constant by construction) while also incorporating potentially costly job transitions
into the average earnings estimates. By following cohorts, the baseline earnings estimates
consist of both the long run earnings changes for workers who remain in the newly regulated
sector as well as the long run earnings changes of the workers who leave the sector. Both of
these earnings components are crucial for understanding the wage costs of labor reallocation,
but due to data limitations they are most often studied in isolation.
The third departure from previous work comes from the use of a new, plant-level dataset
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that details exactly which plants are reg-
ulated under the various environmental programs in the United States. The Clean Air Act
regulations apply heterogeneously within certain industries. Prior literature in this area has
had to rely on more aggregate, industry-level proxies for environmental regulation since this
plant-level data was not yet available.7 I match this database to administrative, plant-level
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, allowing me to observe plant-level regulatory status over
time.
Fourth, this paper is also able to lend insight as to how workers and labor markets adjust
to sector specific shocks. Existing evidence suggests that local labor markets adjust to inno-
vations in labor demand primarily through worker migration across labor markets (Blanchard
and Katz 1992, Bound and Holzer 2000). However, this evidence is somewhat indirect as
existing data does not permit fine-grained analysis of worker transitions.8 This project com-
bines both geographic and temporal detail to observe and estimate transitional dynamics
7Berman and Bui (2001) is an exception. However, they only focus on the Southern California Air Basin
and oil refineries.
8Previous research examining labor market responses to innovations in labor demand either relies on ag-
gregate state-level data (see e.g. Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992)) or long panels incapable of
identifying detailed dynamic responses to shocks (see e.g. Bound and Holzer (2000) and Notowidigdo (2011)).
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surrounding wage and mobility responses to regulatory shocks.
The results in this paper suggest that the reallocative costs to the workforce from the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments are significant, but remain far below most estimated benefits of
the policy. For those workers in the regulated sector prior to the change in regulation, the
average earnings declined by more than 5 percent in the 3 years after the regulation. These
earnings declines are persistent and only begin to recover some 5 years after the policy. The
average worker in a regulated sector experienced a total earnings loss equivalent to 23 percent
of their pre-regulatory earnings. In aggregate, the total foregone wage bill associated with this
regulation-induced sectoral shift in production is estimated to be more than 9 billion dollars
(in 1990 dollars). These foregone earnings estimates are two orders of magnitude below most
estimates of the health benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
I explore the mechanisms generating these earnings changes by stratifying the sample into
those employees who stay with their firm versus those who leave to a new job in another
location or sector. While a job separation is endogenous in this setting, comparisons across
the two groups provide striking contrasts in the earnings adjustment process for these sets of
workers. Workers who remain at a firm in the newly affected sector experience no discernible
earnings change, whereas those who separate see both sizable and persistent earnings losses.
Consistent with these results, estimates using average industry earnings measures show little
responsiveness to these regulations, highlighting the importance of longitudinal data when
characterizing the costs and incidence of labor market adjustment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The following section discusses the details
of the Clean Air Act more fully with a brief discussion of the previous literature. Section 2.3
presents a simple conceptual framework to motivate the empirical analysis as well as highlight
key differences between this project and existing work in this area. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss
the research design and data while Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present an econometric framework and
estimation results. Section 2.8 offers a short discussion of the results. Section 2.9 concludes.
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2.2 The Clean Air Act and Environmental Regulation
Air pollution regulation in the United States is coordinated under the Clean Air Act, the
largest environmental program in the United States. The Clean Air Act requires the EPA
to develop and enforce regulations to protect the general public from exposure to airborne
contaminants that are known to be hazardous to human health. The Act was passed in 1963
and significantly amended in 1970, 1977, and 1990. The enactment of the Clean Air Act
of 1970 resulted in a major shift in the federal government’s role in air pollution control,
authorizing federal and state regulations to limit emissions. In doing so, the EPA established
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) which specify the minimum level of air
quality acceptable for six criteria air pollutants.9
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments stipulated that every county in the U.S. must be
designated annually as being in-attainment or out-of-attainment (nonattainment) of NAAQS.
When a county is out of attainment for one of the regulated pollutants, the EPA requires
states to adopt regulatory plans, known as State Implementation Plans (SIPs), to bring their
county into compliance. The EPA can impose sanctions in areas that fail to comply with these
requirements, where sanctions include the withholding of federal grant monies (e.g., highway
construction funds), direct EPA enforcement and control (through Federal Implementation
Plans), and bans on the construction of new establishments with the potential to pollute.10
The regulatory plans require polluting plants locating in a county labeled as out-of-
attainment, or substantially expanding operations at an existing plant, to adopt “lowest
achievable emission rates” (LAER) technologies without regard to costs. Moreover, any new
emissions from plant entry or investment/expansion must be offset from an existing source
within the same county. In contrast, in areas designated as “attainment”, large polluting
plants must use “best available control technology” (BACT). In cases concerning BACT, the
9These pollutants consist of sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulates (TSP, PM2.5, and PM10), nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone, and lead.
10A 1999 report by the Congressional Research Service (McCarthy 1999) states that 858 notices of impending
sanctions were issued by EPA between 1990 and October 1999. Becker (2005) notes that the vast majority of
these CAA violations were rectified within the 18-month grace period following formal notification. Sanctions
were imposed in 18 instances and a second round of additional sanctions was administered in two of those
cases.
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economic burden on the plant is considered in arriving at a final solution. Using plant-level
survey evidence, Becker (2005) finds that BACT is significantly less costly to plants than
LAER technology. Since SIPs require states to develop plant-specific regulations for every
major source of air pollution, existing plants in nonattainment areas also face greater regula-
tory scrutiny than plants in attainment areas. These plant-specific regulations typically have
come in the form of emissions limits. Regulatory compliance may also necessitate redesigns in
production processes, introducing additional costs if output must be suspended in the interim
(Becker and Henderson 2000). Becker and Henderson (2001) attempt to quantify these costs
using plant-level data from the Census of Manufactures. They estimate that total operating
costs were 17% higher in polluting plants from nonattainment areas relative to similar plants
in attainment areas. In addition to the increased abatement expenditures, inspections and
oversight are more persistent in nonattainment areas.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 introduced a new NAAQS standard (PM-10) and
formally required all polluters to obtain an operating permit for operation.11 The requirement
that polluting sources obtain operating permits is crucial for this study, as it allows one to
observe regulatory status at the plant level, something that has not been possible in previous
work in this literature. The EPA also formally evaluated their existing nonattainment desig-
nations for each air region so that 133 counties found themselves in nonattainment for at least
one new pollutant, a 33% increase. Appendix Figure 2.8 shows the 1990 CAA Amendments
led to by far the largest documented increase in county nonattainment designations since
1978.
In no small part due to these regulations, pollution levels have declined considerably from
1970 levels (Henderson 1996, Chay and Greenstone 2003d). More recently, since 1990 pollu-
tion levels have declined even further despite GDP rising, vehicle miles traveled increasing,
population growing, and energy consumption rising by more than 20 percent (Environmental
Protection Agency 2008, Auffhammer, Bento, and Lowe 2009). The combined evidence sug-
gests that nonattainment designations are effective at reducing pollution levels, and much
11Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment established a tradeable market for sulfur dioxide emissions.
These markets apply nationally, are primarily for electric utilities, and do not correspond to the variation in
nonattainment designation used in this study.
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of this reduction comes through increased firm compliance. The following section presents a
simple conceptual framework designed to map these regulatory changes into worker outcomes
and motivate the empirical analysis.
2.3 A Mapping Between Regulatory Change and Reallocative
Incidence
New regulations force plants to install pollution abatement technologies, so that for a given
level of output plants must now use more inputs. Therefore, a straightforward way to model
environmental regulations is to view these regulations as affecting plant level productivity.12
This is consistent with recent empirical evidence suggesting that CAA nonattainment des-
ignation lowers plant-level total factor productivity (Greenstone, List, and Syverson 2010).
This modeling decision foregoes potential complementarities between pollution abatement
and capital or labor while allowing for a more general treatment of labor reallocation in the
context of productivity shocks. I will treat the industry as competitive, with price being set
on an international market. Thus, a reduction in sectoral productivity will lead to a reduction
in sectoral output as well as a reduction in the demand for inputs.13
In order to map these changes in factor demands into worker outcomes, as well as to
motivate the empirical setup, consider the following partial-equilibrium Roy (1951) model of
occupational choice.14 A population of N workers supply an indivisible unit of labor to a
sector s ∈ {p, o} (i.e. the polluting sector p or the outside sector o). Both sectors are assumed
large so that any movements across sectors do not affect wages through movements in the
12There are many ways to model pollution or pollution abatement within a plant level production decision
(see e.g. Copeland and Taylor (2004)). In particular, note that if environmental regulations are factor biased
(e.g. by increasing the rental rate of capital), the total effect of regulation on labor demand is ambiguous
depending on both the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and any “scale effect” associated
with changes in industry output.
13In a dynamic setting, there may also be interactions between plants’ endogenous production decisions in
the context of these regulations (e.g. Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992)). Moreover, shifts in the costs
of entry and investment can lead to markets with fewer firms and lower production (Ryan 2011).
14The partial equilibrium assumption is not necessary for generating the main implications from this exercise.
It is primarily chosen for simplicity. The same conclusions may be reached in the context of a general equilibrium
Roy model (e.g. Heckman and Sedlacek (1985)) by adding a competitive production sector, at the cost of
additional notation.
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labor supply curve. Each worker is endowed with sector-specific ability wis ≥ 0, and workers
are paid according to their ability in each sector. Agents are free to enter the sector that gives
them the highest income. However, they can work in only one sector at a time.
Workers are income maximizing and do not value leisure so that utility for a worker i may
be written as
Ui = max{wio, wip}.
Worker i simply chooses a sector s that maximizes utility with full knowledge of their ability
component in each sector. Workers self-select into the sector for which they have compara-
tive advantage. Define the indicator variable Dis = 1 when sector s satisfies individual i’s





which is simply equal to the total wage bill for workers in sector s.
2.3.1 The Incidence of Regulation for Polluting Sector Workers
As a result of this regulatory shock, both output and demand for inputs fall.15 In a competitive
labor market, holding labor supply fixed, a reduction in labor demand will reduce the wage
from wip to w′ip. As skill prices vary, individuals shift sectors in pursuit of their comparative
advantage.16
In the new regulatory regime, some workers who originally chose the polluting sector p will
now choose the outside sector o. The structure of the model also tells us which workers switch,
namely those who now have comparative advantage in the outside sector. On average, these
are low-wage workers in the polluting sector, which implies the average wage of workers in the
polluting sector may be higher after the regulations go into place. In such a case, the average
wage in the polluting sector p may rise, not because of a shift in the labor supply curve,
15Here, the implicit assumption is that regulations are factor neutral with respect to production.
16There is no involuntary job loss in this exercise. This is taken as a modeling convenience, but the implica-
tions remain similar to models with heterogeneous workers that endogenize the demand-side job separations;
least productive workers are laid off in response to negative demand shocks. See e.g. Gibbons and Katz (1991).
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but instead because the remaining workers are, on average, more productive than before.
This reflects the well-known empirical issue pertaining to composition bias in aggregate wage
regressions – the workers who stay in a sector and the workers who leave the sector are selected
(see e.g. Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994)).
Now consider the effect of the change in regulations on the workers in the polluting sector
p. Denote the set of workers in the polluting sector prior to the policy change as Np:
Np = {wip : wip > wio}.
Write the wage bill for the subset of these workers better off in sector o after the regulations
as Wo|i∈Np and the wage bill of those who remain in sector p after the regulations as W ′p|i∈Np .
The change in utility for workers in the polluting sector prior to the regulations may be written
as:




 D′ip × (w′ip − wip)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Change for Stayers
+ D′io × (wio − wip)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Change for Leavers
 , (2.1)
where D′is is the re-optimized decision rule pertaining to sector s under the new regulatory
regime. Equation (2.1) suggests that we can write the change in utility for workers in the
polluting sector as a sum of two components: the first component represents the wage costs for
the inframarginal workers (i.e. those workers not induced to switch sectors by the productivity
shock), and the second component represents the wage costs for those workers who are now
better off in sector o. The latter term consists of the difference between the individual’s wage
in the outside sector wio and the wage the worker received in the previous sector wip. Note
that in this partial equilibrium framework, both terms are negative. The sign of the first term
inside the brackets is negative due to a reduction in the productivity of all workers in the
sector; the sign of the second term is negative, since any worker now in the outside sector o
had optimally chosen sector p to begin with.
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This framework highlights two important components pertaining to reallocative incidence
in the context of any external labor market shock. First, the total change in utility for workers
in the polluting sector consists of both the wage changes for those who remain in the sector
and any change in wages experienced by those who leave the sector. Second, the frame-
work highlights the econometric challenges faced in estimating either of these components in
isolation – namely both workers who stay and workers who leave are selected.
With this in mind, I develop an econometric framework to match the main features of
equation (2.1). The empirical analysis focuses on all workers who had chosen to work in the
polluting sector prior to the change in regulations and then estimates the change in earnings
for this subset of workers after the policy change. Since the model suggests that workers who
remain in the sector are positively selected and those who leave are negatively selected, the
baseline regression estimates refrain from separating these two components, instead focusing
on the average wage change for stayers and leavers. Since I am following the same group of
workers before and after the policy change, concerns pertaining to composition bias no longer
apply (i.e. the composition is explicitly held constant).
2.3.2 Regulatory Effects in General Equilibrium
While regulations affect workers in the polluting sector, employment flows away from the
regulated sector may affect factor prices in other, non-regulated sectors or locations. This
section highlights these relevant factor price adjustments in the context of a stylized general
equilibrium model.
Consider a closed economy with two locations (attainment and nonattainment) and two
sectors in each location (polluting and non-polluting) that produce freely tradable goods
using a single input (labor). Labor is heterogeneous in the sense implied by the previous
section: workers differ in their sector specific productivity. Workers consume production
goods. Assuming perfectly competitive markets, all prices (wages and prices for polluting and
non-polluting goods) are set such that each market clears.
Regulations lower productivity in the polluting sector of nonattainment counties, which
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will lower polluting sector wages in those counties. Marginal workers leave the polluting
sector, finding work either in the non-polluting sector of the nonattainment location or in
either sector of the attainment location. This will increase the sectoral labor supply in all
sectors, which will drive down the wage in those sectors (depending on the total increase in
labor supply and the labor demand elasticity of each sector).17,18 These effects suggest that
relative geographic comparisons will overstate changes in labor demand (i.e. double counting)
and understate wage declines in the regulated location. These will be important considerations
for interpreting the empirical estimates to follow, and I will present a series of tests speaking
to the relative importance of these spillovers in the context of the research design.
2.4 The Clean Air Act as a Research Design
The previous section highlighted the empirical challenges faced when estimating earnings
regressions separately for groups of workers who remain in a sector and groups of workers
who leave the sector, while also providing a straightforward solution – estimate the earnings
components jointly, not conditioning on job separation. One remaining empirical challenge is
that plant-level regulations are not randomly assigned. In addition, workers are not randomly
assigned to firms. Instead, firm and worker decisions are made to maximize their respective
objective functions. Wages vary tremendously across both firms and locations due to reasons
observed and unobserved to the econometrician. Moreover, this variation in the wage structure
is likely correlated with a firm’s status as a polluter. For example, polluting firms tend to
be both older and larger (Becker and Henderson 2000, Walker 2011a), and larger plants
tend to pay significant wage premia (Brown and Medoff 1989). Workers may also demand
some form of compensating wage differential associated with potentially harmful working
conditions. Therefore, a naive comparison of earnings in polluting and non-polluting firms of
17Since labor is relatively less expensive in the newly regulated sector, this could encourage new polluting
firms to enter nonattainment counties. However, EPA regulations explicitly prevent new polluting firms from
entering, so that all wage adjustment occurs through worker out-migration (rather than new firms entering).
18There may also be important general equilibrium spillovers pertaining to compositional changes in the
local labor market, workers’ bargaining power, and sectoral wage determination. See Beaudry, Green, and
Sand (2011) for recent evidence along these lines.
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nonattainment counties is likely to yield biased estimates. Credible estimates of the effects
of new environmental regulations requires the identification of a group of firms and workers
that are similar to those affected by the regulations in ways observable and unobservable to
the econometrician. The regulatory variation inherent in the design of the CAA provides a
solution to this identification problem.
Due to the way in which the CAA is implemented, regulations vary over both time and
space. Figure 2.1a shows counties in the United States that were in nonattainment for any
pollutant in 1991. Since only some counties are regulated in a given year, it is possible to
estimate models that include flexible controls for nationwide or industry-specific shocks to
employment and/or earnings such as the recession in the early 1990’s or the phase-in of the
North American Free Trade Act throughout the 1990’s. Temporal variation in regulations
exists from counties that go in and out of nonattainment based on annual pollution levels,
allowing for pre-post comparisons within counties, industries, plants, or workers. This means
that any time-invariant unobservables unique to these groups may be controlled for by includ-
ing a set of group-specific fixed effects while still controlling for nationwide trends as detailed
above. The inclusion of group-specific fixed effects ensures that estimates are derived only
from those sources that experience a change in the regulation - comparing outcomes before
and after the change.
A potential issue with time series variation in light of nonattainment designation is that
pollution is correlated with economic activity (Chay and Greenstone 2003c). Therefore, coun-
ties that switch into nonattainment in a given year may also be more economically vibrant.19
To address this issue, this study relies on the discrete policy change induced by the 1990
CAA Amendments. Since the EPA introduced a new pollutant class for PM-10, a group of
counties suddenly found themselves in nonattainment relative to the year prior. Figure 2.1b
plots only those counties that switched into nonattainment status in 1991, the first year that
the 1990 CAAA were adopted. The figure shows that a considerable number of counties were
newly regulated with the passage of the 1990 CAAA. Appendix Figure 2.8 shows that the
19Note that the direction of bias here is clear, and that this type of confounding variation would lead me to
understate the effects of the regulations.
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1990 CAAA led to the largest increase in newly regulated counties since 1978.
Lastly, within any nonattainment county, only polluting plants are regulated and only
if they emit the specific pollutant for which the county is in violation. Even within 2-digit
industry SIC codes, there is a considerable amount of variation in the fraction of plants that
are classified as polluters. Figure 2.2 plots the fraction of establishments in nonattainment
counties that are classified as a polluter by the EPA, split by 2-digit manufacturing SIC codes.
Since only the polluting firms within a given county-industry are regulated, it is possible to
control for unobservable, county-level economic trends.
All of these sources of variation amount to a research design which examines the earn-
ings outcomes of workers in polluting plants of newly regulated counties, before and after the
introduction of the plant level regulations - all while controlling for fixed, unobservable at-
tributes of these workers, national variation in the polluting/non-polluting sectors, and county
level trends. The following section details how observable characteristics of affected and non-
affected sectors may differ across these sources of regulatory variation while also informing
the choice of econometric model.
2.5 Data Overview and Description
This project relies upon the most detailed and comprehensive data currently available on
both local labor markets as well as the program components of the CAA. To understand the
wage costs of the regulations for both workers who remain in an industry and workers who
leave, we need longitudinal data both on workers and firms, as well as information detailing
which set of firms were subject to these regulations. I have obtained access to two new data
sources, heretofore not used to study the effects of local labor market shocks, that will be
briefly described below. Appendix 2.10.1 provides additional details.
The Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Files (LEHD) The primary
source of data used in this project comes from the Census Bureau’s LEHD file which provides
administrative, quarterly earnings records for a large percentage of the United States work-
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force.20 I observe the complete employment history and earnings profile for each worker in
the LEHD, conditional on the worker remaining within the reporting states over the course
of the sample. Since the administrative earnings records are based on firms’ reports that
are used to calculate tax liabilities they are presumably free of measurement error, compared
to existing survey data (Duncan and Hill 1985, Bound and Krueger 1991). The LEHD also
provides important demographic information on workers such as age, race, and education as
well as time-varying information from the firms at which they work. This provides a detailed
snapshot of local labor markets at any given point in time.
The entire LEHD file consists of over 2.8 billion quarterly earnings records. To limit the
computational burden of working with the complete file, I make some important sample re-
strictions. I begin by restricting the analysis to states in the LEHD that have data prior
to the 1991 implementation of the CAAA. This limits the analysis considerably, as the only
states that contain 1990 quarterly earnings are Illinois, Maryland, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. Appendix Table 2.7 compares aggregate characteristics of this sample to those from a
national sample. The counties in this study comprise 20 percent of the total polluting sector
employment share of counties newly regulated by the 1990 CAAA. When comparing newly
regulated counties that are both in and out of the sample (i.e. columns (5) and (6) of Ta-
ble 2.7) we see that the newly regulated counties from these 4 states are slightly wealthier
and have a slightly larger manufacturing base than the rest of the newly regulated counties.
These will be important distinctions to consider when extrapolating the earnings estimates
from this paper to the rest of counties affected by the 1990 CAAA.
I limit the sample to workers who worked in the manufacturing and electric/gas industries
(i.e. 2 digit SIC 20-39, 49) in 1990.21 This leaves me with a balanced panel of 3 million
workers in 1990 that I track over the course of their next 12 years irrespective of whether or
20The full LEHD file currently contains earnings records from over 30 states, with some states containing
records as far back as 1985. See Abowd, Stephens, Vilhuber, Andersson, McKinney, Roemer, and Woodcock
(2008) and McKinney and Vilhuber (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of both the construction and contents
of the LEHD files.
21These industries constitute over 90% of the total number of plants regulated by the EPA. While the
electric/gas industry is one of the largest polluting sectors in the United States, electric utilities are also
undergoing rapid restructuring over the sample period. I include this sector in the baseline sample while
noting that results are not sensitive to this choice.
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not they remain with their employer, transition outside of the manufacturing sector, or move
across state lines. Earnings are deflated by the national-level CPI with the base year index
as 1990.
While the LEHD data are incredibly detailed in some regards, they have several impor-
tant limitations that bear mention. As is true with most linked worker-firm administrative
datasets, it is not possible to distinguish between unemployment and non-participation.22
Moreover, the data do not allow the researcher to assess whether a missing earnings record is
due to unemployment/non-participation or whether the worker moved outside of the states
covered in the data. To reduce biases due to this type of selective sample attrition, I require
workers to have at least some positive earnings in a particular year to contribute to earnings
estimates. I explore the sensitivity of the results to reclassifying missing data in various ways
designed to bound the true value. See Appendix 2.10.1 for further details.
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) Since the LEHD contains earnings records
only as far back as 1990, and the CAA Amendments went into place in 1991, I draw upon
another administrative dataset from the Census Bureau to assess whether pre-CAAA trends
differ significantly across the main sources of identifying variation. The Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD) is a plant level database that covers the universe of establishments in the
United States from 1975-2005.23 Included in the database is annual information on employ-
ment, payroll, and firm age. The database also includes information on detailed industry,
location, and entry/exit years for the respective establishments. Thus, I can observe trends
in employment and earnings per worker before and after these changes for newly affected sec-
tors relative to unaffected sectors. The LBD also allows me to revisit the previous literature
pertaining to CAA regulation and sectoral employment (Greenstone 2002, Walker 2011a) to
see how sector size (as measured by employment) is related to variation in the regulations. I
limit the LBD sample to plants in the manufacturing industry (SIC 20-39), the electric/gas
industries (SIC 49), and plants residing in states covered by the LEHD sample.
22Using administrative data linked to survey data, Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006) find this distinction
not very important for men, but more so for women. Accordingly, I estimate robustness specifications using a
sample of only prime-age males 25-55.
23I only have access to the LBD from 1985-2005.
2.5. DATA OVERVIEW AND DESCRIPTION 33
EPA Air Facility Subsystem (AFS) I match both the LEHD and LBD to plant-level,
regulatory micro data from the EPA. The EPA’s AFS database is a plant level database that
provides information detailing the regulatory programs for which the plant is permitted (and
regulated) as well as the specific pollutants for which the permit is issued.24 An important
aspect of this project is the ability to observe plant level regulatory status over time. In doing
so, this project is the first to use the AFS data to examine the effects of plant level regula-
tory status on firm and worker outcomes.25 Using the Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical
Establishment List (SSEL), I am able to link the LEHD and LBD to plant-level regulatory
and permit data from the EPA’s Air Facility Subsystem (AFS) using a name and address
matching algorithm. The exact details of the matching algorithm as well as the match rates
are described in Appendix 2.10.1.
One limitation of the AFS data is that it does not provide any information as to when these
operating permits were issued. Fortunately, the regulatory structure of the CAA allows one to
infer the timing of the regulations based on the county nonattainment status. Specifically, I
define a plant as regulated if the plant has an operating permit in the AFS database and that
plant resides in a county that is in nonattainment for the specific pollutant on the permit.
This plant level definition of regulation is in contrast to previous research for which regulation
was proxied by 2- and 4-digit SIC-level national pollution estimates (Greenstone 2002, List,
Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone 2003, Becker 2005, Kahn and Mansur 2010, Greenstone,
List, and Syverson 2010). Lastly, I match the EPA’s annual county level nonattainment
designations to each dataset.
2.5.1 Aggregation
The linked worker-firm sample from the LEHD consists of a balanced panel of 3 million
workers for 12 years in the data so that the baseline sample consists of 36 million annual
earnings observations. For the baseline empirical analysis, I aggregate the data in two separate
24Note that these permits are simply operating permits that the EPA requires polluting plants obtain to
legally emit pollutants. These permits are unrelated to “cap and trade” permits from other pollution abatement
programs, in that they are non-tradable and are fixed for a particular source.
25In a companion paper, Walker (2011a) uses the AFS linked to the LBD to examine how CAA regulatory
status affects plant-level gross job flows.
34 CHAPTER 2. THE TRANSITIONAL COSTS OF SECTORAL REALLOCATION
ways. First, I compute the average earnings and employment in each county×sector×year in
order to see how aggregate sectoral employment and wages respond to changes in regulatory
status. Each county has two observations in a given year, one observation each for the
polluting sector and non-polluting sector of the manufacturing industry in that particular
county/year. Second, I compute the average “cohort” earnings by collapsing the micro data
to the cohort×year. Cohorts are defined by the county and sector of work in 1990. In
either model, collapsing the data eases the computational burden while also accounting for
issues pertaining to inference when the identifying variation occurs at a more aggregate level
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
A more subtle reason for aggregation in this particular context is due to biases induced
by selective attrition in log earnings models. I estimate log earnings regressions since I do
not have an accurate measure of the cost-adjusted, real wage for each labor market over time.
When estimating models using log earnings, any cohort-year in which all individuals are
unemployed will drop out of the regression sample (i.e. log(0) is undefined). Therefore, more
granular definitions of cohorts leads to selective attrition from the sample.26 Accordingly, I
aggregate to minimize this type of selective attrition. Estimates using more granular group
definitions yield similar results and are presented in subsequent sections.
2.5.2 Baseline Industry and Worker Characteristics
Table 2.1 presents characteristics of the data in terms of plant, worker, and sectoral charac-
teristics. The columns are indexed first by county (i.e. attainment, nonattainment, and those
that switch into nonattainment following the CAAA of 1990) and then by the polluting/non-
polluting sector. Since this table presents statistics only from 1990, the sample only consists of
the manufacturing sector. As workers move from their initial 1990 employer, gradually other
industries work their way into the analysis. When comparing polluting to non-polluting sec-
26Selective attrition is exacerbated by the dynamic nature of the estimation framework. In the distributed
lag models estimated in this project, if a cohort has zero earnings in any lagged year, the entire cohort drops
out in every year the zero earnings lagged variable remains in the model. These issues are dramatically reduced
by using more aggregate cohort definitions (i.e. county×sector). In the main specification, any worker with
missing earnings for a given year simply does not contribute to the cohort average in the year they are missing,
whereas in the case of models which replace non-employment with zero earnings, these workers will lower the
respective cohort average earnings in that year.
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tors in Panel A, it becomes immediately clear that polluting plants tend to be older and larger
than their non-polluting counterparts. This distinction becomes important when comparing
worker outcomes across these groups, as younger and smaller firms experience both faster
growth (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989) and tend to pay higher earnings conditional
on size (Schmieder 2010).
Turning to Panel B of Table 2.1, we see that workers in the polluting sector are paid con-
siderably more than their non-polluting counterparts. There are several reasons why workers
in the polluting sector may be paid more such as higher rates of unionization, compensating
wage differentials pertaining to worker health, and/or any skill differentials in the production
process. This last point can be see when comparing education across polluting/non-polluting
sectors. Workers in the polluting sector are, on average, older and more educated than their
non-polluting counterparts.
Table 2.1 highlights two of the major forms of selection that need to be accounted for in
any research design evaluating the differences in earnings profile across these groups. Younger
firms tend to pay higher wages, and they experience higher separation rates relative to their
older counterparts. In contrast, workers in the polluting sector tend to be older and more
educated, leading them to have higher earnings. The primary research design relies upon
within sector comparisons before and after the changes in regulatory status. Accordingly,
the main source of identifying variation comes from within Column 6 of Table 2.1, which
constitutes the polluting sector in counties that switched into nonattainment following the
CAAA of 1990. The exact details pertaining to estimation and identification are described in
the following section.
2.6 Measurement Framework
2.6.1 Estimation Setup: A Two Period Example
The estimation strategy is first illustrated in a two period example and then extended to
incorporate dynamics. There are three margins of variation inherent in this empirical frame-
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work: county nonattainment status (c ∈ Attain, Nonattain), polluter status (s ∈ Polluting,
Non-Polluting), and two time periods (τ ∈ Pre, Post). EPA regulations apply only to pollut-
ing firms in nonattainment counties after the nonattainment designation goes into place. Let
Nc be an indicator equal to 1 for counties that were newly designated as nonattainment. Let
Ps be an indicator for the polluting sector, and let 1(τt > 0) be an indicator for the years after
the introduction of the new regulations. Then Nc × Ps × 1(τt > 0) is an indicator equal to 1
for those sectors that change regulatory status with the introduction of the 1990 CAAA (i.e.
polluting sectors in newly designated nonattainment counties after the change in regulation).
This term will serve as the reduced form proxy corresponding to the regulations induced by
nonattainment designation in the econometric model described below.
Consider the data generating process for outcome Ycst (i.e. earnings and employment) in
the unregulated county-sectors
Ycst = ρcs + γt + nct + pst + cst
where ρcs are county×sector indicators meant to model time invariant observed or unobserved
characteristics that govern outcome Ycst; γt are year fixed effects to capture overall trends in
outcomes; nct is a vector of nonattainment×year effects to model aggregate shocks common
to nonattainment counties in a given year; and pst is a vector of polluting sector×year fixed
effects. The error, cst, represents unobserved county×sector shocks to outcomes that would
have occurred in the absence of treatment so that
E[cst | ρcs, γt, nct, pst] = 0.
The change in Ycst due to a change in a county×sector’s nonattainment designation may be
inferred from the coefficient on η1 in the equation below:
Ycst = η1[Nc × Ps × 1(τt > 0)] + ρcs + γt + nct + pst + cst (2.2)
where η1 represents the reduced-form effect of nonattainment designation on outcome Ycst.
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Equation (2.2) is simply a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator of the change in out-
come Ycst attributable to changes in nonattainment designation for polluting sectors. For
this estimate to be unbiased, outcome Ycst must depend additively on these unobserved fac-
tors. The identifying assumption is that there are no other factors generating a difference in
differential trends between production decisions in regulated and unregulated manufacturing
firms.
While the identifying assumption of these models is untestable, data from other time
periods and alternative specifications permit several indirect tests. First, data from years prior
to the change in regulations permit the analysis of trends in covariates and outcomes prior
to the change in policy. Second, since regulations in the polluting sector may lead to indirect
effects on workers outside the polluting sector, an alternative specification provides a test as
to the importance of these spillovers in contributing to bias in relative earnings comparisons.
Since nonattainment designation varies at the county level, models which estimate earnings
changes for all manufacturing workers in a county (i.e. workers in both the polluting and
non-polluting sector) will encompass both the direct regulatory induced wage effects as well
as any indirect local spillover effects in the unregulated manufacturing sector. This test is
given by the difference-in-difference estimator:
Yct = ηG[Nc × 1(τt > 0)] + ρc + γt + ct. (2.3)
This test relies on the assumption that employment spillovers are important within a county
but are not important across counties. Since the LEHD offers information on location and
industry of any subsequent jobs, it is possible to observe the magnitudes of within-county
versus across-county transitions, informing the strength of this assumption. If labor market
spillovers into other markets do not appreciably affect the wages in those sectors, either due
to inelastic labor demand or imperfectly competitive wage-setting, the estimate of equation
(2.3) should be exactly proportional to the size of the polluting sector in newly regulated
counties. That is, ηˆG from equation (2.3) should be equal to ηˆ1 from equation (2.2) times the
fraction of workers in the polluting sector of newly regulated counties.
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2.6.2 A Cohort-Based Approach
If labor markets are geographically integrated, fully competitive, and in continuous equilib-
rium, then all worker transitions are voluntary, and examining changes in average sectoral
earnings in this setting would be sufficient for estimating regulatory incidence. However, fric-
tions in the labor market and involuntary job transitions imply that industry earnings may
not fully characterize the effects of innovations in labor demand on the affected workforce.
Ex-post industry earnings may also be subject to composition biases from non-random worker
exits.
One possible solution to these issues is to follow the same group of workers over time,
explicitly observing both the earnings costs associated with reductions in average sectoral
productivity as well as any future earnings costs associated with transitions between jobs.
This is the approach taken in this paper. Specifically, I group workers based upon their
sector and location of work in the year prior to the 1990 CAA Amendments. I then follow
these groups over time, allowing workers to change both industries and locations while still
contributing to their “cohort’s” earnings. The cohort earnings then explicitly nests both
the earnings costs associated with reductions in sectoral productivity in the newly regulated
sector with any earnings costs associated with job transitions for workers who leave the sector.
Formally, I modify equation (2.2) to estimate changes in the cohort wage
Y˜cst =η1[N˜c × P˜s × 1(τt > 0)] + ρ˜cs + γt + n˜ct + p˜st + ˜cst (2.4)
where a tilde represents a cohort-specific variable, and the subscripts c and s correspond to
the original county and sector from which that cohort originated.
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2.6.3 Estimation Setup: Incorporating Dynamics








ηk1 [N˜c × P˜s × 1(τt = k)] + ρ˜cs + γt + n˜ct + p˜st + ˜cst (2.6)
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) are simply generalizations of a triple-difference estimator that allows
any regulatory effects to evolve over time as opposed to assuming that the effect occurs
immediately and lasts forever. Equation (2.5) examines the dynamic relationships between
regulatory changes, employment and sectoral earnings using data from the LBD for the years
1985-2000. Equation (2.6) explores how results differ when using cohort-specific outcomes
(i.e. earnings, job separation rates, and non-employment durations) using data from the
LEHD from for the years 1990-2000.27 These two equations serve as the principal econometric
framework for the rest of the empirical analysis.
A few final estimation details bear mention. First, estimates using the LBD (employment
and industry earnings) rely on samples for every year from τ = −5 to τ = 10, whereas
the LEHD samples (cohort earnings) are limited to work histories from τ = −1 to τ =
10. Because the LEHD begins in the year prior to the change in regulations, this is the
earliest period for which worker earnings records exist. Second, cluster-robust standard errors
are used for inference to account for correlation between sectors and cohorts in the same
county, both within periods and over time. Third, the specifications are weighted by the
sector or cohort employment size in the years before the change in regulations to account
for heteroskedasticity associated with differences in group sizes. The weighting specification
also ensures that estimates reflect the earnings costs for the average worker as opposed to the
27In theory, since nonattainment designations are pollutant-specific, it is possible to jointly estimate the
pollutant-specific effects of nonattainment status (Greenstone 2002). In practice, this is difficult due to the
dynamic nature of the estimation strategy and the large number of parameters for each pollutant class. Specif-
ically, for each pollutant there are 45 parameters to be estimated: the baseline triple difference parameters
(15), the polluter-by-year fixed effects for each pollutant (15), and the nonattainment-by-year fixed effects (15).
Degrees of freedom issues prevent this from being a viable econometric test, although models stratifying by
pollutant yield similar estimates to those produced in the baseline estimates below.
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average cohort/sector.28
2.7 Results
The results are presented in the various subsections below. I begin by examining employment
at the industry level (Section 2.7.1). This is done to motivate the baseline empirical framework
by first demonstrating that industry employment measures respond to changes in regulations.
Section 2.7.2 presents the central findings of the paper, consisting of the earnings responses of
workers in newly regulated sectors over time. Subsequent sections (Sections 2.7.3-2.7.7) offer
various robustness checks and explore both the mechanisms generating the observed earnings
change as well as heterogeneity in the central estimates.
2.7.1 Regulation Leads to a Reduction in Sectoral Employment
Previous literature has shown that the CAA regulations lead to industry downsizing (Henderson
1996, Greenstone 2002, Kahn and Mansur 2010, Walker 2011a). However, these estimates re-
flect earlier time periods and/or a different sample of states, and it is not clear how previous
results generalize into this particular setting. I begin by estimating the degree to which sec-
toral employment responds to changes in environmental regulations. The focus on sectoral
employment rather than plant employment is done so that regression estimates reflect em-
ployment flows on both the intensive and extensive plant operating margin.29 If reductions
in labor demand (and/or labor supply) are costly to the affected workforce, results from
this exercise should motivate the incidence analysis using workers’ earnings histories. I draw
upon the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to construct measures of average sectoral
employment for each county×sector from τ = −5 to τ = 10.
Figure 2.3 plots the coefficients from a version of equation (2.5) using log(employment) as
the dependent variable. Specifically, Figure 2.3a plots event time indicators (5 years before
28For samples using the LBD, the weights correspond to sectoral employment in year τ = −5. In samples
using the LEHD, the weights correspond to the size of cohort in year τ = −1.
29If a plant were to exit in any period τ ∈ [−5, 10], that plant would drop out of a plant level regression of
equation (2.5). Plant level models yield results similar to those presented here. See Walker (2011a) for further
plant level evidence.
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and 10 years after) for both the newly-regulated, polluting sector as well as sectors presumed
to be unaffected by the direct regulatory variation. The plotted coefficients represent the
time path of employment in each sector relative to the year before the change in regulations
conditional on county×sector fixed effects ρcs and year fixed effects γt. In the presence of
county×sector fixed effects not all the event-time indicators are identified. For this reason, I
normalize the coefficient on indicators in τ = −1 to be equal to zero. Figure 2.3b plots the
difference between the solid line and dashed lines in Figure 2.3a, which corresponds to the
“triple-difference” coefficient estimates from equation (2.5).30
There are two important features from Figure 2.3. First, employment in years prior to the
change in regulations is nearly constant and not significantly different from zero. The lack of
significant employment effects in the years prior to the change in policy provide an important
test as to the validity of the identifying assumption; trends in outcomes across comparison
groups evolve smoothly except through the change in policy. The second important feature of
Figure 2.3 is that beginning with the year of the regulatory change, employment of polluting
sectors in newly regulated counties begins to fall, reaching levels nearly 10 percent below
1990 employment levels in the 5 years after the regulatory change (or 15 percent below the
counterfactual employment trends).31 The magnitudes and dynamics of the estimates are
similar to those of Walker (2011a), which uses the same dataset for the entire United States
rather than this restricted subsample. See Walker (2011a) for further discussion of these
results as they pertain to plant and sectoral job destruction and job creation rates.
2.7.2 The Wage Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from Cohorts
Previous research and the conceptual framework suggest that industry wages are not sufficient
for characterizing the incidence of labor market reallocations for two reasons: (i) composition
biases may affect average industry wage measures, and (ii) changes in wages do not reflect
30Specifically, Figure 2.3b plots the ηˆk1 coefficient estimates from equation (2.5) after controlling for
county×sector, polluting-sector×year, nonattainment×year, and year fixed effects.
31An auxiliary test of the slopes in Figure 2.3, before and after regulation, rejects the null of equal slope
with a p value of 0.03.
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the costs born by those workers who switch sectors. Here, I present the results using cohort
earnings, where cohorts are defined by the place of work in year τ = −1. By following the
same group of workers over time before and after the changes in regulations, the composition
of the workforce remains constant and any future earnings losses (or gains) associated with
job transitions are incorporated into the earnings measure.
Table 2.2 presents the central findings of the paper using cohort earnings as the dependent
variable in various versions of equation (2.6). Each column in the table corresponds to a
different regression. Columns (1)-(4) report exponentiated coefficients from equation (2.6)
using the translation exp(ηk1 − 1). Column (1) suggests that new environmental regulations
lead to a reduction in earnings for the cohort affected by the regulations. The earnings
decrease steadily over time, beginning to level off after three years, at which point they begin
to recover to their pre-regulation level. The last row of Table 2.2 presents estimates of the
total present discounted value of the earnings change over the 9 reported years, discounting
the future earnings changes using a 4 percent annual discount rate.32 After 9 years the average
worker in the affected cohort experienced a present discounted earnings loss of around 26.1
percent of their pre-regulatory earnings. Note that these estimates do not condition on job
separation and thus are a weighted average of earnings changes for those workers who leave
the sector and those workers who stay.
Column (2) of Table 2.2 includes controls for the average experience of the cohort in a
given year.33 While including cohort fixed effects will control for mean differences in earnings
across these sectors, they do not account for differences in the growth rate of earnings across
the various groups. Thus, a linear and quadratic term in potential experience is meant to
capture some of this heterogeneity across cohort earnings profiles in the spirit of Mincer (1974).
Controlling for average cohort experience reduces the size of the estimated effect slightly, but
the 9 year present discounted value still exceeds 22 percent of pre-period earnings. Column (3)
adds a common trend for earnings in each cohort county.34 Here, estimates are identified by
32Specifically, this is calculated as
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 ) − 1), where βk is the discount factor corresponding to
a 4 percent annual discount rate.
33Sectoral experience is proxied by “potential experience” which is defined here as: average sectoral age -
average sectoral education - 6.
34Recall that cohorts are defined by the 1990 county×sector. Thus, the “county trend” in Table 2.2 corre-
2.7. RESULTS 43
comparing earnings changes before and after the policy, after netting out any earnings trends
common to both the polluting and non-polluting sector of a given “county cohort”. The results
remain very similar the estimates from column (2). Column (4) includes county×year fixed
effects, so that the identifying variation comes from pairwise comparisons of cohort earnings
for workers who were in either the polluting or non-polluting sector of a newly regulated
county in the years before the policy. These estimates tend to be smaller than the estimates
in columns (1)-(3), which may be driven by local spillovers or through measurement error
and the resulting attenuation bias from a misspecified regulatory variable. The issue of local
spillovers will be addressed in subsequent sections.
Column (5) of Table 2.2 presents estimates where the dependent variable has been replaced
with the average cohort earnings (as opposed to log earnings), and the results are similar to
both columns (2) and (3). The present discounted earnings loss amounts to $8477, which is
22 percent of the average earnings for workers in the polluting sector of switching counties
(i.e. Column 6 of Table 2.1). Lastly, Column (6) presents estimates from models that re-
place any missing earnings observations with zeros. Recall that the baseline estimates ignore
any missing annual earnings when calculating the average cohort earnings (i.e. up to three
quarterly earnings can be missing per year). Since missing earnings may occur through either
unemployment or sample attrition, it is not a priori clear how to address such an issue.35 To
understand the implications of missing earnings in my data, I replace any annual earnings
data that is missing with a zero, conditional on that worker having positive earnings in the
final year of the data. In theory, this should serve as a lower bound on earnings estimates as
we are attributing all sample attrition to unemployment rather than other worker transitions
(such as moving to non LEHD states or switching into self-employment).
Appendix Table 2.8 presents results using two alternative earnings measures. The first
measure (columns (1)-(2)) replaces any missing earnings in a worker’s earnings history with
their last observed earnings. In contrast to filling missing earnings observations with zero,
these results should serve as a useful upper bound on the absolute magnitude of the earnings
sponds to a trend for each 1990 “county cohort”.
35This issue is not unique to this paper, and other papers have dealt with these limitations in similar fashions.
See e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
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losses. The estimates are indeed smaller in magnitude than those from Table 2.2, but earnings
losses still remain more than 19 percent of the pre-regulatory earnings. Columns (3)-(4)
present results from a sample that consists only of workers that had non-missing earnings
observations in every year of the sample. This selection criteria mimics that employed by
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) in their seminal paper on mass layoffs and the cost
of job loss. This selection criteria results in a different sample of workers, but the results
remain fairly similar. The main difference between this sample and the baseline sample is
that it excludes cohorts for which all workers were unemployed for at least one year in the
data. This selective attrition occurs primarily for small cohort sizes (i.e. rural areas) and is
reflected in the heterogeneity of the estimates.36
The average present discounted earnings loss estimate from Table 2.2 is around 23 percent
of 1990 earnings. Multiplying this number by the average annual earnings in that sector
(≈$39,000) and then by the total number of employees in the polluting sector of all “switching”
counties in the United States (approximately 1 million workers),37 the total foregone wage
bill is approximately 9 billion dollars.
To facilitate interpretation, Figures 2.4a and 2.4b present graphical estimates of equa-
tion (2.6). Specifically, the plotted coefficients in Figure 2.4a are coefficient estimates from a
single regression of cohort earnings against event time indicators for various cohorts of work-
ers. Regression estimates control for cohort fixed effects and year fixed effects. The solid
line represents the time path of earnings for workers in the newly-regulated, polluting sector,
whereas the dashed lines represent the various counterfactual earnings profiles of either pol-
luting sector workers in unaffected counties or non-polluting sector workers in newly regulated
counties. Figure 2.4b corresponds to the regression estimates in Table 2.2, which are implic-
itly identified by taking the difference between the solid line and dashed lines in Figure 2.4a.
The results in both figures show the earnings profile of workers in the newly regulated sector
falling in the years after the policy change, only beginning to recover after 3-4 years.
36For example, the earnings recovery is more rapid for workers in thicker, urban labor markets reflected in
the more rapid earnings recovery in both columns (3) and (4). In addition, the cost of living in more urban
areas is also higher, which is reflected in the larger levels estimates from column (4)).
37This last statistic comes from Table 1 of Walker (2011a).
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2.7.3 Heterogeneity and Robustness of Cohort Wage Estimates
Cohort Earnings Heterogeneity
Appendix Table 2.9 explores heterogeneity in the baseline estimates for different subgroups
of workers and firms. Each cell in the table consists of a different regression estimate from
a different sample, where the regression estimates represent the present discounted value
earnings change over the 9 year horizon. Panel A begins by showing heterogeneity in earnings
losses for different age groups of workers, defined by their pre-regulatory, 1990 ages. Column
(1) explores earnings losses for prime-age male workers, defined as male-workers aged 25-55
in 1990. Results remain very similar in magnitude to the baseline estimates. Columns (2),
(3), and (4) show that younger workers generally fair much better than older workers, which
is consistent with the earnings loss findings in the job-displacement literature (Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). This is likely driven
by the fact that older workers tend to have longer job tenure in pre-regulatory jobs, which
can lead to larger long-term earnings losses (Kletzer 1989, Neal 1995).
Panel B explores heterogeneity by sex, showing that female workers experience much larger
earnings losses as a percentage of pre-regulatory income. The larger earnings losses as a per-
centage of income for women are consistent with earnings losses from job displacement found
in von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2009). Panel C of Appendix Table 2.9 shows that
workers who have earnings above the average earnings of their pre-regulatory firm experience
larger earnings losses. This is likely driven by the same mechanism in Panel A; workers with
above average earnings tend to be those who are most senior and have longer job-tenure prior
to the regulation.
Panels D and E of Appendix Table 2.9 look at heterogeneity in earnings losses based on
the pre-regulatory plant at which the worker worked. Panel D shows that workers in low-
wage plants experienced larger earnings losses relative to workers in high-wage plants. Panel
E suggests that the largest earnings losses come from workers in larger plants, relative to
smaller plants. This latter result, that earnings losses are larger in larger plants, is consistent
with evidence from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Von Wachter and Bender
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(2006), who show that workers displaced from larger firms tend to have larger earnings losses.
Non-attainment Designation and Threshold Counties
Since county level nonattainment is non-linear in the level of pollution, it is possible to esti-
mate models that exploit this non-linearity. Namely, counties that were near to the ambient
air pollution, regulatory threshold in the years prior to the policy were not certain ex-ante
as to whether the proposed regulations would apply in their county. Therefore, any antici-
patory action on the part of the regulator or the firm in the years prior to the regulations
is less likely to bias estimates for these threshold counties. In practice, the relatively few
number of counties in the four states of this analysis preclude a formal treatment of a re-
gression discontinuity design. Instead, I adopt the approach taken in Chay and Greenstone
(2005a) and restrict the sample to counties that are 1 standard deviation above and below
the nonattainment threshold. Appendix Figure 2.10 presents the earnings estimates for co-
horts originating in counties one standard deviation above and below the EPA’s ambient air
pollution, nonattainment threshold for particulate matter. The dashed line corresponds to
the “threshold county” estimates, whereas the solid line plots the baseline cohort earnings
estimates for comparison (from Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4). This “threshold-county” sample
restriction reduces the sample size by 85 percent, but the results remain similar both in terms
of magnitude and dynamics. However, the results lose statistical precision.
Granular Cohort Models: County×Polluter×Industry Definitions
As Figure 2.2 suggests, only a fraction of plants within a given 2-digit SIC code are clas-
sified by the EPA as polluters. This suggests that within newly regulated counties, only
a fraction of a particular industry is subject to the regulation. In order to explore this
within county×industry heterogeneity I estimate models for which cohorts are defined by the
county×sector×2-digit-SIC of work in 1990, where sector is again defined as “polluting” or
“non-polluting”.
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ηk1 [N˜c × P˜s × 1(τt = k)] + ρ˜cs + γt + n˜ct + p˜st + θ˜cjt + ˜cjst (2.7)
where θ˜cjt controls for unobserved heterogeneity in earnings at the county×2-digit industry
level. Appendix Table 2.10 presents different estimates from Equation (2.6) where θ˜cjt is
either omitted, included as a time-invariant county×2-digit-SIC fixed effect, or included as a
county×2-digit-SIC×year fixed effect. Estimates from the latter model are identified off of
pairwise comparisons of earnings within county×2-digit industries for workers in the polluting
sector relative to those of the non-polluting sector in the same year. Thus, the regression model
is robust to unobserved, county-by-industry specific shocks that affect workers in the same
industry of the same county similarly.
Column (1) of Appendix Table 2.10 presents baseline estimates without county×industry
controls that corresponds to the baseline regression estimates from Column (2) of Table 2.2. As
would be expected, the results are nearly identical to before, as the only change in specification
has been the level of aggregation. Column (2) includes county×2-digit-SIC controls, and the
results become slightly larger in magnitude. Lastly, Column (3) includes county×2-digit-
SIC×year fixed effects, which reduces the point estimate only slightly. Note, however, that
the sample size drops dramatically, as the number of newly-regulated counties that have
both polluting and non-polluting firms within the same industry is limited. Neither the level
of disaggregation nor unobserved county×industry heterogeneity affect the baseline earnings
estimates.
“Local” General Equilibrium Effects
Any major shift in the sectoral labor supply or demand curves is likely to influence other
sectors within the same local labor market. Assuming that polluting sector workers are
substitutes across sectors, any workers leaving the polluting sector will increase the potential
labor supply of the unregulated sector within that county. If wages are set on a downward
sloping demand curve, this increase in the labor supply will drive down the equilibrium wage
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in that sector. Therefore, relative wage comparisons across these groups may understate the
total wage costs.
To get a sense of the empirical magnitude of such effects, first consider the following
back-of-the-envelope calculation. Manufacturing accounts for about 15 percent of non-farm
employment in the United States, and the polluting sector accounts for a 35 percent share
of the manufacturing industry in newly-regulated counties. The employment estimates from
Section 2.7.1 and Figure 2.3 suggest that employment in newly-regulated sectors falls by
around 15 percent in the 5 years after the policy change. This amounts to 0.7 percent of the
total employment in newly regulated counties. Using a labor demand elasticity of 0.5, the
implied general equilibrium effect of a 0.7 percent increase in the labor supply would be a
0.35 percent decrease in equilibrium wages for workers in the non-polluting sector of newly
regulated counties. This assumes that polluting sector workers are perfect substitutes in all
other sectors of the county. Conversely, the other extreme case would occur where workers
from the polluting sector transitioned only to the non-polluting manufacturing sector since
they may share similar skills. In this case, the same calculation suggests that a reduction
in labor demand in the polluting sector would increase labor supply for the non-polluting
sector of the manufacturing industry by 8 percent. This would translate into a 4 percent
reduction in the equilibrium wages of workers in the non-polluting sector. These two extreme
assumptions serve as ex-ante bounds on the importance of local general equilibrium spillovers
in the context of the research design.
Alternatively, equation (2.3) from Section 2.6.1 offers a straightforward test as to the
empirical magnitude of any general equilibrium bias present in within-county earnings esti-
mates.38 Table 2.3 presents results from a dynamic version of equation (2.3) which suggests
that the average worker in the manufacturing industry of a county that switched regulatory
status experienced a 9.1 percent (discounted) reduction in earnings in the 9 years after the
38Instead of the baseline triple-difference estimator from before, I use a difference-in-differences estimator
to look at variation in county earnings profiles of all manufacturing workers over time. The model then
delivers estimates of the average change in earnings for workers in the manufacturing industry of a county that
switched into nonattainment with the introduction of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. If a reduction
in labor demand in the polluting sector drives down the equilibrium wage in the non-polluting sector of the
same county, then estimates focusing on across-county variation rather than within-county variation will be
attenuated by these “local” general equilibrium wage effects.
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policy change. This consists of the direct earnings effects of workers in the polluting sector
and the indirect effects on workers in the non-polluting sector. If there are no general equi-
librium wage effects in other sectors then these estimates should be directly proportional to







The polluting sector accounts for approximately 35 percent of the manufacturing industry in
newly regulated counties, which implies that the right hand side of equation (2.8) is equal
to -8.1 percent. This implies that earnings fell by 0.95 percent in the non-polluting sector
of the manufacturing industry for newly regulated counties.39 This empirical test relies on
the assumption that within-county spillovers are of greater empirical importance than across-
county spillovers, but it suggests that the empirical magnitude of these spillovers are small.
2.7.4 Mechanisms: Regulation Increases the Rate of Separations
Presumably, the change in earnings is related to both reductions in sectoral productivity
and/or costly job transitions. The subsequent empirical sections attempt to shed light on the
mechanisms by which these changes occur, examining gross job flows and earnings changes
associated with various labor market transitions.
Since sectoral employment from the LBD only measures net changes in employment, I turn
to the LEHD data to estimate the degree to which changes in environmental regulations lead
to excess labor reallocation in the years following the policy.40 I begin by examining the rate
39To see this formally, denote the difference-in-difference earnings estimate for workers in the polluting sector
of a newly regulated county as Pˆ . Denote the difference-in-difference earnings estimate for workers in the non-
polluting sector of a newly regulated county as Nˆ . The empirical estimate of ηˆG is a combination of these two
terms:
ηˆG = (sp × Pˆ ) + (sn × Nˆ)
where sp and sn reflect the shares of workers in each of these sectors (i.e. sn + sp = 1). Assuming that any
across-county wage spillovers are zero, then a triple difference estimate of the earnings impact of regulations
on polluting sector is given by ηˆ1 = Pˆ − Nˆ . This implies that
Nˆ = ηˆG − (sp × ηˆ1) = −0.09− (0.35×−0.23) = −0.0095
40The employment results from Section 2.7.1 suggest that some of the earnings changes are associated with
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of separation from a worker’s “base-year” employer, and thus the following discussion parallels
that of duration analysis, where a failure in this model is defined by a separation from the
“base-year” firm.41 Separation rates for a cohort are calculated at the county×sector level as
the number of “base-year” firm separations in a cohort-year over the total number of workers
in that cohort that remain at their pre-regulatory establishment. The data is constructed so
that workers contribute to the cohort-year observation for every year they remain with their
“1990” plant. The risk set evolves over time as workers leave their 1990 plant.
The empirical analysis estimates how this failure rate changes as a function of the new
environmental regulations. The regression framework is the same as used in equation (2.6),
where the dependent variable is the failure rate for workers remaining at their 1990 “pre-
regulation” firm. Given the definition of a job separation, there are a positive number of
separations in the “base-year”. The baseline estimates then measure the differences in the
failure rate as a function of the change in regulatory status. Figure 2.5 plots estimates of the
ηk1 ’s from equation (2.6), which corresponds to the difference in the failure rate for the newly
regulated sector relative to the year prior to the nonattainment designation. Accompanying
Figure 2.5 is a bar graph representing the fraction of workers in polluting plants of newly
designated nonattainment counties that remain in their 1990 firm t years after the CAA
Amendments (i.e. the Kaplan-Meier survival probability). The figure shows that the rate
of separation increases for the newly regulated cohort in the years following the regulations.
After 4 years, the failure rate begins to peak, and after 8 years it is nearly back to the baseline
level. Similar to the sectoral employment regressions from before, the estimates here suggest
that the changes in regulations lead to a relative reallocation of labor away from the newly
regulated sector.
reductions in labor demand. However, this tells us little about whether reductions in labor demand cause
earnings to fall from the standpoint of reducing the equilibrium wage in the newly regulated sector or by
causing costly job transitions from that sector.
41A job separation is defined as equaling one in period t if earnings > 0 at plant j in period t and either
earnings=0 in period t+ 1 or plantj1990t 6= plantj1990t+1
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2.7.5 Regulation Increases the Incidence of Non-Employment Between Jobs
Alternatively, we can directly estimate the duration between jobs by looking at the average
incidence of non-employment for a cohort as a function of changes in regulatory stringency.
Non-employment is defined as the number of quarters for which a worker has missing earnings
in a given year, bounded below by 0 and above by 4. Appendix Table 2.11 summarizes the
results from a regression using the average quarters of nonemployment as a dependent variable
in equation (2.6). While the temporal dynamics match those from the earnings estimates and
the separation hazards presented above, the results are only marginally significantly different
from zero. Taken literally, however, the estimates suggest that the average duration of non-
employment increased by 0.35 quarters following the introduction of the regulations. Using
this result, we can calculate the earnings loss attributable to non-employment versus earnings
losses attributable to future employment at lower wages. This exercise should be interpreted
as more speculative since the earnings in periods before and after non-employment may also
be lower due to a reduction in the total amount of time spent working in the respective
quarters. Even so, these estimates suggest that about 38% of the observed earnings changes
are driven by non-employment.42
2.7.6 Effects of Regulations for “Stayers” and “Leavers”
While the temporal dynamics from job separations and non-employment incidence parallel
those from the cohort earnings (i.e. Figure 2.4b), it is still not clear what proportion of the
observed change in earnings is explained by costly job transitions relative to reductions in
sectoral productivity. Here, I examine earnings changes for workers that remain with their
initial employer and for workers who separate from their initial employer. As the motivating
example in Section 2.3 suggests, these groups may be self-selected based on sector-specific
ability. However, the form of selection has relatively clear predictions for the direction of bias
in each of the regressions that I will highlight below. To address the issue of selection bias
42The observed increase in non-employment is around 0.35 quarters (i.e. approximately 1 month in a year).
Using the average annual earnings in the polluting sector of counties that switch nonattainment (i.e. Column
(6) of Table 2.1), this amounts to $3250 in foregone earnings. This is 38% of the estimated total earnings loss
in Column (4) of Table 2.2.
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explicitly, I look at wage changes for only the “stayers” and only the “leavers” in separate
models. This allows the inclusion of group-specific fixed effects to isolate the source of iden-
tifying variation to come from within each of these groups, before and after the change in
policy. By including group-specific fixed effects, the regression model implicitly controls for
any time-invariant unobservable characteristics of these “stayers” or “leavers”.43
I stratify the treatment group based on whether the worker stayed with their firm or sepa-
rated at some point within the first 4 years after the regulations.44 In each specification, I de-
compose the earnings for the affected cohort only. That is, the earnings of the various control
group cohorts remain the same as in the previous section, while the newly regulated sector’s
earnings consists only of “stayers” or only of “leavers”, depending upon the specification.45
Column (1) of Table 2.4 presents results from a version of equation (2.6) where I compare
earnings trends in earnings of the affected cohort only if they remain at their “base-year” firm
for more than 4 years after the change in regulations (i.e. they remain at their firm for at least
the years τ ∈ [0, 4]). The results from column (1) suggest that the earnings of “stayers” are
essentially unaffected by the regulatory change. This finding of zero wage response for those
who remain at their firm is consistent with previous literature examining wage responses to
labor market shocks in the manufacturing industry (Blanchard and Katz 1992, Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson 2011, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips 2011). This result is also con-
sistent with industry-level earnings responses. Appendix Figure 2.9 plots the average earnings
per worker in the newly-regulated, polluting sector before and after the change in regulations
using data from the LBD. The figure shows no significant industry earnings response to regu-
latory changes. While previous research often cites composition bias as one potential reason
behind this zero result, the results in Table 2.4 suggest that composition bias is not the answer
(since the composition is constant by construction). One explanation for these results is that
union wages are often set in multi-year contracts, making manufacturing wages less sensitive
43This is equivalent to the identifying assumption in the large literature on the cost of job loss stemming
from mass layoffs (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009).
44The choice of focusing on workers with separations within 4 years is somewhat arbitrary. However, the
results are not sensitive to this cutoff.
45An alternative comparison that gets around this form of selection bias is to compare the earnings of stayers
to that of stayers in other sectors. Results (not reported) are consistent with those shown here.
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to external shocks in the short/medium run (Lewis 1963).
Column (2) of Table 2.4 presents the same model as above, except that I examine earnings
changes for those who separate from their “base-year” firm in the 4 years after the change
in regulations. Here we see much larger earnings changes that are all statistically significant.
The pattern of the estimates suggests that the average earnings declines rapidly in the years
following the change in regulations, and they begin to recover only in the later years. The
present discounted earnings change for separators is more than 130 percent of their pre-
regulatory, annual earnings.46
In general, the earnings loss attributable to job separations in this context is smaller than
estimates found in the literature on displacement induced by mass layoffs (Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). Notably, the earnings recovery
of the average worker in this setting is more rapid than that found in the displacement liter-
ature. There are a few possible explanations for these discrepancies. First, it seems possible
that the rapid earnings recovery comes from the fact that most of these regulations occur
in dense, urban labor markets. Workers are likely able to re-integrate themselves into the
workforce more quickly in these “thicker” labor markets than elsewhere where alternative
job options are limited (Marshall 1920). Second, it is possible that some of the job tran-
sitions I observe are voluntary, job-to-job transitions for which workers often experience a
rise in earnings (Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer forthcoming). In contrast,
the job transitions from mass layoffs are often characterized by involuntary job loss and pro-
longed unemployment durations (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, Davis, Faberman,
and Haltiwanger 2006, von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). Third, the rapid earnings
recovery may be unique to this setting, stemming from the high-pressure labor market in the
mid to late 1990’s (Katz, Krueger, Burtless, and Dickens 1999). Lastly, an alternative ex-
planation for this relatively quick recovery comes from the difference in research designs and
46Another estimate of the average cost of job transitions comes from “scaling” the baseline cohort earnings
regressions (i.e. column (3) in Table 2.2) by the number of workers we see transitioning out of that sector (i.e.
figure 2.3). The average sectoral earnings loss for a cohort from Table 2.2 is around 23 percent. Estimates from
figure 2.3 suggest a more than 15 percent reduction in the sectoral workforce in the 5 years after the policy.
This suggests that the average earnings loss for a worker who loses his/her job because of the policy shock is
around 150 percent of their 1990 earnings. This is consistent with what we see for those who separate from
his/her job in column (2) of Table 2.4.
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research questions. Namely, the long run implications from job loss for those who were af-
fected by mass layoffs may be fundamentally different from those affected by the more gradual
sectoral changes that we see in this setting.
2.7.7 Sectoral Transition Rates and the Wage Costs of Labor Reallocation
The ability to follow workers over their employment histories allows for decompositions of
worker transitions based on destination sectors. This offers some degree of insight as to how
workers respond to sector-specific shocks of this nature. Similar to before, I estimate how the
“failure rate” responds to changes in regulations, where a failure is defined as a job separation
from the “base-year” firm to a specific location and/or industry. Figure 2.6 presents these
estimates for workers who transition to a different industry in a different county (panel 2.6a),
the same industry in the same county (panel 2.6b), a different industry in the same county
(panel 2.6c), and the same industry in a different county (panel 2.6d). The figures suggest that
workers in newly regulated sectors are disproportionately more likely to exit to a completely
different industry after the regulations, relative to before. Furthermore, workers are more
likely to transition to a different industry within the same county.
There is considerable heterogeneity in earnings estimates based on this same set of des-
tination industry-locations. I decompose the earnings effects of separators (i.e. column (2)
of Table 2.4) based on the location and sector where workers in the newly regulated sec-
tor find their subsequent job. The estimates suggest that the earnings changes for work-
ers who stay within the same industry and the same county (column (3) of Table 2.4)
are significantly less than for those workers that change industries (even within the same
county - i.e. column (4) of Table 2.4). This is consistent with previous literature suggest-
ing a role for industry-specific human capital as a barrier to job mobility (Podgursky and
Swaim 1987, Topel 1991, Neal 1995, Parent 2000, Poletaev and Robinson 2008). Of course,
these earnings losses also reflect losses due to non-employment between jobs that may also
be higher for workers who switch industries (Murphy and Topel 1987). Figure 2.7 displays
the estimates from columns (3)-(6), summarizing the dynamics and incidence by destination
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sectors.
2.8 Interpretation and Discussion
2.8.1 The Economic Costs of Sectoral Reallocation
If workers are paid their marginal product and firms earn zero profits, then all earnings
losses are social costs, and the estimates allow for simple approximations of the welfare costs
pertaining to policy-induced job reallocation. Throughout, I have made several simplifying
assumptions: utility is linear in earnings, workers do not value leisure, and there are no
government transfers in the form of unemployment insurance. Under these assumptions, the
total foregone wage bill associated with industry reallocation represents the welfare costs to
workers.
These are obviously strong assumptions, but they also provide a useful benchmark for
assessing the degree to which the estimates presented here serve as upper or lower bounds
on the true reallocative incidence. For example, if individuals have concave utility and are
liquidity constrained then the welfare losses from unemployment might be much larger than
what is implied by mean earnings losses. If workers value leisure, these estimates will overstate
the welfare costs to workers.
In terms of aggregate welfare and the social costs of workforce reallocation, it is important
to realize that, in the United States, workers are often compensated for involuntary job loss
in the form of unemployment insurance (UI).47 In this case, UI primarily reflects income
redistribution among citizens via taxation and transfers and should not be treated as an
economic loss, except through the shadow cost of public funds or the deadweight loss of
taxation. Consider the following thought experiment pertaining to UI payments in the context
of this particular setting.48 Average UI payments consist of 20 weeks of compensation at 50%
replacement. Assuming that 150,000 jobs were lost (based on a 15% reduction in sectoral
47Displaced workers may also receive other forms of social assistance such as Social Security Disability
Insurance and other forms of government transfers not considered in the following thought experiment.
48Social insurance programs such as UI generally redistribute income from those with low marginal utility
of income to those with high marginal utility of income. In this simplified, linear-utility setting, the marginal
utility of income is constant and thus the following discussion is simply descriptive.
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employment multiplied by the number of workers in the polluting sector of newly regulated
counties), this implies an increase in UI payments of approximately $1.2 billion.49 Then using
an estimate of 40% for the deadweight loss of taxation from Gruber (2010), the economic
costs associated with this increase in UI payments amounts to $480 million. In such a case,
the total economic loss to society associated with CAAA-induced labor reallocation amounts
to $9.48 billion.50
2.8.2 Costs Relative to Benefits and Policy Prescriptions
The EPA estimates the present discounted value (in terms of health benefits) of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments from 1990-2010 to be between 160 billion and 1.6 trillion dollars
(1990$) (Environmental Protection Agency 1999).51 The lower bound estimate is similar to
the estimated benefits from various hedonic studies which estimate marginal willingness to pay
for improvements in air quality (see e.g. Chay and Greenstone (2005a) and Bayer, Keohane,
and Timmins (2009)). In light of these benefits, the transitional costs of worker reallocation
are relatively small. In addition, there are reasons to believe the estimates presented in this
paper serve as an upper bound on the labor market costs of environmental regulations to
workers; namely I have attributed zero value to leisure and the costs of job loss in the early
1990’s may be larger than earnings losses in more expansionary time periods.52
Obviously, there are many more economic costs associated with the regulations, notably
plant productivity effects (Greenstone, List, and Syverson 2010), losses to foreign direct in-
vestment (Hanna 2010), as well as any adjustment costs associated with reallocating the
capital stock (Goolsbee and Gross 1997, Ramey and Shapiro 2001).53 While the results here
49This number is calculated by multiplying average earnings ($39,000) by the 50% replacement rate for 20
weeks and then times the reduction in employment in the newly regulated sector.
50This is calculated as the total foregone wage bill + deadweight loss of taxation associated with UI transfers.
This calculation stems from a linear utility assumption (i.e. workers have constant marginal utility of income).
In an economy where income is redistributed from individuals with low marginal utility of income to individuals
with high marginal utility of income the social value of UI may be positive.
51Note that these estimates do not include the estimated benefits from the SO2 trading markets, which are
not analyzed in this study.
52See Davis and von Wachter (forthcoming) for recent evidence of the cost of job loss over the business cycle.
That long-term
53While both Goolsbee and Gross (1997) and Ramey and Shapiro (2001) look at the adjustment costs of
capital, these studies do not consider capital adjustment costs in the context of environmental regulation.
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suggest that the adjustment costs in terms of labor reallocation are relatively small in mag-
nitude compared to the estimated benefits of the policy, workers in these industries are still
adversely affected. Accordingly, the EPA included a component of transition assistance in the
1990 CAAA under the Clean Air Employment Transition Assistance Program administered
by the Department of Labor. This program was designed to aid workers who were displaced
by environmental regulations and was allocated $50 million for the 1990 CAAA. Estimates
here suggest this program was severely underfunded in terms of compensating workers for any
earnings losses pertaining to regulatory induced reallocation.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, the estimates document that the real-
locative costs of environmental policy in the context of worker outcomes is significant. The
average worker in a newly regulated plant experiences a present discounted earnings loss of
around 23% of their pre-regulatory earnings. In aggregate, this amounts to almost $9 billion
in foregone earnings. Prior research on the labor market impacts of environmental regulation
has primarily focused on employment losses in manufacturing industries, without regard for
how quickly and at what costs workers are reallocated back into the labor market. The results
presented here suggest that the predominant focus of the previous literature on employment
misses important aspects of labor market adjustment to environmental regulations.
The findings in this paper have important policy implications both for worker compensa-
tion in the context of environmental regulations and also more generally in terms of labor mar-
ket adjustment. The results suggest that firms respond to environmental regulations; costly
job transitions from the perspective of the workforce are a consequence of this response. The
magnitude of these estimates calls into question the amount of transition assistance allocated
under the CAA Amendments of 1990, which was more than two orders of magnitude below
what would be needed to fully compensate the affected workforce.
However, this research suggests that these costs may be significant in the context of environmental regulations
and suggest an interesting area for future research.
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Second, the estimates shed light on how both firms and workers respond to gradual changes
in regulatory stringency. Aggregate employment falls in affected sectors, but the wages for
workers who remain at the firm do not. Instead, most of the costs of reallocation occur through
costly job transitions associated with sectoral downsizing. Job transitions occur mostly from
the regulated sector to other industries within the same labor market rather than across labor
markets. These findings highlight the importance of longitudinal data for characterizing the
costs and consequences of labor market adjustment.
Third, this paper offers a new approach to understanding the costs and consequences
of labor market shocks in an economy where labor is not instantly reallocated and average
industry wages may not fully reflect shifts in the labor demand curve. By exploiting detailed
longitudinal data and following the same group of workers over time, regression estimates
correspond to the average change in earnings for workers who stay at their firm and the cost
of job transitions for those who leave. In addition, concerns pertaining to compositional biases
are explicitly addressed.
The arguments supporting environmental regulations point to increasing evidence that
benefits from environmental policy far exceed the costs. The findings in this paper do not
contradict this logic; the wage costs borne by workers are a small fraction of the estimated
benefits. These findings simply highlight the fact that regulations have distributional con-
sequences – there are both winners and losers. The empirical approach in this paper could
be applied to any area concerned with the distributional implications of labor market adjust-
ment, be it cost shocks to firms, local labor demand shocks to economies, trade shocks, or the
welfare costs of natural disasters. The one limitation of this approach is the data necessary to
implement it. However, with the growing availability of longitudinal micro data, this should
be a fruitful area of future research.
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Figure 2.1: Nonattainment Counties Across All Pollutants in 1991
(a) Nonattainment for Any Pollutant 1991
(b) New Nonattainment Counties 1991
Note: The top panel shows all counties in nonattainment for any pollutant in 1991. The bottom panel
shows those counties that switched into nonattainment in 1991 (i.e. from zero nonattainment designations to
one or more designations). The top panel shows that while there is considerable amount of variation in the
cross-section, nonattainment designation is primarily concentrated in large metropolitan areas and likely to
be correlated with other unobservable features of urban labor markets. The bottom panel shows only those
counties that switched into nonattainment status in 1991, the first year that the 1990 CAAA were adopted,
showing a considerable number of counties that were newly regulated with the passage of the 1990 CAAA.
These counties serve as the primary source of identification in the paper.
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Polluting Polluting Polluting Polluting Polluting Polluting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Plant Characteristics (LBD)
No. of Plants 6806 1707 5910 1549 7622 1452
Plant Employment 146.82 244.6 133.15 266.42 144.24 234.58
Plant Age 8.64 10.07 8.4 10.89 8.84 10.71
Panel B: Workforce Characteristics (LEHD)
Age 36.88 38.61 36.67 38.3 37.04 38.1
Education 13.34 13.56 13.72 14.08 13.67 13.89
Earnings 26996.56 36950.09 31159.89 38030.07 31692.56 39307.95
Separation Rate 0.22 0.08 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.08
Same Ind, Same County 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01
Same Ind, Diff County 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
Diff Ind, Same County 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.1 0.03
Diff Ind, Diff County 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02
Leave Sample 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Sep: Job to Job 0.19 0.06 0.2 0.08 0.18 0.05
Panel C: Sectoral Characteristics (LBD and LEHD)
Total Employment 233994 210386 179590 146123 379553 209364
Total Earnings 6317.03 7773.78 5596 5557.07 12029.01 8229.67
(in millions)
notes: Sample statistics for the “base” states from which the LEHD workforce sample is drawn (IL, MD,
WA, WI). Since these are statistics for the “base” year, they only include the manufacturing industry. All
dollar amounts are reported in 1990 dollars. Separation is defined as working in 1990 and working either at
a different plant in 1991 or having missing earnings in 1991. The separation rate is further decomposed into
five different categories listed in the table. LBD denotes characteristics derived from the LBD sample. LEHD
denotes characteristics from the LEHD worker cohort sample. Source LEHD, LBD.
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Note: This figure shows the fraction of plants by major industry in nonattainment counties that have air
pollution operating permits as mandated by the CAA. The percentages are weighted by employment. This
figure shows that within a specific 2-digit industry SIC code, less than half of most industries are classified as
polluters (and hence regulated under nonattainment). Source LBD 1985-2005.
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Figure 2.3: Sector Level Employment Before and After 1990 CAAA
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Years Before and After 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of equation (2.5). Specifically, Panel (a) plots event
time indicators for various sectors of the manufacturing industry, which correspond to the “second-order”
interaction terms from the triple-difference estimator in equation (2.5). Affected counties correspond to those
counties that switched into EPA’s nonattainment designation in 1991. The solid line represents employment in
the newly-regulated, polluting sector, and the dashed lines represents employment in other sectors (normalized
to zero in year τ = −1). Panel (b) plots the difference in event time indicators from Panel (a), corresponding to
the “triple-difference” regression coefficients in equation (2.5). The first year of the nonattainment designation
corresponds to year 1 in the graph. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. An auxiliary test of
the slopes in Figure 2.3b, before and after regulation, rejects the null of equal slope with a p-value of 0.03. See
text for details. Source: LBD.
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Table 2.2: Effect of Sector Level Regulation on Earnings
Zero
Baseline Levels Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regulation (t+0) -0.037 -0.029 -0.030 -0.025 -1045.38 -1202.74
(0.029) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (812.10) (831.06)
Regulation (t+1) -0.064∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.052∗ -1889.78∗ -1989.91∗
(0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (1071.37) (1185.02)
Regulation (t+2) -0.056∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -1898.65∗∗ -2148.54∗∗
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (819.29) (848.44)
Regulation (t+3) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -1740.67∗∗∗ -2015.65∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (589.96) (650.99)
Regulation (t+4) -0.052∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.042∗ -1992.42∗∗ -2039.14∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (829.28) (750.97)
Regulation (t+5) -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.015 -785.76 -785.56
(0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (703.65) (734.25)
Regulation (t+6) -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -275.51 -1197.87
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (670.41) (1212.38)
Regulation (t+7) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 39.49 6.89
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (545.17) (521.49)
Regulation (t+8) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 307.51 441.14
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (390.56) (343.14)
9 Year PDV -0.261∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.201∗ -8477.32∗∗ -9902.34∗∗
(0.120) (0.089) (0.085) (0.105) (3811.51) (3841.66)
N 6847 6847 6847 6847 6847 6847
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Experience X X X X X
County Trends X X X
County×Year FE X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from equation (2.6). Each column corresponds to a different
regression, where the results are presented for three different samples as indicated in the table headings. An
observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county has two observations per year. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county.
The baseline sample is estimated using three different log specifications (columns (1)-(4)), and exponentiated
coefficients are reported using the translation (exp(ηk1 )− 1). The regressions are weighted by the 1990 cohort
size. The final row of the table reports the discounted sum of the coefficients using a 4 percent annual discount
rate (with discount factor β). Columns (1)-(4) use the translation
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 )− 1). Standard errors for
the final row are calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details.
Source: LEHD.
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Cohort Wage Trends After Nonattainment Designation
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Years After 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of equation (2.6). Specifically, Panel (a) plots
the event time indicators for three sets of cohorts, which correspond to the “second-order” interaction terms
from the triple-difference estimator in equation (2.6). Affected counties correspond to the set of counties that
switched into EPA’s nonattainment designation in 1991. Cohorts are defined by place of work in 1990. The
solid line represents the cohort that worked in the newly-regulated, polluting sector in 1990, and the dashed
lines represents the cohorts that did not work in the newly-regulated sectors in 1990. Panel (b) plots the
“triple-difference” regression coefficients in equation (2.6), corresponding to the difference in the dashed and
solid lines in Panel (a). See text for details. Source: LEHD.
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Table 2.3: Testing for “Local” General Equilibrium Effects: County Level Earnings Estimates
Zero
Baseline Levels Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
9 Year PDV -0.110∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -3597.67∗∗∗ -3837.45∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (1342.59) (1670.12)
N 3823 3823 3823 3823 3823
Cohort FE X X X X X
Experience X X X X
County Trends X X X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from a version of equation (2.3). Each column corresponds to a
different regression, where the results are presented for three different samples as indicated in the table headings.
An observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county has two observations per year. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county.
The baseline sample is estimated using three different log specifications (columns (1)-(3)), and exponentiated
coefficients are reported using the translation (exp(ηk1 )− 1). The regressions are weighted by the 1990 cohort
size. The final row of the table reports the discounted sum of the coefficients using a 4 percent annual discount
rate (with discount factor β). Columns (1)-(3) use the translation
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 )− 1). Standard errors for
the final row are calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details.
Source: LEHD.
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
66 CHAPTER 2. THE TRANSITIONAL COSTS OF SECTORAL REALLOCATION































































0 2 4 6 8 10
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Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of equation (2.6), which pertain to the difference
in separation probabilities for the newly regulated sector after the change in regulations. See text for details.
The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The bars represent the survivor probability for workers
in polluting plants of newly designated nonattainment counties. Source: LEHD.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Sector Level Regulation on Earnings: Decomposition Based on Sectoral
Transitions
Separator: Separator: Separator Separator
Same Industry Diff. Industry Same Industry Diff. Industry
Stayer Separator Same County Same County Diff. County Diff. County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regulation (t+0) 0.007 -0.125∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.038) (0.026) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033)
Regulation (t+1) -0.016 -0.218∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.050) (0.022)
Regulation (t+2) 0.002 -0.308∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018) (0.026) (0.013)
Regulation (t+3) -0.006 -0.313∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.040) (0.055) (0.044) (0.020) (0.029)
Regulation (t+4) -0.019 -0.244∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.021) (0.024)
Regulation (t+5) 0.010 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.043) (0.028) (0.021) (0.014)
Regulation (t+6) 0.015 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.097∗∗∗ -0.056 -0.116∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.035) (0.013)
Regulation (t+7) 0.007 -0.050∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.043∗∗ -0.008 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017)
Regulation (t+8) 0.006 -0.012 0.010 0.013 -0.003 0.008
(0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.014)
9-Year PDV 0.008 -1.375∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗ -1.389∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.063) (0.125) (0.073) (0.158) (0.060)
N 6847 6847 6847 6847 6847 6847
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Experience X X X X X X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from equation (2.6). Each column corresponds to a different
regression, where the results are presented for six different samples as indicated in the table headings. An
observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county has two observations per year. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county.
Exponentiated coefficients are reported using the translation (exp(ηk1 ) − 1). The regressions are weighted by
the 1990 cohort size. The final row of the table reports the discounted sum of the coefficients using a 4 percent
annual discount rate (with discount factor β) and the translation
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 ) − 1). Standard errors for
the final row are calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details.
Source: LEHD.
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Decomposing Differences in Job Transition Rates
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Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates that decompose the separation probabilities into destination sectors.
The plotted coefficients come from a version of equation (2.6), which pertain to the difference in transition
probabilities for the newly regulated sector after the change in regulations. See text for details. The dashed
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Source: LEHD.
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Same Ind. Same County Diff. Ind. Same County
Same Ind. Diff. County Diff. Ind. Diff. County
Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a various versions of equation (2.6) fit for each sub-category
of job transitions. The figure shows that worker transitions that result in a new job in the same industry
experience a far lower earnings loss than those workers who switch industries. The lines correspond to the
estimates reported in columns (3)-(6) of Table 2.4. See Section 2.7.6 for details. Source: LEHD.




LEHD Earnings Data Construction
This section describes the basic data cleaning necessary to arrive at the analysis files used
in this project. For a much more detailed description of the LEHD files see McKinney and
Vilhuber (2008) and Abowd, Stephens, Vilhuber, Andersson, McKinney, Roemer, and Wood-
cock (2008). I begin creating the data by creating a “base-year” file of workers who worked
in the manufacturing industry in 1990 in the states for which I have data in 1990 (MD, IL,
WA, WI). I then use the Employment History Files (EHF) from all states in all subsequent
years to “follow” these workers over time, irrespective of whether or not they remain in their
initial state. Using these earnings histories, I assign the worker to their highest paying job in
a given year. I exclude any worker whose maximum annual earnings over their entire work
history was less than $10,000. Using this work history, I assign workers to “cohorts” where a
cohort is defined by the county and sector that a worker worked in 1990.
Two important limitations of the LEHD data in the context of this project are the temporal
coverage over time (detailed further in Table 2.5) and the inability to observe the unit of work
with certainty. To be more specific about the latter issue, state UI data records the firm that
an employee works at in a given quarter. If a firm has more than one operating unit within
the same state, then it becomes difficult to say with certainty which of the units the employee
works. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of state-level employment is concentrated in employers
that operate more than one establishment in that state. If there is more than a single plant
belonging to a firm within a given state, the Census imputes place of work using a non-
ignorable missing data model with multiple imputation. The model imputes establishment-
of-employment using two key characteristics available in the LEHD Infrastructure Files: 1)
distance between place-of-work and place-of-residence and 2) the distribution of employment
across establishments of multiunit employers. This same imputation file is used in the creation
of Census’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators. See McKinney and Vilhuber (2008) for more
information.
This place of work distinction is important for my research design as CAA regulations only
affect polluting plants in nonattainment counties. If a firm has a plant in a nonattainment
county and another plant within an attainment county of the same state, then the only workers
who should be affected are those in the nonattainment plant. Thus, I need the plant level
imputation to distinguish between those workers who are affected and those who are not. In
practice, around 60 percent of the workforce in my sample resides in a single-unit firm, and thus
the remaining 40 percent of workers have to be matched using imputation.54 The imputation
procedure yields 10 (not mutually exclusive) implicates pertaining to a person’s place of work.
This requires the creation of 10 separate datasets pertaining to the 10 implicates, estimating
the model on each of these datasets, and combining the parameter estimates as in Rubin
(1987).55
54I have also estimated the models in this paper using only workers from “single-unit” plants, and the results
(not reported) are similar to those presented here.
55Multiple imputation is used in other popular datasets such as the National Health and Nutrition Exami-
nation Survey (NHANES).
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Table 2.5: LEHD State Year Coverage: Based on Years with Unit-to-Work Imputation Data
State State Abbreviation First Year Last Year
Alabama AL 2001 2004
Arkansas AR 2002 2004
California CA 1991 2003
Colorado CO 1993 2004
Delaware DE 1998 2004
Florida FL 1992 2004
Iowa IA 1998 2004
Idaho ID 1991 2004
Illinois IL 1990 2004
Indiana IN 1998 2004
Kansas KS 1993 2004
Kentucky KY 2001 2004
Maryland MD 1990 2004
Maine ME 1996 2004
Minnesota MN 1994 2004
Missouri MO 1995 2004
Montana MT 1993 2004
North Carolina NC 1991 2003
North Dakota ND 1998 2004
New Jersey NJ 1996 2004
New Mexico NM 1995 2004
Oklahoma OK 1999 2004
Oregon OR 1991 2004
Pennsylvania PA 1997 2004
South Carolina SC 1998 2004
Texas TX 1995 2004
Virginia VA 1995 2004
Vermont VT 2000 2004
Washington WA 1990 2004
Wisconsin WI 1990 2004
West Virginia WV 1997 2004
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) is a longitudinal plant level database that covers
the universe of establishments in the United States from 1975-2005. In each year, there
consists of detailed industry information as well as information on employment and earnings
for the particular plant. Also included in the data are years of entry and exit for the particular
plant (and hence firm age). In the analysis, I limit the dataset to include only establishments
within the manufacturing and utility sectors. I also exclude any establishments for which
the maximum employment over the sample frame is less than 50 employees as well as any
establishment with a lifespan of less than 3 years. Since EPA regulations primarily apply
to major sources with potential to emit of more than 100 tons per year, excluding these
smaller establishments has little effect on the estimates. Lastly, there is an issue with the
LBD data for multi-unit establishments in 1988 (Jarmin and Miranda 2002). I have dropped
the employment and earnings data for each multi-unit establishment in 1988 and imputed
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the missing data using the midpoint of 1987 and 1989 employment and payroll measures
(conditional on firm survival).
EPA Air Facility Subsystem (AFS)
The EPA’s Air Facility System (AFS) contains compliance and enforcement data and permit
data for stationary sources of air pollution regulated by EPA, state and local air pollution
agencies. The permit data is the primary data element used in this analysis, detailing whether
or not a particular plant has ever had a Title V Operating Permit, a New Source Review
Permit, a “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” permit, or a “Pre-Construction” permit
issued under the Clean Air Act. These are legally enforceable documents that authorities issue
to air pollution sources whether or not they are in a nonattainment region. The permits are
issued to all large sources (major sources) and a limited number of smaller sources (called area
sources, minor sources, or non-major sources). Permits include pollution-control requirements
from federal or state regulations that apply to a particular plant. Construction permits specify
what construction is allowed, what emission limits must be met, and often how the source
must be operated. Thus, for each AFS plant I match to the Census data (see section 2.10.1),
I include an indicator for whether or not they have ever been issued one of these permits.
This is my plant-level “polluter” indicator detailed in the text.
Matching Algorithm and Match Results
To match plant level data from the EPA’s Air Facility Subsystem to the Longitudinal Busi-
ness Database, I rely upon a name and address matching algorithm. Using information from
the EPA and the Census on plant name, detailed address, and industry, I iterate over various
combinations of these observables to construct unique matches between the two datasets. The
name and address data from the Census comes from the Standard Statistical Establishment
List (SSEL) which can be linked to the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and Longi-
tudinal Employer Household Dynamics file (LEHD) after the matching process. Since I have
annual plant level information from the Census and the EPA AFS database is only available
as a cross-section, I construct a match candidate for each year in the Census data. That
is, for every year in the SSEL, I perform a match of the SSEL to the AFS database using
information on address, location, industry, and name. I then combine all possible matches
across all years and select the modal match from the full distribution of potential matches.
Thus, for each SSEL year in the loop, the basic matching algorithm is as follows:
1. Select a matching group of characteristics to match on (e.g. plant name, street number,
street name, city, state)
2. Keep only the unique combination of these variables in each of the respective datasets
3. Perform a one-to-one merge across these characteristics
4. Save matched results
5. Loop back to beginning, removing matched results
This basic loop is performed for over 100 unique combinations of plant level characteristics for
each SSEL year in the data, but a plant can only match once within the SSEL year loop. This
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creates a maximum of 20 possible matches for each plant. For various reasons some plants
cannot be matched at all. Table 2.6 details the various match statistics for the initial match
to the SSEL (Column 2) and then after linking the SSEL to the LBD (Column 3). These
statistics only correspond to the “1990 states” used to construct the cohorts (i.e. IL, MD,
WA, WI). I then select the modal LBD match across all possible matches to construct the
link. In the event that the mode is not unique, I randomize to select the match. Column (5)
details the percentage of matches that contained a non-unique mode, and thus were randomly
assigned to a modal match candidate.
Table 2.6: AFS to Business Register Match Statistics: Multi Year Matching Algorithm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total AFS SSL Match LBD Match Percent Percent Non-Unique
Establishments Percentage Percentage Non-Unique LBD Mode LBD
Match Statistics 8777 0.80 0.78 0.41 0.03
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2.10.2 Appendix: Figures and Tables
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Note: This figure shows the number of newly designated nonattainment counties by year for any pollutant
regulated under the Clean Air Act. Source: EPA Greenbook.
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−4 1 6 11
Years Before and After 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of equation (2.5). Specifically, the figure plots
the event time indicators for earnings per worker in the polluting sector of counties that switched into EPA’s
nonattainment designation in 1991. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. See text for details.
Source: LBD.
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Note: Plotted are the coefficient estimates from a version of equation (2.6). Specifically, each line plots the
“triple-difference” regression coefficients in equation (2.6) for different samples. The solid line consists of the
baseline earnings estimates estimated using all cohorts. The dashed line represents the earnings estimates
for those cohorts in counties +/- 1 standard deviation from the EPA’s ambient air pollution, nonattainment

















































Table 2.7: 1990 Decennial Census Characteristics of In-Sample and Non-Sample Counties
Attainment Nonattainment Switch Into Nonattainment t-statistic
In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample Col. 5 - Col. 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: County Demographics
Population 70387.2 33998.6 515753.4 348729.8 87927.7 108540.5 -0.90
Population urban (percent) 0.529 0.307 0.791 0.671 0.470 0.517 -0.81
Median household income (dollars) 26549.8 22384.7 35505.1 31891.2 34893.9 28325.2 3.61
Median household rent (dollars) 331.4 298.6 465.1 453.7 440.2 389.1 1.84
Median home value (dollars) 52431.7 46115.8 90309.4 97000.8 84652.6 73951.7 1.36
Panel B: County Industrial Composition
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.0237 0.0419 0.0113 0.0120 0.0247 0.0163 2.09
Mining 0.00350 0.00766 0.000826 0.00335 0.00117 0.00550 -4.30
Construction 0.0258 0.0290 0.0303 0.0308 0.0425 0.0335 2.52
Manufacturing, nondurable goods 0.0335 0.0355 0.0333 0.0336 0.0325 0.0323 0.05
Manufacturing, durable goods 0.0552 0.0432 0.0604 0.0538 0.0637 0.0459 2.10
Transportation 0.0194 0.0167 0.0214 0.0207 0.0192 0.0190 0.17
Communications and other public utilities 0.0112 0.0104 0.0124 0.0127 0.0148 0.0131 0.86
Wholesale trade 0.0165 0.0141 0.0228 0.0199 0.0188 0.0172 1.16
Retail trade 0.0802 0.0671 0.0818 0.0793 0.0809 0.0802 0.29
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.0223 0.0169 0.0348 0.0303 0.0260 0.0251 0.44
Business and repair services 0.0153 0.0132 0.0233 0.0214 0.0183 0.0185 0.14
Note: This table compares the various county characteristics for those counties in the LEHD base year files (MD, IL, WA, WI)
to the rest of the counties in the United States, further split along the dimensions of variation in the dataset (i.e. Attainment,
Nonattainment, and Switch into Nonattainment). Panel A displays basic demographic characteristics of the respective counties,
whereas Panel B displays the industrial composition (as measured by employment). Industrial composition is measured as total
number of workers in a given industry as a fraction of the total population. Source: 1990 Decennial Census.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Sector Level Regulation on Earnings: Alternative Earnings Measures
Pre-Earnings Positive Earnings
Logs Levels Logs Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation (t+0) -0.016 -86.285 -0.016 -1105.436
(0.023) (794.579) (0.022) (818.608)
Regulation (t+1) -0.047 -956.154 -0.051 -2092.967∗
(0.030) (1093.909) (0.032) (1194.311)
Regulation (t+2) -0.043∗∗ -1142.984 -0.043∗∗ -2154.688∗∗
(0.021) (718.664) (0.020) (855.849)
Regulation (t+3) -0.038∗∗∗ -1136.972∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -1864.084∗∗∗
(0.014) (494.243) (0.012) (627.626)
Regulation (t+4) -0.045∗∗∗ -1434.609∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -1937.368∗∗
(0.017) (682.979) (0.017) (823.276)
Regulation (t+5) -0.019 -481.101 -0.005 -565.965
(0.019) (557.336) (0.020) (771.149)
Regulation (t+6) -0.007 -42.994 0.006 -55.994
(0.018) (589.769) (0.016) (658.904)
Regulation (t+7) -0.004 75.777 0.000 -163.088
(0.013) (453.429) (0.013) (543.281)
Regulation (t+8) 0.001 271.191 0.009 377.890
(0.009) (334.411) (0.012) (440.596)
9 Year Total -0.196∗ -4473.159 -0.158 -8780.517∗∗
(0.106) (3369.741) (0.097) (3937.052)
N 6847 6847 6748 6748
Cohort FE X X X X
Experience X X X X
County Trends X X X X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from equation (2.6). Each column corresponds to a different
regression, where the results are presented for two different samples as indicated in the table headings. The
“Pre-Earnings” sample replaces missing earnings observations with the last observed earnings record of a
particular worker. The “Positive Earnings” model restricts the sample to include only those workers who report
non-missing earnings in every year of the sample. An observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county
has two observations per year. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered within each county. The
baseline sample is estimated using three different log specifications (columns (1) and (3)), and exponentiated
coefficients are reported using the translation (exp(ηk1 )− 1). The regressions are weighted by the 1990 cohort
size. The final row of the table reports the discounted sum of the coefficients using a 4 percent annual discount
rate (with discount factor β). Columns (1) and (3) use the translation
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 )− 1). Standard errors
for the final row are calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details.
Source: LEHD. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneous Effects of Sector Level Regulation on Cohort Earnings
Panel A: Age
Prime-Age
Male Workers 25≤Age<35 35≤Age<45 45≤Age<55
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9 Year PDV -0.209∗ -0.101 -0.264∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.106) (0.126) (0.193)
N 6847 6714 6637 6508
Panel B: Worker Sex Panel C: Initial Worker Earnings
Initial Earnings< Initial Earnings≥
Male Female Firm Average Firm Average
(1) (2) (1) (2)
9 Year PDV -0.202∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.123 -0.304∗∗
(0.094) (0.091) (0.085) (0.141)
N 6847 6847 6847 6847
Panel D: Initial Plant Earnings Panel E: Initial Plant Size
Avg. Plant Earnings> Avg. Plant Earnings≤
Avg. Sector Earnings Avg. Sector Earnings Plant Emp≤150 Plant Emp>150
(1) (2) (1) (2)
9 Year PDV -0.240∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.149 -0.329∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.132) (0.121) (0.122)
N 6549 5825 6840 5444
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from a version of equation (2.3). Each entry corresponds to
a different regression, where the results are presented for different samples as indicated in the table headings.
An observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county has two observations per year. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county.
Each entry reports the discounted sum of the coefficients using a 4 percent annual discount rate (with discount
factor β) and the translation
P8
k=0 β
k(exp(ηk1 ) − 1). The regressions are weighted by the 1990 cohort size.
Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details.
Source: LEHD. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Effects of Sector Level Regulation on Cohort Earnings: Results Using County×2-
Digit-SIC×Year Cohort Definitions
(1) (2) (3)
9 Year PDV -0.227∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.241∗
(0.105) (0.096) (0.141)
N 156480 156480 33614
Cohort FE X X X
Experience X X X
SIC×Year FE X
County×SIC×Year FE X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from a version of equation (2.7). Each column corresponds to
a different regression, where the results are presented for three different models as indicated in the table notes.
An observation is a cohort×year, where cohort is defined by the county×2-digit-SIC×Polluter of work in 1990.
Therefore, each cohort county×2-Digit-SIC has two observations per year. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county. Each entry reports




k(exp(ηk1 )− 1). The regressions are weighted by the 1990 cohort size. Standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. Earnings are reported in 1990($). See text for details. Source: LEHD.
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Sector Level Regulation on Non-Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Regulation (t+0) 0.026 0.010 0.024
(0.070) (0.051) (0.046)
Regulation (t+1) 0.032 0.019 0.030
(0.054) (0.039) (0.037)
Regulation (t+2) 0.060∗ 0.050 0.059
(0.034) (0.039) (0.046)
Regulation (t+3) 0.056∗ 0.050 0.056
(0.033) (0.040) (0.045)
Regulation (t+4) 0.086∗ 0.082 0.086
(0.046) (0.050) (0.054)
Regulation (t+5) 0.035 0.034 0.035
(0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Regulation (t+6) 0.023 0.024 0.023
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Regulation (t+7) 0.027 0.032 0.028
(0.028) (0.024) (0.022)
Regulation (t+8) 0.022 0.030 0.023
(0.037) (0.030) (0.027)
9 Year Total 0.367∗∗ 0.330∗ 0.364∗
(0.174) (0.190) (0.217)
N 6847 6847 6847
Cohort FE X X X
Experience X X
County Trends X
Note: This table reports regression coefficients from equation (2.6). Each column corresponds to a different
regression, where the dependent variable is the average quarters of non-employment in a given year ∈ [0, 4].
An observation is a cohort×year so that each cohort county has two observations per year. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each county.
The sample is estimated using three different specifications (columns (1)-(3)). The regressions are weighted by
the 1990 cohort size. The final row of the table reports the sum of the coefficients. Standard errors for the final
row are calculated using the delta method. See text for details. Source: LEHD. ***,**,* denotes statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Abstract
We exploit the introduction of electronic toll collection, (E-ZPass), which greatly reduced
both traffic congestion and vehicle emissions near highway toll plazas. We show that the
introduction of E-ZPass reduced prematurity and low birth weight among mothers within
2km of a toll plaza by 10.8% and 11.8% respectively relative to mothers 2-10km from a toll
plaza. There were no immediate changes in the characteristics of mothers or in housing prices
near toll plazas that could explain these changes. The results are robust to many changes
in specification and suggest that traffic congestion contributes significantly to poor health
among infants.
3.1 Introduction
Motor vehicles are a major source of air pollution. Nationally they are responsible for over 50
percent of carbon monoxide (CO), 34 percent of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and over 29 percent
of hydrocarbon emissions in addition to as much as 10 percent of fine particulate matter
emissions (Michelle Ernst and Greene-Roesel 2003). In urban areas, vehicles are the dominant
source of these emissions. Furthermore, between 1980 and 2003 total vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) in urban areas in the United States increased by 111 percent against an increase in
urban lane-miles of only 51 percent (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2004). As a result,
traffic congestion has steadily increased across the United States, causing 3.7 billion hours
of delay by 2003 and wasting 2.3 billion gallons of motor fuel (Lomax and Schrank 2005).
Traditional estimates of the cost of congestion typically include delay costs (Vickrey 1969),
but they rarely address other congestion externalities such as the health effects of congestion.
This paper seeks to provide estimates of the health effects of traffic congestion by examin-
ing the effect of a policy change that caused a sharp drop in congestion (and therefore in the
level of local motor vehicle emissions) within a relatively short time frame at different sites
across the northeastern United States. Engineering studies suggest that the introduction of
electronic toll collection (ETC) technology, called E-ZPass in the Northeast, sharply reduced
delays at toll plazas and pollution caused by idling, decelerating, and accelerating. We study
the effect of E-ZPass, and thus the sharp reductions in local traffic congestion, on the health
of infants born to mothers living near toll plazas.
This question is of interest for three reasons. First, there is increasing evidence of the long-
term effects of poor health at birth on future outcomes. For example, low birth weight has
been linked to future health problems and lower educational attainment (see Currie (2009) for
a summary of this research). The debate over the costs and benefits of emission controls and
traffic congestion policies could be significantly impacted by evidence that traffic congestion
has a deleterious effect on fetal health. Second, the study of newborns overcomes several diffi-
culties in making the connection between pollution and health because, unlike adult diseases
that may reflect pollution exposure that occurred many years ago, the link between cause
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and effect is immediate. Third, E-ZPass is an interesting policy experiment because, while
pollution control was an important consideration for policy makers, the main motive for con-
sumers to sign up for E-ZPass is to reduce travel time. Hence, E-ZPass offers an example of
achieving reductions in pollution by bundling emissions reductions with something consumers
perhaps value more highly such as reduced travel time.
Our analysis improves upon much of the previous research linking air pollution to fetal
health as well as on the somewhat smaller literature focusing specifically on the relation-
ship between residential proximity to busy roadways and poor pregnancy outcomes. Since
air pollution is not randomly assigned, studies that attempt to compare health outcomes for
populations exposed to differing pollution levels may not be adequately controlling for con-
founding determinants of health. Since air quality is capitalized into housing prices (see Chay
and Greenstone (2005b)) families with higher incomes or preferences for cleaner air are likely
to sort into locations with better air quality, and failure to account for this sorting will lead
to overestimates of the effects of pollution. Alternatively, pollution levels are higher in urban
areas where there are often more educated individuals with better access to health care, which
can cause underestimates of the true effects of pollution on health.
In the absence of a randomized trial, we exploit a policy change that created large local and
persistent reductions in traffic congestion and traffic related air emissions for certain segments
along a highway. We compare the infant health outcomes of those living near an electronic
toll plaza before and after implementation of E-ZPass to those living near a major highway
but further away from a toll plaza. Specifically, we compare mothers within 2 kilometers of
a toll plaza to mothers who are between 2 and 10 km from a toll plaza but still within 3
kilometers of a major highway before and after the adoption of E-ZPass in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania provide a compelling setting for our particular research
design. First, both New Jersey and Pennsylvania are heavily populated, with New Jersey
being the most densely populated state in the United States and Pennsylvania being the
sixth most populous state in the country. As a result, these two states have some of the
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busiest interstate systems in the country, systems that also happen to be densely surrounded
by residential housing. Furthermore, we know the exact addresses of mothers, in contrast to
many observational studies which approximate the individuals location as the centroid of a
geographic area or by computing average pollution levels within the geographic area. This
information enables us to improve on the assignment of pollution exposure. Lastly, E-ZPass
adoption and take up was extremely quick, and the reductions in congestion spillover to all
automobiles, not just those registered with E-ZPass (New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2001).
Our difference-in-differences research design relies on the assumption that the character-
istics of mothers near a toll plaza change over time in a way that is comparable to those of
other mothers who live further away from a plaza but still close to a major highway. We
test this assumption by examining the way that observable characteristics of the two groups
of mothers and housing prices change before and after E-ZPass adoption. We also estimate
a range of alternative specifications in an effort to control for unobserved characteristics of
mothers and neighborhoods that could confound our estimates.
We find significant effects on infant health. The difference-in-difference models suggest
that prematurity fell by 6.7-9.16 percent among mothers within 2km of a toll plaza, while
the incidence of low birth weight fell by 8.5-11.3 percent. We argue that these are large
but not implausible effects given previous studies. In contrast, we find that there are no
significant effects of E-ZPass adoption on the demographic characteristics of mothers in the
vicinity of a toll plaza. We also find no immediate effect on housing prices, suggesting that
the composition of women giving birth near toll plazas shows little change in the immediate
aftermath of E-ZPass adoption (though of course it might change more over time).
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section I provides necessary background.
Section II describes our methods, while data are described in Section III. Section IV presents
our results. Section VI discusses the magnitude of the effects we find, and Section V details
our conclusions.
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3.2 Background
Many studies suggest an association between air pollution and fetal health. Glinianaia,
Rankin, Bell, Pless-Mulloli, and Howel (2004) and Mattison (2003) summarize much of the
literature. For more recent papers see for example Currie, Neidell, and Schmieder (2009);
Rose, Linda, David, and Marc (2006); Huynh, Woodruff, Parker, and Schoendorf (2006);
Karr, Rudra, Miller, Gould, Larson, Sathyanarayana, and Koenig (2009); Lee, Hajat, Steer,
and Filippi (2008); Leem, Kaplan, Shim, Pohl, Gotway, Bullard, Rogers, Smith, and Tylenda
(2006); Liu, Krewski, Shi, Chen, and Burnett (2006); Parker, Woodruff, Basu, and Schoendorf
(2005); Salam, Millstein, Li, Lurmann, Margolis, and Gilliland (2005); Ritz, Wilhelm, and
Zhao (2006); Wilhelm and Ritz (2005); Woodruff, Darrow, and Parker (2008). Since traffic is
a major contributor to air pollution, several studies have focused specifically on the effects of
exposure to motor vehicle exhaust (see Wilhelm and Ritz (2003); Ponce, Hoggatt, Wilhelm,
and Ritz (2005); Brauer, Hoek, Van Vliet, Meliefste, Fischer, Gehring, Heinrich, Cyrys, Bel-
lander, Lewne, et al. (2003); Slama, Morgenstern, Cyrys, Zutavern, Herbarth, Wichmann,
Heinrich, et al. (2007); Beatty and Shimshack (2011); Knittel, Miller, and Sanders (2011)).
At the same time, researchers have documented many differences between people who are
exposed to high volumes of traffic and others (Gunier, Hertz, Von Behren, and Reynolds 2003).
A correlational study cannot demonstrate that the effect of pollution is causal. Women living
close to busy roadways are more likely to have other characteristics that are linked to poor
pregnancy outcomes such as lower income, education, and probabilities of being married, and
a higher probability of being a teen mother. This is partly because wealthier people are more
likely to move away from pollution. Depro and Timmins (2008) show that gains in wealth
from appreciating housing values during the 1990s allowed households in San Francisco to
move to cleaner areas. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008b) show that neighborhoods experiencing
improvements in environmental quality tend to gain population while the converse is also
true.
Most previous studies include a minimal set of controls for potential confounders. Fami-
lies with higher incomes or greater preferences for cleaner air may be more likely to sort into
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neighborhoods with better air quality. These families are also likely to provide other invest-
ments in their children, so that fetuses exposed to lower levels of pollution also receive more
family inputs, such as better quality prenatal care or less maternal stress. If these factors
are unaccounted for, then the estimated effects of pollution may be biased upwards. Alterna-
tively, emission sources tend to be located in urban areas, and individuals in urban areas may
be more educated and have better access to health care, factors that may improve health.
Omitting these factors would lead to a downward bias in the estimated effects of pollution,
suggesting that the overall direction of bias from confounding is unclear.
Several previous studies are especially relevant to our work because they address the
problem of omitted confounders by focusing on “natural experiments.” Chay and Greenstone
(2003a) and Chay and Greenstone (2003b) examine the implementation of the Clean Air
Act of 1970 and the recession of the early 1980s. Both events induced sharper reductions
in particulates in some counties than in others, and they use this exogenous variation in
pollution at the county-year level to identify its effects. They estimate that a one unit decline
in particulates caused by the implementation of the Clean Air Act (or by recession) led to
between five and eight (four and seven) fewer infant deaths per 100,000 live births. They
also find some evidence that declines in Total Suspended Particles (TSPs) led to reductions
in the incidence of low birth weight. However, the levels of particulates studied by Chay and
Greenstone are much higher than those prevalent today; for example, PM10 levels have fallen
by nearly 50 percent from 1980 to 2000. Furthermore, only TSPs were measured during the
time period they examine, which precludes the examination of other pollutants that are found
in motor vehicle exhaust.
Other studies that are similar in spirit include a sequence of papers by Arden Pope and
his collaborators, who investigated the health effects of the temporary closing of a Utah steel
mill (Pope 3rd (1989); Ransom and Pope III (1992); Pope III, Schwartz, and Ransom (1992))
and Friedman, Powell, Hutwagner, Graham, and Teague (2001a) who examine the effect of
changes in traffic patterns in Atlanta due to the 1996 Olympic games. However, these studies
did not look at fetal health. Parker, Mendola, and Woodruff (2008) examine the effect of the
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Utah steel mill closure on preterm births and find that exposure to pollution from the mill
increased the probability of preterm birth. This study however does not speak to the issue of
effects of traffic congestion on infant health.
Currie, Neidell, and Schmieder (2009) examine the effects of several pollutants on fetal
health in New Jersey using models that include maternal fixed effects to control for potential
confounders. They find that CO is particularly implicated in negative birth outcomes. In
pregnant women, exposure to CO reduces the availability of oxygen to be transported to the
fetus. Carbon monoxide readily crosses the placenta and binds to fetal haemoglobin more
readily than to maternal haemoglobin. It is cleared from fetal blood more slowly than from
maternal blood, leading to concentrations that may be 10 to 15 percent higher in the fetuss
blood than in the mothers. Indeed, much of the negative effect of smoking on infant health is
believed to be due to the CO contained in cigarette smoke (World Health Organization 2000).
Hence, a significant effect of E-ZPass on CO alone would be expected to have a significant
positive effect on fetal health.
E-ZPass is an electronic toll collection system that allows vehicles equipped with a special
windshield-mounted tag to drive through designated toll lanes without stopping to manually
pay a toll. The benefits include time saved, reduced fuel consumption, and reductions in
harmful emissions caused by idling and acceleration at toll plazas. In addition, the air quality
benefits are thought to be large enough that some counties have introduced ETC explicitly
in order to meet pollution migitation requirements under the Clean Air Act (Saka, United
States. Dept. of Transportation. Office of Innovation, Education, for Transportation Studies,
and (US) 2000).
Engineering estimates of the reduction in pollution with E-ZPass adoption vary. They are
typically based on a combination of traffic count data, and measures of the extent to which
reducing the idling, deceleration and acceleration around toll plazas would reduce emissions
for a given vehicle mix. For example, Saka, United States. Dept. of Transportation. Office of
Innovation, Education, for Transportation Studies, and (US) (2000) compared data on traffic
flows through manned toll lanes and electronic toll collection lanes at one toll plaza at a
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single point in time and estimated that reductions in queuing, decelerations and accelerations
in the ETC lanes resulted in reductions of 11 percent for NO2 and a decrease of more than 40
percent for hydrocarbons and CO relative to emissions in the manned lanes. A similar study
of the George Washington Bridge toll plaza, one of those included in this study, by Venigalla
and Krimmer (2006), estimated that VOC, CO, and NO2 emissions from trucks were reduced
in the E-ZPass lanes by 30.8 percent, 23.5 percent, and 5.8 percent.
Although these studies suggest that E-ZPass could lead to substantial reductions in ambi-
ent pollution, these studies may over-estimate or under-estimate the extent of that reduction.
For example, if reducing toll plaza delays encourages more people to drive rather than take
public transit, then this may offset the reduction in pollution per-vehicle to some extent. Con-
versely, to the extent that drivers in non E-ZPass lanes also benefit from reduced congestion,
comparing delays at E-ZPass and manual lanes will understate the benefits of E-ZPass. We
were unable to find a study that measured pollution in the radius of a toll plaza before and
after the introduction of ETC.
However, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority commissioned a study of the extent to which
E-ZPass reduced total delays at toll plazas (New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2001). This study
used before and after data on traffic counts at each toll plaza, and measured the delays at toll
plazas using video cameras. Evidently, the total delay is given by (number of vehicles)*(delay
per vehicle). This study concluded that total delay at toll plazas dropped by 85 percent after
the implementation of E-ZPass, saving 1.8 million hours of delay for cars, and 231,000 hours
of delay for trucks in the year after adoption. If pollution around the toll plaza is proportional
to these delays, then it is reasonable to conclude that it was also reduced considerably. The
report estimated that E-ZPass reduced emissions of NO2 by .056 tons per day, or 20.4 tons per
year. In 2002, mobile on-road sources emitted approximately 300 tons of NO2 per year (New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 2005). Hence, a crude estimate is that E-
ZPass reduced NO2 emissions from traffic by about 6.8 percent. Unfortunately, the EPAs air
quality monitors are placed throughout the state such that there is only one monitor located
near a toll plaza in our study area. Furthermore, this particular monitor only measures NO2
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and SO2. Nevertheless we show evidence that suggests a sharp decline in NO2 levels following
E-ZPass adoption. This is in contrast to SO2 levels at the same monitor, for which we see
no noticeable decline. This is consistent with the fact that cars produce a large percentage of
local NO2 emissions, while they are responsible for a very small fraction of SO2 emissions.
An important unresolved question is how far elevated pollution levels extend from highways
or toll plazas? Most studies have focused on areas 100 to 500 meters from a roadway. However,
Hu, Fruin, Kozawa, Mara, Paulson, and Winer (2009) find evidence that pollution from the
405 Freeway in Los Angeles is found up to 2,600 meters from the roadway. Moreover, their
study was conducted in the hours before sunrise, when traffic volumes are relatively light, but
most people are in their homes. We investigate this issue below.
We focus on the implementation of E-ZPass on three major state tollways in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the New Jersey Turnpike, and the Garden
State Parkway. Portions of all three of these state highways rank nationally as some of the
busiest in the country. In addition to these state tollways, we also use the major bridge and
tunnel tolls connecting New Jersey to New York (George Washington Bridge, Lincoln Tunnel,
and the Holland Tunnel). Each of these bridges and tunnels are extremely well traveled,
transporting around 105 million, 42 million, and 35 million vehicles respectively. New Jersey
has 38 toll plazas, 3 at bridge/tunnel entrances to New York City, 11 along the Garden State
Parkway, 22 along the New Jersey Turnpike, and 2 along the Atlantic City Expressway. There
are 60 toll plazas in Pennsylvania. Figure 3.1 shows the toll plazas and major highways that
we use.
Our research design exploits the fact that E-ZPass was installed at different times and in
different locations across the two states. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
implemented E-ZPass at the bridge and tunnels entering New York City in 1997. Soon after,
New Jersey installed its first E-ZPass toll plazas on the Atlantic City Expressway. Start-
ing in December 1999, New Jersey began installing E-ZPass on the Garden State Parkway.
Throughout the course of the following year, toll plazas were added at the rate of 1 per month
(working from North to South on the GSP), with the final plaza installed in August of 2000.
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In September 2000, the NJ Turnpike installed E-ZPass at all their toll collection terminals
throughout the system. Similarly, the PA Turnpike installed most of their toll-plazas with
E-ZPass in December 2000, with a major addition occurring in December of 2001. E-ZPass
adoption and take up was extremely rapid. By early 2001 (1 year after implementation of the
Garden State Parkway and NJ Turnpike), 1.3 million cars had been registered with E-ZPass
in New Jersey.
3.3 Data
Our main source of data for this study are Vital Statistics Natality records from Pennsylvania
for 1997 to 2002 and for New Jersey for the years 1994 to 2003. Vital Statistics records are
a very rich source of data that cover all births in the two states. They have both detailed
information about health at birth and background information about the mother, including
race, education, and marital status. We were able to make use of a confidential version of the
data with the mothers address, and we were also able to match births to the same mother over
time using information about the mothers name, race, and birth date. Like most previous
studies of infant health, we focus on two birth outcomes, prematurity (defined as gestation
less than 38 weeks) and low birth weight (defined as birth weight less than 2500 grams).
Using this information, we first divided mothers into three groups: Those living within
2km of a toll plaza; those living within 3km of a major highway, but between 2km and 10km
from a toll plaza; and those who lived 10km or more away from a toll plaza. Our treatment
group in the difference-in-difference design is the mothers living within 2km of a toll plaza,
while the control group is those who live close to a highway, but between 2km and 10km
from a toll plaza. We drop mothers who live more than 10km away from a toll plaza. In
total, we have 98 toll plazas that adopted electronic tolling in our sample, and thus we have
98 separate sample regions. We also drop births that occurred more than 3 years before or
after the E-ZPass conversion of the nearest plaza, in an effort to focus on births that occurred
around the changes. All of the mothers in the sample are assigned to their nearest toll plaza.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the way that we created the treatment and control groups for each
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of our toll plaza sample regions. As one can see from the figure, there are many homes within
the relevant radius of the toll plaza. Moreover, housing tends to follow the highway. The areas
more than 2km away from either a toll plaza or the highway are somewhat less dense. We
also repeat this procedure using mothers less than 1.5km from a toll plaza as the treatment
group, comparing them to mothers who live within 3km of a highway but between 1.5 and
10km from a toll plaza.
In the analysis including mother fixed effects, we select the sample differently. Specifically,
we keep only mothers with more than one birth in our data. We then restrict the sample to
only mothers who have had at least one child born within 2km of a toll plaza, since only these
mothers can help to identify the effects of E-ZPass. (The other mothers could in principal
identify some of the other coefficients in the model, but as we show below, they have quite
different average characteristics so we prefer to exclude them). We use all available years
of sample data, in order to maximize the number of women we observe with two or more
children.
We obtained data on housing prices in New Jersey from 1989 to 2009 by submitting an open
access records request. In addition to the sales date and price, these data include information
about address, square footage, age of structures, whether the unit is a condominium, assessed
value of the land, and assessed value of the structures. We will use these data to see if housing
prices changed in the neighborhood of toll plazas in response to amenity benefits generated
from reduced traffic congestion and increased air quality surrounding E-ZPass implementation.
Means of the outcomes we examine (prematurity and low birth weight) and of the inde-
pendent variables are shown in Table 3.1 for all of these groups. Panel A shows means for
the treatment and control group used in the difference-in-differences analysis. For the control
group, “before” and “after” are assigned on the basis of when the closest toll plaza converted
to E-ZPass. The last column of Panel A shows means for mothers who live more than 10km
from a toll plaza. They are less likely to have a premature birth, and their babies are less
likely to be low birth weight. They are also less likely to be black or Hispanic. These mothers
are omitted from our difference-in-difference analysis.
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The treatment and control groups are similar to each other before the adoption of E-ZPass
except in terms of racial composition: Mothers close to toll plazas are much more likely to be
Hispanic and somewhat less likely to be African-American than other mothers. Mothers close
to toll plazas are also less likely to have smoked during the pregnancy. These differences have
potentially important implications for our analysis, since other things being equal, African
Americans and smokers tend to have worse birth outcomes than others. Hence, it is important
to control for these differences, and we will also examine these subgroups separately.
In terms of before and after trends, both areas show increases in the fraction of births to
Hispanic and African-American mothers, and decreases in the fraction of births to smokers
and teen mothers over time. The fraction of births that were premature rose over time,
especially in the control areas. The fraction of births that were low birth weight showed a
slight decrease in the treatment area near toll plazas, but an increase in the control areas.
These patterns reflect national time trends in the demographic characteristics of new mothers
and in birth outcomes. We can use these means tables to do a crude difference in difference
comparison. Such a comparison suggests that prematurity and low birth weight fell by about
7 percent in areas less than 2km from a toll plaza after E-ZPass. Appendix Table 3.8 shows
changes in mean outcomes when the treatment group is restricted to those who were within
1.5km of a toll plaza.
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows means for the sample that we use in the mother fixed effects
analysis. Panel B shows that in general, the mothers with more than one birth in the sample
have somewhat better birth outcomestheir children are less likely to be premature or low
birth weight than in the full sample of children (Panel A). The sample of women who have
more than one birth and who ever had a child within 2 km of a toll plaza changes over time.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 shows that over time this population has become more Hispanic,
less educated, and somewhat more likely to be having a higher order birth. Columns 3 and 4
of Panel B show that the population of women who never had a birth within 2 km of a plaza
are quite differentthey are less likely to be Hispanic, the sample tends to gain education over
time, and (not surprisingly) lives further from a highway.
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Panel C shows means from the housing sales data. All prices were deflated by the CPI
into 1993 dollars. Comparing columns 1 and 3 suggests that sales prices were similar in areas
close to toll plazas and a little further away from toll plazas before E-ZPass, but that prices
increased faster near toll plazas after adoption. The same comparison is shown for the area
within 1.5km of a toll plaza and areas 1.5-10km away from toll plazas in Appendix Table 3.8.
We show below that controlling for a fairly minimal set of covariates (month and year of sale,
square footage, age of structure, municipality and whether it is a condominium) reduces this
estimate to statistical insignificance. Still, the idea that prices may have increased, thereby
changing the composition of mothers in the neighborhood provides a motivation for the models
we estimate below including mother fixed effects.
Figures 3.3 to 3.6 provide more nuanced pictures of the relationship between E-ZPass
adoption, birth weight, and prematurity. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 focus on mothers within 2km of
a toll plaza and take the average values over .1km bins before and after E-ZPass. Figure 3.3
shows that there is a dramatic reduction in low birth weight after E-ZPass in the area closest
to the toll plaza. The reduction tapers off and the lines cross at a little after 1km. Figure 3.4
shows a similar pattern for prematurity, although here the lines cross at about 1.5 km from
the toll plaza.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare low birth weight and prematurity in households more than
1.5km from a toll plaza and households less than 1.5km from a toll plaza in the days before
and after E-ZPass. These figures indicate a higher incidence of low birth weight in the 500
days prior to E-ZPass adoption in the area near the toll plaza. Around the time of E-ZPass
adoption, the incidence of low birth weight near toll plazas begins to decline dramatically,
and falls below the control rate soon after adoption. Figure 3.6 shows increasing rates of
prematurity in both mothers near toll plazas and mothers further away. Around the time of
E-ZPass adoption, the rate of prematurity begins to fall for the near toll plaza group.
It is noticeable that in both figures, the incidence of poor outcomes begins to decline
slightly before the official date of E-ZPass adoption. We believe that this slight discrepancy
in the timing may be explained by E-ZPass construction. Prior to the official opening date,
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each plaza had to be adapted for E-ZPass. The New Jersey E-ZPass contract included the
installation of fiber optic communications networks, patron fare displays, E-ZPass toll plaza
signs and road stripping at a cost of $500 million (New Jersey Department of Transportation
1998). In one recent example, the toll plaza for the I-78 Toll Bridge is being upgraded to E-
ZPass. Construction is scheduled to take place between early January 2010 and Memorial Day,
approximately 5 months. In the meantime, commuters are being advised to use an alternative
route so that traffic may be lighter than usual near this plaza (The Warren Reporter 2010).
3.4 Methods
To implement our difference-in-difference estimator, we begin by testing the assumptions for
the estimator to be valid, namely that any trends in the observable characteristics of mothers
are the same across both treatment and control groups. The models for these specification
checks take the following form:
MomCharit =a+ β1EZPassit + β2Closeit + β3Plazait + β4EZPass ∗ Closeit (3.1)
+ β5Y ear + β6Month+ β7Distanceit + eit,
where MomCharit are indicators for mother is race or ethnicity, her education, teen moth-
erhood, and whether she smoked during pregnancy t. EZPass is an indicator equal to one
if the closest toll plaza has implemented E-ZPass, Closeit is an indicator equal to one if the
mother lived within 2km (or 1.5km) of a toll plaza, and Plazait is a series of indicators for
the closest toll plaza. This indicator is designed to capture any unobserved, time-invariant
characteristics of each toll plaza sample region. The coefficient of interest is that on the in-
teraction between EZPassit and Closeit. We also include indicators for the year and month
to allow for systematic trends, such as the increase in minority mothers. Finally, we control
for linear distance from a busy roadway. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
toll plaza, to allow for correlations in the errors of mothers around each plaza. If we saw
that maternal characteristics changed in some systematic way following the introduction of
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E-ZPass, then we would need to take account of this selection when assessing the effects of
E-ZPass on health outcomes.
We also estimate models of the effects of EZPass on housing prices. These models are
similar to (1) above except that they control for whether it is a condominium, age (in cate-
gories, including missing), square footage (in categories, including missing), fixed effects for
the municipality, and year and month of sale. We have also estimated models that control for
the ratio of assessed structure to land values, with similar results.
Our baseline models examining the effects of E-ZPass on the probabilities of low birth
weight and prematurity are similar to the models from equation (1). The estimated equation
takes the following form:
Outcomeit = a+ β1EZPassit + β2Closeit + β3Plazait + β4EZPassit ∗ Closeit (3.2)
+ β5Y ear + β6Month+ β7Xit + β8Distanceit + eit,
where Outcome is either prematurity or low birth weight, and the vector Xit of mother
and child characteristics includes indicators for whether the mother is black or Hispanic; 4
mother education categories (¡12, high school, some college, and college or more; missing is
the left out category); mother age categories (19-24, 25-24, 35+); an indicator for smoking
during pregnancy; indicators for birth order (2nd, 3rd, or 4th or higher order); an indicator
for multiple birth; and an indicator for male child. Indicators for missing data on each of
these variables were also included. Again, the main coefficient of interest is β4 which can
be interpreted as the difference-in-differences coefficient comparing births that are closer or
further from a toll plaza, before and after adoption of E-ZPass.
We perform a series of robustness checks. First, we estimate models that restrict the
sample to mothers within 5km of a toll plaza. Second, we include interactions of Closeit
and a linear time trend. It is possible that areas close to toll plazas are generally evolving
in some way that is different from other areas (e.g. racial composition), but as we shall see,
this does not seem to affect our estimates. Third, we estimated models of the propensity to
live close to a toll plaza to see whether mothers were more or less likely to live near a toll
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plaza before or after E-ZPass adoption. The propensity models are estimated using all of
the maternal and child characteristics listed above, the interactions of these variables, as well
as zip code fixed effects. We then excluded all observations with a propensity less than .1
or greater than .9 as suggested by Crump et al. (2009). We estimated separate models for
African Americans and non-African Americans since these groups tend to have very different
average birth outcomes. We also looked separately at estimates for non-smokers. As we show
below, our difference in difference results are robust to these changes, though we do find larger
effects for African-Americans and for smokers.
The estimates from (2) reflect an average effect of E-ZPass on people anywhere within the
2km (or 1.5km) window. We have also experimented with allowing the effect to vary with
distance from the toll plaza. To do this requires that some assumption be made about the
rate at which the effects decay with distance from the toll plaza. The engineering literature
is not particularly helpful in this respect, since most studies focus on areas very close to
roadways. As we show below, the estimates are somewhat sensitive to these assumptions, but
are qualitatively consistent with the results from the simple difference-in-difference models.
One possible threat to identification is that new mothers with better predicted birth
outcomes could select into areas around toll plazas after E-ZPass is adopted. Although we
do not find evidence of changes in the average demographic characteristics of those living
near toll plazas after E-ZPass, an arguably better way to control for possible changes in the
composition of mothers is to estimate models with mother fixed effects. These models take
the following form:
Outcomeit =ai + β1EZPassit + β2Closeit + β3Plazait + β4EZPassit ∗ Closeit (3.3)
+ β5Y ear + β7Month+ β8Zit + β9Distanceit + eit,
where ai is a fixed effect for each mother i, and Z is a vector including child gender and birth
order and potentially time varying maternal characteristics including mothers age, education,
and an indicator for smoking. Although all the mothers are selected to have had at least one
child while residing within 2km of a toll plaza, we alternatively define the indicator for Close
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either as less than 2km from a toll plaza, or as less than 1.5km from a toll plaza.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 shows the results of estimating equation (1), the effects of E-ZPass on the character-
istics of mothers who live near toll plazas and on housing prices. Each coefficient represents
an estimate of b4 from a separate regression. The only maternal characteristic to show any
significant changes with E-ZPass adoption is smoking, where it is estimated that E-ZPass
has a positive effect. Note that if more smokers move to areas after E-ZPass adoption (or
if mothers smoke more) this will tend to work against finding any net benefit of E-ZPass on
birth outcomes. The last column shows that there is no immediate significant effect on hous-
ing prices (although the coefficient is positive), suggesting that it takes time for any effects
through the housing market to be felt. These results suggest that the estimated health effects
of E-ZPass are not due to changes in the composition of mothers who live close to toll plazas.
Table 3.3 shows our estimates of (2). Again, each coefficient is an estimate of β4 from
a separate regression. The first and third columns show a model that controls only for
month and year of birth, toll plaza fixed effects, and distance to highway. These estimates
are somewhat higher than the raw difference-in-difference estimates implied by Table 3.1,
suggesting that it is important to control for time trends and regional differences. The second
and fourth columns add maternal characteristics as in equation (2). Assuming our research
design is valid, adding controls for mothers characteristics should only reduce the sampling
variance while leaving the coefficient estimates unchanged. The results in columns (2) and (4),
are consistent with the validity of the research design, since adding maternal characteristics
has little impact on the estimated coefficients. These estimates suggest that E-ZPass adoption
reduced prematurity by 8.6 percentage points. This suggests that in the 29,677 births that we
observe within 2km of a toll plaza after E-ZPass, 255 preterm births were averted. A similar
calculation indicates that E-ZPass reduced the incidence of low birth weight by 9.3 percentage
points, which means that in our sample 275 low birth weight births were averted (of course
many of these births overlap since most preterm infants are low birth weight).
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Panel 2 of Table 3.3 shows that the estimates are not generally significantly different when
we define “close” as 1.5km from a toll plaza. The point estimates are somewhat higher for
prematurity, and somewhat lower for low birth weight. In what follows we focus on models
using the 2km cutoff and explore the robustness of our results.
The first panel of Table 3.4 shows the effect of restricting the sample to mothers within
5km of a toll plaza only. This cuts our sample size by about 40 percent. Still, the standard
errors are quite similar to those shown in the comparable columns of Table 3.3 although the
point estimates are somewhat reduced. In this specification, there is a 6.7 percent reduction
in prematurity and an 8.5 percent reduction in low birth weight. Panel 2 shows the results
of adding interactions between Closeit and a linear time trend to the model. These interac-
tions capture any differences in the evolution of areas near toll plazas and other areas (such
as, perhaps, different trends in demographic characteristics or in housing markets). Adding
these time trends again lowers the estimates somewhat from those in Table 3.3, to 7.4 per-
centage points for prematurity and 8.4 percentage points for low birth weight. Similarly,
the propensity-score trimmed estimates shown in Panel 3 of Table 3.4, are a little smaller
than those in Table 3.3 (7.9 and 8.6 percentage points for prematurity and low birth weight
respectively).
The remaining panels of Table 3.4 focus on some important subgroups. Panels 4 and 5
estimate separate models for African-Americans and all others. These estimates suggest that
effects are much larger for African-Americans. Since these mothers are twice as likely to have
small and/or premature babies, it is possible that similar reductions in gestation and birth
weight are more likely to push African-American babies below the thresholds for concern.
Alternatively, it is possible that African-American mothers are at a different point on the
production possibility frontier, so that a similar exposure to pollution has a larger effect. In
results not reported in the table, we compared the estimated effects on a continuous measure
of birth weight for African-Americans and others and again found much larger effects for the
former.
Panel 6 examines the effects for non-smokers. These are slightly smaller than the effects
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estimated in Table 3.3 (7.5 compared to 8.6 percentage point reduction in prematurity 7.9
compared to 9.3 percentage point reduction in low birth weight) suggesting that pollution
from motor vehicles is more damaging for children of smokers. This result is consistent with
(Currie, Neidell, and Schmieder 2009).
Table 3.5 shows estimates in which we allow the effect of distance to vary within a 2km
radius of the toll plaza. As discussed above, these specifications require assumptions about the
form of the decay in the effects of E-ZPass. Table 3.5 compares two models. The first, shown
in columns one and three, assumes that the decay in effects is linear and dies out completely
after 2km. When we use this specification, the estimated effects of E-ZPass are negative,
but relatively small and not precisely estimated. However, if the form of the decay is not in
fact linear, then we can expect the imposition of linearity to bias the estimated coefficient
towards zero. An alternative specification that conforms more closely to the pattern shown in
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 assumes that the effects decay exponentially with distance from the toll
plaza. Columns 3 and 4 show that imposing this assumption (specifically, interacting “after
E-ZPass” with 1/(edistance)) results in much larger point coefficients, although the coefficient
on prematurity is significant only at the 90 percent level of confidence. This coefficient (of
-.0153) implies, for example, that prematurity falls by 15.3 percentage points at 0km, 9.3 at
.5km , 5.6 at 1km and 3.4 at 1.5km.
Table 3.6 shows estimates of (3) that include mother fixed effects. Panel A defines Close
as less than 2km from a toll plaza while Panel B defines Close as less than 1.5km from a toll
plaza. These estimates are significantly negative, suggesting that the effects we find in the
difference-in-difference specification are not driven primarily by changes in unobservable fixed
characteristics of mothers in the neighborhood of toll plazas after E-ZPass.
3.6 Discussion
Our results suggest that the adoption of E-ZPass was associated with significant improve-
ments of infant health. While these results are robust to a number of different specifications,
in the absence of a “first stage” it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of these effects.
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Unfortunately, there is only one air quality monitor located within 2km of a toll plaza, but it
happens to be located just .15km from a toll plaza in our study. In this section we use data
from this monitor as well as other air quality monitors maintained by the EPA as various
control groups, allowing us to estimate the effect of E-ZPass. We combine our results with
information from the engineering studies discussed above to try to interpret our reduced form
coefficients.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 shows difference in difference estimates of the effects of E-
ZPass on daily mean NO2 and SO2 levels at the one monitor that we observe within 2km of a
toll plaza. These models compare pollution at this “close” monitor to pollution at all monitors
further than 2km from a toll plaza, before and after E-ZPass. The model includes year, month,
and day of week effects, as well as monitor specific time trends. Furthermore, since pollution
is correlated with weather, we control for daily weather variation using quadratic polynomials
in minimum temperature, maximum temperature, and precipitation at the site of the air
quality monitor. It is interesting to compare the effects on NO2 and SO2 , because cars are a
major source of the former but not of the later. The estimates indicate that NO2 fell by 10.8
percent, post E-ZPass, while SO2, showed no change. The remaining columns of Table 3.7
show five similar models each estimated using a randomly selected monitor from the sample
of all NO2 monitors over 2km from a toll plaza as a control. Four of the five show a significant
decline in NO2 at the toll plaza monitor relative to the others, and these declines range from
6.5 to 20.8 percent.
It is unfortunate that this monitor does not also measure CO, since CO has been specif-
ically linked to poorer infant health outcomes in these data. However, the Saka, United
States. Dept. of Transportation. Office of Innovation, Education, for Transportation Studies,
and (US) (2000) and Venigalla and Krimmer (2006) studies discussed above suggest that a
10 percent reduction in NO2 due to E-ZPass would likely be accompanied by at least a 40
percent reduction in CO. Currie, Neidell, and Schmieder (2009)estimate that a one part per
million (ppm) change in ambient CO levels among women within 10km of an air monitor
in New Jersey reduced the incidence of low birth weight by 10.6 percent. While the mean
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levels of CO among all mothers within 10km of an air monitor was 1.64ppm, the standard
deviation was .8, suggesting that more highly polluted areas of the state had ambient levels
over 3 ppm. Hence, the finding that E-Zpass led to reductions in the incidence of low birth
weight of 8.5-11.3 percent within 2km of a toll plaza seems reasonable.
3.7 Conclusions
We provide the first estimates of the effect of improvements in traffic congestion on infant
health. We show that E-ZPass reduced the incidence of prematurity and low birth weight
in the vicinity of toll plazas by 6.7-9.1 percent and 8.5-11.3 percent respectively. These are
large but not implausible effects given the correlations between proximity to traffic and birth
outcomes found in previous studies. For example, Slama, Morgenstern, Cyrys, Zutavern,
Herbarth, Wichmann, Heinrich, et al. (2007) measure levels of PM2.5 (particulates less than
2.5 microns in diameter) associated with traffic and find that mothers in the highest quartile
of exposure had a risk of birth weight less than 3000 grams that was 1.7 times higher than
mothers in the lowest quartile of exposure. Wilhelm and Ritz (2003) find that the risk of
preterm birth was 8 percent higher in mothers in the highest quartile of a distance weighted
traffic exposure measure, an estimate that is remarkably similar to our own. The strength of
our approach is that our estimates are based on a credible natural experiment rather than
correlations between proximity and outcomes. Our results are robust across a variety of
specifications, providing reassuring evidence on the credibility of the research design.
Our results suggest that policies intended to curb traffic congestion can have significant
health benefits for local populations in addition to the more often cited benefits in terms of
reducing travel costs. Traffic congestion is an increasingly salient issue, with annual congestion
delays experienced by the average peak-period driver increasing 250 percent over the last 25
years. In 2007, a study of 439 U.S. urban areas found that congestion cost about $87.2 billion
in terms of wasted time and fuel (Schrank and Lomax 2010). Our results suggest that these
numbers are lower bounds on the true costs, since the health externalities of traffic congestion
contribute significantly to social costs.
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The recent Institute of Medicine report on the costs of prematurity estimated that the
societal cost was $51,600 per infant (in 2005 dollars, Behrman and Butler (2007)). Hence, the
6.7-9.1 percent reduction in the risk of prematurity (from a baseline of around 10 percent)
in the 29,677 infants born within 2km of a toll plaza in the 3 years after the implementation
of E-ZPass can be valued at approximately $9.8-$13.2 million. While it is difficult to know
precisely how many of the roughly 4 million infants born each year in the U.S. are affected by
traffic congestion, estimates from the United States Census Bureau: American Housing Survey
(2003) suggest that 26 percent of occupied units suffer from street noise or other disamenities
due to traffic; hence, nationwide roughly 1 million infants per year are potentially affected.
This figure suggests that nationwide reductions in prenatal exposure to traffic congestion
could reduce preterm births by as many as 8,600 annually, a reduction that can be valued
at $444 million per year. Since we have focused on only one of the possible health effects of
traffic congestion, albeit an important one, the total health benefits of reducing pollution due
to traffic congestion are likely to be much greater.
106 CHAPTER 3. TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND INFANT HEALTH
Figure 3.1: Locations of Toll Plazas and Major Roadways in New Jersey and Pennsylvania
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Figure 3.2: Research Design Showing 1.5km and 2km Treatment Radii and Control Group
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Note: Smoothed plots of treatment and control groups using locally weighted regression. To facilitate compu-
tation, observations are first grouped into 0.1-mile bins by treatment and control and averaged. The weights
are applied using a tricube weighting function (Cleveland 1979) with a bandwidth of 1.
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Note: Smoothed plots of treatment and control groups using locally weighted regression. To facilitate compu-
tation, observations are first grouped into 0.1-mile bins by treatment and control and averaged. The weights
are applied using a tricube weighting function (Cleveland 1979) with a bandwidth of 1.
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Low Birthweight by day
Before and After EZPass
Note: Smoothed plots of treatment and control groups using locally weighted regression. The weights are
applied using a tricube weighting function (Cleveland 1979) with a bandwidth of 1.
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Note: Smoothed plots of treatment and control groups using locally weighted regression. The weights are
applied using a tricube weighting function (Cleveland 1979) with a bandwidth of 1.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference Sample
<2km E-Zpass <2km E-Zpass >2km & <10km >2km & <10km >10km
Outcomes Before After E-Zpass Before E-Zpass After Toll Plaza
Premature 0.095 0.095 0.102 0.109 0.085
Low Birth Weight 0.082 0.078 0.089 0.092 0.078
Controls
Mother Hispanic 0.291 0.332 0.165 0.229 0.054
Mother Black 0.16 0.173 0.233 0.264 0.047
Mother Education 13.12 13.2 13.276 13.24 12.92
Mother HS Dropout 0.169 0.164 0.154 0.163 0.173
Mother Smoked 0.089 0.075 0.109 0.086 0.152
Teen Mother 0.073 0.061 0.082 0.069 0.079
Birth Order 1.3 1.37 1.39 1.46 1.68
Multiple Birth 0.028 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.033
Child Male 0.51 0.512 0.514 0.512 0.512
Distance to Roadway 1.099 1.074 1.507 1.482 21
Number of Obs. 33,758 29,677 190,904 161,145 185,795
New Jersey Obs. 26,415 26,563 128,547 133,560 70,484
Penn. Obs 7,343 3,114 62,357 27,585 115,311
Panel B: Mothers with More than One Birth in Sample
Ever Birth<2km Ever Birth<2km Never Birth<2km Never Birth<2km
E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza
Outcomes Before After Before After
Premature 0.088 0.099 0.092 0.103
Low Birth Weight 0.081 0.077 0.086 0.086
Controls
Mother Hispanic 0.167 0.29 0.088 0.161
Mother Black 0.145 0.157 0.169 0.171
Mother Education 12.78 12.6 12.75 13.13
Mother HS Dropout 0.168 0.201 0.178 0.162
Mother Smoked 0.113 0.076 0.135 0.095
Teen Mother 0.041 0.044 0.072 0.047
Birth Order 1.575 1.708 1.598 1.735
Multiple Birth 0.03 0.037 0.033 0.046
Child Male 0.513 0.512 0.512 0.512
Distance to Highway 3.702 2.561 5.598 5.3
Total # Obs. 179,537 58,180 1,640,118 485,351
NJ Obs. 85,565 47,012 678,025 352,751
PA Obs. 93,972 11,168 962,093 132,600
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Housing Sales Data (New Jersey Only)
<2km E-Zpass <2km E-Zpass >2km & <10km >2km & <10km
Before After E-Zpass Before E-Zpass After
Sales Price 94,883 126,006 95,518 116,691
Assessed Land Value 42,146 43,219 46,551 46,126
Assessed Building Value 78,234 81,437 70,093 69,752
Total Assessed Value 119,166 123,640 115,129 114,403
Year Built 1952 1954 1951 1950
Square Footage 1,573 1,569 1,646 1,675
# Obs. 22,350 22,604 105,341 102,048
Note: Notes: All observations in Panels A and C are selected to be within 3km of a busy roadway. Housing
price data is only for New Jersey and pertains to housing units, not mothers, as described in the text. The
housing price data has been deflated by the CPI (base year=1993).
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Table 3.2: Regressions of Maternal Characteristics on E-Zpass Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother Teen Mother Housing
Panel 1 Black Hispanic Yrs. Ed Dropout Mother Smoked Sale Price
<2km toll*after EZpass -0.011 -0.01 0.037 -0.007 -0.001 .005* 0.149
(0.011) (0.010) (0.040) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.103)
# observations 397,201 406,641 406,198 397,201 412,884 402,590 252,343
Panel 2
<1.5km toll*after EZpass -0.014 -0.01 0.013 -0.003 0.001 .007** 0.031
(0.055) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.106)
# observations 397,201 406,641 406,198 397,201 412,884 402,590 252,343
Note: Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Each coefficient in columns 1-6 is from a regression
that also included controls for being within 2km (or 1.5km) of a toll plaza, year of birth, month of birth,
indicators for each toll plaza, an indicator for post EZpass at nearest toll plaza, and distance to highway.
Housing sale price regressions in column 7 include year and month of sale, indicators for nearest toll plaza, an
indicator for condo units, distance to highway, municipality fixed effects, square footage (in categories including
dummies for missing), and age (in categories, including dummies for missing). Standard errors in brackets. A
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. A * indicates
significance at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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Table 3.3: Regressions of Birth Outcomes on E-Zpass Adoption
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel 1 Prematurity Prematurity LBW LBW
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0094 -0.0093
[0.0039]** [0.0034]** [0.0032]** [0.0028]**
R-squared 0.0044 0.0034 0.0032 0.0028
Panel 2
<1.5km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0088 -0.0098 -0.0077 -0.0084
[0.0051]* [0.0048]** [0.0035]** [0.0032]**
R-squared 0.0042 0.0048 0.0035 0.0032
Maternal Characteristics no yes no yes
# Obs. 405,802 405,802 409,673 409,673
Note: Each coefficient is from a different regression. All regressions also included controls for being within
2km (or 1.5km) of a toll plaza, year of birth, month of birth, toll plaza indicators, an indicator for post E-Zpass,
and distance to highway. Maternal characteristics include: mother black, mother hispanic, mother education
(<hs, hs, some college, college +), mother age (19-24, 25-34, 35+), smoking, multiple birth, gender, and birth
order, and indicators for missing values. Standard errors in brackets. A ** indicates that the estimate is
statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. A * indicates significance at the 90 percent level
of confidence.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Checks, Birth Outcomes on E-Zpass Adoption
[1] [2]
Panel 1: All obs. within 5km toll plaza
Prematurity LBW
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0064 -0.007
[0.0035]* [0.0028]**
R-squared 0.104 0.1224
# Obs. 255,711 258,226
Panel 2: Add time trend for areas near toll plazas
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0074 -0.0084
[0.0035]** [0.0029]**
R-squared 0.1053 0.1222
# Obs. 405,802 409,673
Panel 3: Propensity Trimmed, .1<=P(near toll)<=.9
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0079 -0.0086
[0.0037]** [0.0036]**
R-squared 0.1011 0.1222
# Obs. 123,467 124,672
Panel 4: Non-African Americans Only
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0052 -0.0059
[0.0035] [0.0029]**
R-squared 0.1078 0.1267
# Obs. 311,038 314,269
Panel 5: African-Americans Only
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0213 -0.0242
[0.0067]** [0.0064]**
R-squared 0.0882 0.0989
# Obs. 94,764 95,404
Panel 6: Non-Smokers Only
<2km toll*after E-Zpass -0.0075 -0.0079
[0.0032]** [0.0028]**
R-squared 0.1074 0.1232
# Obs. 367,465 371,089
Note: See Table 3.3
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Table 3.5: Using Linear and Exponential Functions of Distance from Toll Plaza
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Prematurity Prematurity LBW LBW
Argmax(2-Distance,0)×after E-Zpass -0.0019 -0.0043
[0.0035] [0.0027]
1/(edistance)×after E-Zpass -0.0153 -0.0225
[0.0093]* [0.0080]**
R-squared 0.1051 0.1051 0.122 0.122
# observations 405,802 405,802 409,673 409,673
Note: All regressions control for after E-Zpass, a dummy for being less than 2km from a toll plaza, distance
to highway, and fixed effects for toll plaza, year, and month of birth, as well as the full set of maternal
characteristics listed for Table 3. Standard errors in brackets. A ** indicates that the estimate is statistically
significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. A * indicates significance at the 90 percent level of confidence.
Table 3.6: Mother Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effects of E-Zpass
Low
Panel A Prematurity Birth Weight








Note: The sample includes all mothers with more than 1 birth who ever gave birth within 2km of a toll
plaza. Each coefficient is from a different regression. All regressions also included controls for being within
2km (or 1.5km) of a toll plaza, year of birth, month of birth, an indicator for post E-Zpass at nearest plaza, toll
plaza indicators, and distance to highway. Maternal characteristics include: mother’s age (19-24, 25-34, 35+),
smoking, and mother’s education (<12, 12, 13-15, 16+). Child gender and birth order are also controlled.
Standard errors in brackets. A ** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level
of confidence. A * indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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Table 3.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects of E-Zpass on Pollution
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
NO2 SO2 NO2 NO2 NO2 NO2 NO2
All Control All Control Random Random Random Random Random
Panel 1 Monitors Monitors Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 4 Control 5
<2km toll -0.108 0.053 -0.208 -0.090 -0.065 -0.181 0.018
×after E-Zpass [0.019]** [0.034] [0.028]** [0.024]** [0.017]** [0.023]** [0.038]
# observations 84,159 128,513 6,361 6,449 6,453 6,448 6,421
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Columns 1 and 2 use all monitors over 2km from a
toll plaza as controls. Columns 3-7 each use a randomly selected control monitor. Regressions also included
controls for being within 2km of a toll plaza, year of birth, month of birth, indicators for each toll plaza, an
indicator for post E-Zpass at nearest toll plaza, and distance to highway. Dependent variable is the log daily
mean pollution level for the indicated pollutant. Standard errors in brackets. A ** indicates that the estimate
is statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. A * indicates significance at the 90 percent level
of confidence.
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Table 3.8: Appendix Table: Means for 1.5km Sample
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference Sample
<1.5km E-Zpass <1.5km E-Zpass >1.5km & <10km >1.5km & <10km
Outcomes Before After E-Zpass Before E-Zpass After
Premature 0.096 0.096 0.102 0.108
Low Birth Weight 0.082 0.08 0.089 0.091
Controls
Mother Hispanic 0.272 0.309 0.176 0.239
Mother Black 0.159 0.174 0.227 0.256
Mother Education 13.25 13.31 13.25 13.23
Mother HS Dropout 0.152 0.152 0.156 0.164
Mother Smoked 0.088 0.078 0.107 0.085
Teen Mother 0.067 0.058 0.082 0.069
Birth Order 1.3 1.37 1.38 1.45
Multiple Birth 0.029 0.034 0.031 0.036
Child Male 0.511 0.518 0.513 0.512
Distance to Roadway 0.976 0.939 1.484 1.459
Number of Obs. 16,934 14,856 207,728 175,966
New Jersey Obs. 12,980 13,175 141,982 146,948
Penn. Obs 3,954 1,681 65,746 29,018
Panel B: Mothers with More than One Birth in Sample
Ever Birth<1.5km Ever Birth<1.5km Never Birth<1.5km Never Birth<1.5km
E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza E-Zpass Plaza
Outcomes Before After Before After
Premature 0.0883 0.0988 0.0914 0.103
Low Birth Weight 0.0803 0.0755 0.0862 0.0857
Controls
Mother Hispanic 0.164 0.286 0.0916 0.168
Mother Black 0.144 0.156 0.168 0.17
Mother Education 12.81 12.54 12.75 13.11
Mother HS Dropout 0.163 0.202 0.178 0.164
Mother Smoked 0.113 0.0756 0.134 0.0939
Teen Mother 0.0414 0.0417 0.07 0.0464
Birth Order 1.581 1.723 1.596 1.733
Multiple Birth 0.0306 0.0382 0.0331 0.0451
Child Male 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512
Distance to Highway 3.612 2.502 5.509 5.159
Total # Obs. 94,473 31,188 1,725,182 512,343
NJ Obs. 45,215 25,376 718,375 374,387
PA Obs. 49,258 5,812 1,006,807 137,956
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Housing Sales Data (New Jersey Only)
<1.5km E-Zpass <1.5km E-Zpass >1.5km & <10km >1.5km & <10km
Before After E-Zpass Before E-Zpass After
Sales Price 95,033 125,567 95,444 117,600
Assessed Land Value 45,270 45,462 45,825 45,608
Assessed Building Value 84,445 87,394 70,219 70,186
Total Assessed Value 128,899 131,867 114,531 114,363
Year Built 1953 1955 1951 1950
Square Footage 1,593 1,551 1,639 1,670
# Obs. 11,586 12,214 116,105 112,438
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Abstract
Airports are some of the largest sources of air pollution in the United States. We demon-
strate that daily airport runway congestion contributes significantly to local pollution levels
and contemporaneous health of residents living nearby and downwind from airports. Our re-
search design exploits the fact that network delays originating from large airports on the East
Coast increase runway congestion in California, which in turn increases daily pollution levels
around California airports. Using the component of California air pollution driven by airport
congestion, we find that carbon monoxide (CO) leads to significant increases in hospitalization
rates for asthma, respiratory, and heart related emergency room admissions that are an order
of magnitude larger than conventional estimates: A one standard deviation increase in daily
pollution levels leads to an additional $1 million in hospitalization costs for respiratory and
heart related admissions for the 6 million individuals living within 10km (6.2 miles) of the 12
largest airports in California. While infants and the elderly are more sensitive to air pollution,
we also find significant relationships for the adult population. The health impacts are driven
by CO, not NO2 or O3, and occur at levels far below existing EPA mandates. Our results
suggest there may be sizable morbidity benefits from lowering the existing CO standard.
4.1 Introduction
The effect of pollution on health remains a highly debated topic. The Clean Air Act (CAA)
requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop and enforce regulations to
protect the general public from exposure to airborne contaminants that are known to be
hazardous to human health. In January 2011, the EPA preliminarily decided against lowering
the existing CAA carbon monoxide standard due to insufficient evidence that relatively low
carbon monoxide levels adversely affect human health. In order to assess the benefits and
cost of lowering the standard, accurate estimates are needed that link contemporaneous air
pollution exposure to observable health outcomes. However, these estimates are hard to
come by as pollution is rarely randomly assigned across individuals, and individuals who
live in areas of high pollution may be in worse health for reasons unrelated to pollution.
Preferences for clean air may covary with unobservable determinants of health (e.g., exercise)
which can lead to various forms of omitted variable bias in regression analysis. Moreover,
heterogeneity across individuals in either preference for, or health responses to, ambient air
pollution implies that individuals may self-select into locations on the basis of these unobserved
differences. In both cases, estimates of the health effects of ambient air pollution may reflect
the response of various subpopulations and/or spurious correlations pertaining to omitted
variables. While recent research attempts to address the issue of non-random assignment
using various econometric tools such as fixed effects or instrumental variables, these studies
often focus on infant health at annual frequencies (Chay and Greenstone 2003d, Currie and
Neidell 2005). Much less is known about short-term, daily effects of ambient air pollution on
the health of the more general population.2
2 An important exception in the economics literature is recent work by Moretti and Neidell (2011), who
examine how daily inpatient hospitalizations in Los Angeles respond to fluctuations in ozone driven by the
arrival of ships to the port of Los Angeles. There is also a literature in epidemiology which focuses on
daily responses to air pollution (see e.g. Ito, Thurston, and Silverman (2007), Linn, Avol, Peng, Shamoo, and
Hackney (1987), Peel, Tolbert, Klein, Busico Metzger, Flanders, Todd, Mulholland, Ryan, and Frumkin (2005),
Schildcrout, Sheppard, Lumley, Slaughter, Koenig, and Shapiro (2006), Schwartz, Spix, Touloumi, Bacha´rova´,
Barumamdzadeh, le Tertre, Piekarksi, de Leon, Po¨nka¨, Rossi, Saez, and Schouten (1996)). The work in our
paper complements the existing epidemiological literature by focusing on issues pertaining to measurement
error, avoidance behavior, and self-selection bias in the context of susceptibility to pollution exposure. Each of
these issues are critically important to providing unbiased estimates of the causal relationship between pollution
and health. The instrumental variables approach in this paper exploits arguably exogenous pollution shocks
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We develop a novel framework for estimating the contemporaneous effect of air pollution
on health using variation in local air pollution driven by airport runway congestion. Air-
ports are one of the largest sources of air pollution in the United States with Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) being the largest source of carbon monoxide in the state of
California (Environmental Protection Agency 2005). A large fraction of airport emissions
come from airplanes, with the largest aggregate channel of emissions stemming from airplane
idling (Transportation Research Board 2008). We show that airport runway congestion, as
measured by the total time planes spent taxiing between the gate and the runway, is a signifi-
cant predictor of local pollution levels. Since local runway congestion may be correlated with
other determinants of pollution such as weather, we exploit the fact that California airport
congestion is driven by network delays that began in large airports outside of California.3 A
recent article in the New York Times (New York Times January 27, 2012) provides a useful
motivation:
[Airplane] delays ripple across the country. A third of all delays around the nation
each year are caused, in some way, by the New York airports, according to the
F.A.A. Or, as Paul McGraw, an operations expert with Airlines for America, the
industry trade group, put it, “When New York sneezes, the rest of the national
airspace catches a cold.”
Our analysis hence links health outcomes of residents living near California airports to changes
in air pollution driven by runway congestion at airports on the East Cast. The identifying vari-
ation in pollution is caused by events several thousand miles away (e.g., weather in Atlanta),
which is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of health in California.
This paper makes five primary contributions to the existing literature. To our knowledge,
we are the first to show how runway traffic congestion significantly increases pollution levels
that are unlikely to be known by local residents, allowing us to simultaneously address issues of measurement
error and avoidance behavior.
3This relationship is well known within the transportation literature (Welman, William, and Hechtman
2010). Optimal airplane scheduling incorporates anticipated ripple effect. For example, Pyrgiotisa, Maloneb,
and Odoni (Forthcoming) use queueing theory to simulate how delays propagate through the system. They
quote a study that found a multiplier effect of seven, i.e., each 1 hour delay of a particular airplane leads to a
combined 7 hours delay for the airline.
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in areas surrounding airports. The increase in demand for air travel has led to large increases
in airport runway congestion (Carlin and Park 1970, Morrison and Winston 2007). Average
airplane taxi time, measured by the amount of time that an airplane spends between the
gate and runway, has increased by 23 percent from 1995 to 2007 (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics 2008). This increase in average congestion, combined with increased number of
flights, translates to an aggregate increase of over 1 million airplane hours per year spent idling
on runways over this time period (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2008). Our estimates
suggest this increase also leads to significantly higher levels of ambient air pollution. We find
that a one standard deviation increase in daily airplane taxi time at LAX increases pollution
levels of carbon monoxide (CO) by 23 percent of a standard deviation in areas within 10km
(6.2 miles) of the airport. The marginal effect of taxi time is largest in areas adjacent to an
airport or directly downwind, and the effect fades with distance.
Second, this paper develops a novel approach to estimating the contemporaneous effect
of pollution on health. Our solution to the identification problem is to exploit the fact that
airports generate a tremendous amount of local ambient air pollution on a given day, with areas
downwind of an airport experiencing much larger changes in ambient air pollution relative
to areas upwind. We leverage the quasi-experimental variation in both airport activity (as
mediated through network delays) and wind direction to estimate the causal effect of air
pollution on contemporaneous health. While there are many epidemiological studies that link
pollution and health, our approach is novel as it relies on arguably exogenous daily shocks
that originated several thousand miles away and are unknown to the local population. The
instrumental variables setting allows us to simultaneously address issues pertaining to both
avoidance behavior and classical forms of measurement error, each of which lead to significant
downward bias in conventional dose-response estimates. The primary estimation framework
examines how zip code level emergency room admissions covary with these quasi-experimental
increases in air pollution stemming from airports. A one standard deviation increase in
pollution explains roughly one third of average daily admissions for asthma problems. It
leads to an additional $1 million in hospitalization costs for respiratory and heart related
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admissions of individuals within 10km of one of the 12 largest airports in California. This is
likely a significant lower bound of the true cost as the willingness to pay to avoid a sickness
might be significantly larger than the medical reimbursement cost. Our baseline IV estimates
are an order of magnitude higher than uninstrumented fixed effects estimates, highlighting the
importance of accounting for measurement error and/or avoidance behavior in conventional
estimators. We find no evidence that airport runway congestion affects diagnoses unrelated
to air pollution such as bone fractures, stroke, or appendicitis.
Third, while most existing literature focuses on the health impacts of infants or elderly,
we are able to examine the health responses of the entire population. Consistent with the
previous literature, we find that infants as well as the elderly are most sensitive to ambient
air pollution. However, given the size of pollution shocks that are caused by daily airport
congestion, we are also able to identify effects on the general adult population aged 20-64.
While the adult population is relatively less sensitive to pollution exposure, the total number
of additional respiratory problems caused by a one-standard deviation increase in pollution is
largest for the general population given its large share of the overall population. The impact
of CO pollution on respiratory problems of infants is roughly one-fourth of the total impact
and an even smaller fraction for heart related diagnoses. Studies that focus on infants will
give a lower bound on the overall impact.
Fourth, we focus on morbidity outcomes using Inpatient as well as Emergency Room
admission data. While previous research has focused predominantly on the effects of pollution
on mortality, we examine the effects of daily variation in pollution on morbidity. At lower
pollution levels, fluctuations in pollution might not be fatal but result in sicknesses that can
be treated. In addition, previous work using administrative hospital records has mostly relied
on Inpatient data from hospital discharge records. These records consist only of patients
who, upon admission, spent at least one night in the hospital. In case of respiratory distress,
patients are often not admitted overnight. We show that estimates using only Outpatient
data lead to underestimates of the pollution-health relationship.
Fifth, we estimate the contemporaneous effect of multiple pollutants simultaneously. Since
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short-term fluctuations among ambient air pollutants are highly correlated, it has traditionally
been difficult to decipher which pollutant is responsible for adverse health outcomes. Our
solution to this identification problem is to rely on the fact that wind speed and wind direction
transport individual pollutants in different ways. By using interactions between taxi time,
wind speed, and wind angle from airports, we can pin down the direct effect of each pollutant,
while holding the others constant. We use over-identified models to instrument for several
pollutants simultaneously. CO is responsible for the large majority of the observed increase
in hospital admissions.
Finally, we present several sensitivity checks of results that do not alter our conclusions.
Since it is possible that California airport delays impact airports on the East Coast, which
then feedback to California airports, we focus on morning airport congestion in the East. Due
to the difference in time zones, very few flights from California reach East Coast airports
before 12pm. Estimates remain similar to our baseline estimates. We also estimate a random
coefficients version of our baseline empirical model that provides a simple test of non-random
sorting behavior. We find no evidence that individuals sort according to their relative sus-
ceptibility to air pollution, which is likely due to the fact that we focus on very small ranges
around an airport. A distributed lag model finds no evidence for delayed impacts or forward
displacement, i.e., that individuals on the brink of an asthma or heart attack may experience
an episode that would have otherwise occurred in the next few days anyway. A Poisson model
linking sickness counts to pollution levels gives comparable estimates to our baseline linear
probability model, which does not account for the truncation of daily sickness rates at zero.
Our findings have three policy implications. First, in January 2011, the EPA preliminarily
decided against lowering the existing CAA carbon monoxide standard due to insufficient
evidence that relatively low carbon monoxide levels adversely affect human health. Our
estimates suggest that daily variation in ambient air pollution has economically significant
health effects at levels below current EPA mandates.
Second, congestion at major airports has been steadily increasing over the past 15 years,
and some researchers have argued that congestion is an unfortunate, but necessary, conse-
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quence of the “hub and spoke” system which provides large benefits to travelers (Mayer and
Sinai 2003).4 An important potential externality of congestion beyond the value of lost time
are health effects due to increasing pollution levels. As suggested in previous research, pollu-
tion externalities associated with congestion should be counted in a full benefit-cost analysis of
congestion. Our results are complimentary to the recent evidence showing automobile traffic
congestion influences health outcomes of nearby residents (Currie and Walker 2011).
Third, a significant portion of taxi time is avoidable as it is a direct consequence of an
inefficient queueing system. Most airports require airplanes to push from the gate to enter a
waiting queue. If idling planes during taxi time cause significant local air pollution, a better
airplane queuing system would require airplanes to wait at the gate until they are cleared for
takeoff.5 In addition, the increased costs of congestion externalities through adverse health of
local communities suggests that congestion or landing fees as airports, designed to limit peak
runway usage, may have additional co-benefits in the form of improved local air quality.
4.2 Background: Airports, Airplanes, and Air Pollution
Regulators have long been aware of the pollution generated by cars, trucks, and public transit.
There have been countless legislative policies designed to curtail harmful emissions from these
sources (Auffhammer and Kellogg 2011). However, aircraft and airport emissions have only
recently become the subject of regulatory scrutiny, although little has been done to reduce or
manage emissions generated by airports and air travel. While there has been some effort to
curtail the substantial CO2 emissions generated by aircraft,6 there has been relatively little
effort to control or contain some of the more pernicious air pollutants generated by jet engines.
This lack of regulatory scrutiny can be traced back to the way in which pollutants are regulated
4There was a significant drop in flights and congestion after September 11th, 2001, but the increase in flights
and congestion has nearly regained its pre-9/11 trend.
5Currently, airplane operators are keen on pushing off the gate as their on-time departure statistics are
based on when they push from the gate and not when they take off from the runway. Moreover, sometimes
departing planes have to push from the gateway to make space for incoming planes.
6The European Union has recently approved greenhouse gas measures, which oblige airlines, regardless of
nationality, that land or take off from an airport in the European Union to join the emissions trading system
starting on January 1, 2012.
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in the United States under the Clean Air Act. Current Federal law preempts all federal, state,
and local agencies except the Federal Aviation Administration from establishing measures to
reduce emissions from aircraft due to potential interstate and international commerce conflicts
that might arise from other decentralized regulations.7
Aircraft jet engines, like many other mobile sources, produce carbon dioxide (CO2), ni-
trogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), oxides of sulfur (SOx), unburned or partially
combusted hydrocarbons (also known as volatile organic compounds, or VOCs), particulates,
and other trace compounds (Federal Aviation Administration 2005a). Each of these pollu-
tants are emitted at different rates during various phases of operation, such as idling, taxing,
takeoff, climbing, and landing. NOx emissions are higher during high power operations like
takeoff when combustor temperatures are high. On the other hand, CO emissions are higher
during low power operations like taxiing when combustor temperatures are low and the engine
is less efficient (Federal Aviation Administration 2005a).8 Even though the aircraft engine is
often idling during taxi-out, the per minute CO and NOx emissions factors are higher than
at any other stage of a flight. Combining this with the long duration of taxi-out times during
peak periods of the day, total taxiing over the course of a day can add up to a substantial
amount. Consistent with these facts, Los Angeles International airport is estimated to be the
largest point source of CO emissions in the state of California and the third largest of NOx
(Environmental Protection Agency 2005).
Airports provide a particularly compelling setting through which to estimate the contem-
poraneous relationship between air pollution and health. Not only are airports some of the
largest polluters of ambient air pollution in the United States but they also have extraordi-
narily rich data on daily operating activity, detailing for each flight the length of time spent
taxiing to and from the gate before takeoff and after landing. This allows for a precise un-
derstanding of the aggregate amount of daily runway congestion at airports. Moreover, daily
runway congestion at airports exhibits a great degree of residual variation even after control-
7Currently, the Environmental Protection Agency has an agreement with the FAA to voluntarily regulate
ground support equipment at participating airports known as the Voluntary Airport Low Emission (VALE)
program (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2004).
8As a result, reducing engine power for a given operation like takeoff or climb out generally increases the
rate of CO emissions and reduces the rate of NOx emissions.
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ling for normal scheduling patterns. Much of the variation in runway congestion is driven by
network delays propagating from major airport hub delays thousands of miles away. Network
delays at distant airports serve as an ideal instrumental variable for local pollution; the effect
of a snow storm in Chicago on congestion at LAX should be orthogonal to any other con-
founding influences of air pollution in the Los Angeles area. In addition, local residents are
likely unaware of increases in taxi time and hence cannot engage in self-protective behavior.
Lastly, every airport has detailed weather data, allowing researchers to exploit the spatial
distribution of airport generated pollution. We can therefore estimate how areas downwind
of an airport on a given day are disproportionately affected by runway congestion relative
to areas upwind. Understanding this spatial variation in pollutant transport improves the
efficiency of our estimates, while also providing important tests of the validity of our research
design.
4.3 Data
This project uses the most comprehensive data currently available on airport traffic, air pol-
lution, weather, and daily measures of health in California. This data is rich in both temporal
and spatial dimension, allowing for fine-grained analysis of how daily airport congestion im-
pacts areas downwind of an airport on a given day. The various datasets and linkages are
described in more detail below.
4.3.1 Airport Traffic Data
A useful feature of a study involving airports is the detailed nature of daily flight data. The
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) Airline On-Time Performance Database contains
flight-level information by all certified U.S. air carriers that account for at least one percent
of domestic passenger revenues. It has a wealth of information on individual flights: flight
number, the origin and departure airport, scheduled departure and arrival times, actual de-
parture and arrival times, the time the aircraft left the runway and when it touches down.
We construct a daily congestion measure for each of the 12 major airports in California by
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aggregating the combined taxi time of all airplanes at an airport. This measure consists of
(i) the time airplanes spend between leaving the gateway and taking off from the runway and
(ii) the time between landing and reaching the gate. An interesting feature of aggregate daily
taxi time is the large amount of residual variation remaining after controlling for daily airport
scheduling, weather, and holidays. We relate this variation to local measures of pollution
and health in our econometric analysis. One caveat of the BTS data is that it only includes
information for major domestic airline passenger travel.9 However, as long as international
flights are not treated differently in the queueing system, congestion of national flights should
be a good proxy for overall congestion.
We limit our analysis to the 12 largest airports in California by passenger count. These air-
ports are (including airport call sign in brackets): Burbank (BUR), Los Angeles International
(LAX), Long Beach (LGB), Oakland International (OAK), Ontario International (ONT),
Palm Springs (PSP), San Diego International (SAN), San Francisco International (SFO),
San Jose International (SJC), Sacramento International (SMF), Santa Barbara (SBA), and
Santa Ana / Orange County (SNA). The locations of these airports are shown as blue dots
in Figure 4.1. Average flight statistics at each of these airports are reported in Table 4.10
of the appendix. There is significant variation in daily ground congestion at airports: the
standard deviation of daily taxi time at the largest airport (LAX) is 1852 minutes. Once
we account for year, month, weekday and holiday fixed effects as well as local weather, the
remaining variation is still 891 minutes. Most of the airports are close to urban areas as
they serve the travel needs of these populations. Seven airports in California rank among the
top 50 busiest airports in the nation according to passenger enplanement (Federal Aviation
Administration 2005b).
A potential concern when linking daily airport activity to daily ambient air pollution
levels is that runway congestion in California airports may be highest in the late afternoon
and evening. This would lead us to erroneously misclassify some of the daily airport effects
to the wrong day. Appendix Figure 4.5 plots the distribution of aggregate taxi time within
9In January 2005, international departures (both cargo and passenger) accounted for 8.5% of total de-
partures, whereas cargo (both international and domestic) accounted for 5.9% of all United States airport
departures (Department of Transportation 2009).
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a day. Most ground activity at airports is skewed towards the beginning of the day. We will
address the sensitivity of our estimates towards these issues of misclassification or across-day
spillovers in subsequent sections.
4.3.2 Pollution Data
We construct daily measures of air pollution surrounding airports using the monitoring net-
work maintained by the California Air Resource Board (CARB). This database combines
pollution readings for all pollution monitors administered by CARB, including information
on the exact location of the monitor. Data includes both daily and hourly pollution readings.
We concentrate on the set of monitors with hourly emission readings for CO, NO2, and O3 in
the years 2005-2007.10 The locations of all CO and NO2 monitors in relation to airports are
shown in Figure 4.1.
A unique feature of pollution data is the significant number of missing observations in the
database. We therefore use the following algorithm when we aggregate the hourly data to
daily pollution readings: Our measure of the daily maximum pollution reading is simply the
maximum of all hourly pollution readings. The daily mean is the duration-weighted average
of all hourly pollution readings. We define the duration as the number of hours until the
next reading.11 We prefer this approach to simply taking the arithmetic average of all hourly
readings on a day since hourly pollution data exhibit great temporal dependance. A missing
hourly observation is better approximated by the previous non-missing value than the daily
average. We also keep track of the number of observations per day. In a sensitivity check (not
reported) we rerun the analysis using only monitors with at least 20 or 12 readings per day.12
10While data exists for other pollutants in California, we limit our analysis to using CO, NO2 as they are
directly emitted by airplanes and have better coverage than PM10. O3 forms from VOC and NOx, and the
latter is emitted by airplanes. We do, however, not find that O3 pollution levels are impacted by airport
congestion and hence focus on CO and NO2. While monitor data exists as far back as 1993, our hospital data,
described further in this section, exists only from 2005 onwards.
11Readings occur on the hour of each day ranging from midnight to 11pm. If readings at the beginning of a
day (midnight, 1am, etc) are missing, we adjust the duration of the first reading from midnight to the second
reading. For example, if readings occur on 3am, 5am, and 8am, the 3am reading would be assigned a duration
of 5 hours and the 5am reading would be assigned a duration of 3 hours. By the same token, if the last reading
of a day is not 11pm, the duration of that last reading is from the time of the reading until midnight.
12If a monitor has not a single reading for a day, we approximate it’s value in a three step procedure: (i) we
derive the cumulative density function (cdf) at each monitor; (ii) take the inverse-distance weighted average
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We create daily zip code pollution measures by taking the average monitor reading of all
monitors within 15km of a zip code centroid, weighting by the inverse distance between the
monitor and the zip code centroid.13 Summary statistics are given in Panel A of Table 4.11
in the appendix. Since we have both the longitude and latitude of all airports and zip code
centroids, we are able to derive (i) the distance between the airport and a zip code, and (ii)
the angle at which the zip code is located relative to the airport. In order to leverage the
spatial features of our data, we normalize the angle between a zip code centroid and an airport
to 0 if the zip code is lying to the north of the airport. Degrees are measured in clockwise
fashion, e.g., a zip code that is directly east of an airport will have an angle of 90 degrees.
The angle between an airport and a zip code allows us to explore the link between airport
emissions and pollution downwind of airports using the weather data described next.
4.3.3 Weather Data
We use temperature, precipitation, and wind data in our analysis to both control for the
direct effects of weather on health (Descheˆnes, Greenstone, and Guryan 2009) and also to
leverage the quasi-experimental features of wind direction and wind speed in distributing
airport pollution from airports. Our weather data comes from Schlenker and Roberts (2009),
which provides minimum and maximum temperature as well as total precipitation at a daily
frequency on a 2.5×2.5 mile grid for the entire United States.14 To assign daily weather
observations to an airport or zip code, we use the grid cell in which the zip code centroid is
located. Summary statistics for the zip-code level data are given in Panel B of Table 4.11 in
the appendix.
Average wind speed and wind direction come from the National Climatic Data by the
of the cdf for a given day at all monitors with non-missing data; (iii) we fill the missing observation with the
same percentile of the station’s cdf. For example, if surrounding monitors with non-missing data on average
have pollution levels that correspond to the 80th percentile of their respective distributions, we fill the missing
value of a station with the 80th percentile of it’s own distribution of pollution readings. This procedure gives
us a balanced panel.
13Inverse distance weighting pollution measures has been used to impute pollution in previous research. See
for example, Currie and Neidell (2005).
14There is one exception: in a set of regression models where we estimate the effect of airport weather on taxi
time we use the closest non-missing daily weather weather station data from NOAA’s COOP station data set
for each airport. This is because Schlenker and Roberts (2009) use a spatial interpolation procedure that might
result in artificial correlation between weather data at airports due to the spatial interpolation technique.
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) hourly weather stations. Most
airports have weather stations with hourly readings. We construct wind direction, which is
normalized to equal zero if the wind is blowing northward and counted in clockwise fashion.
If the angles of the zip code and the wind direction are identical, the zip code is hence exactly
downwind from the airport. An angle of 180 degrees implies that the zip code is upwind
from the airport. The hourly wind speed and wind direction is aggregated to the daily level
by calculating the duration-weighted average between readings comparable to the pollution
data above. The distribution of wind directions is shown in Figure 4.2. Airports at the
ocean predominantly have winds coming from the direction of the ocean. For example, Santa
Barbara, located on the only portion of the California coast that runs east-west has winds
blowing northward. Note again that we are measuring the direction in which the wind is
blowing, not from which it is coming. In our empirical analysis, we use this daily variation
in wind speed and wind direction to predict how pollution from airports disproportionately
impacts some zip codes more than others on a given day.
4.3.4 Hospital Discharge and Emergency Room Data
Health effects are measured by overnight hospital admission and emergency room visits to
any hospital in the state of California. We use the California Emergency Department &
Ambulatory Surgery data set for the years 2005-2007.15 The dataset gives the exact admission
date, the zip code of the patient’s residence (as well as the hospital), the age of the patient,
as well as the primary and up to 24 secondary diagnosis codes. An important limitation of
the Emergency Department data is that any person who visits an ER and is subsequently
admitted to an overnight stay drops out of the dataset. This is done to prevent double
counting in California’s hospital admissions records, as overnight hospital stays are logged in
California’s Inpatient Discharge data. Therefore we also obtained Inpatient Discharge data
for all individuals who stayed overnight in a hospital in the years 2005-2007. In our baseline
model we focus on the sum of emergency room visits and overnight stays in a zip code-day
to avoid non-random attrition in the ER data. Focusing only on emergency room admittance
15The Emergency Room data was not collected prior to 2005.
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would suffer from selection bias as higher pollution levels (and more severe health outcomes)
could result in more overnight stays, yet the emergency room numbers would actually appear
smaller.
We count the daily admissions of all people in a zip code who had a diagnosis code
pertaining to three respiratory illnesses: asthma, acute respiratory, and all respiratory. Note
that each category adds additional sickness counts but includes the previous. For example,
asthma attacks are also counted in all respiratory problems. We also count heart related
problems, which Peters, Dockery, Muller, and Mittleman (2001) have shown to be correlated
with pollution. Finally, we include three placebos: stroke, bone fractures, and appendicitis.16
In our baseline model, we count a patient as suffering from a sickness if either the primary or
one of the secondary diagnosis codes lists the illness in question.
We merge the zip code level hospital data with age-specific population counts in each zip
code obtained from both the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. We use the weighted average between
the 2000 (weight 0.4) and 2010 (weight 0.6) counts, as the midpoint of our data is 2006. We
limit our analysis to the 164 zip codes whose centroid lies within 10km of an airport and which
have at least 10000 inhabitants.17 The total population of these 164 zip codes is around 6
million people, or roughly one sixth of the overall population of California. Summary statistics
for the zip codes in the study are given in Panel C of Appendix Table 4.11. We use these
age-specific population counts to construct daily hospitalization rates for zip code. Table 4.12
provides sickness rates per 10 million inhabitants for both the entire population as well as
population subgroups of those over 64 years of age and under 5 years of age.
4.4 Empirical Methodology
We are estimating the link between ground level airport congestion, local pollution levels, and
contemporaneous hospitalization rates for major airports in the state of California. To begin,
16The exact ICD-9 codes are: asthma: [493, 494); acute respiratory: [460,479), [493,495), [500,509), [514,515),
[516,520); all respiratory: [460, 520); heart problems: [410, 430); stroke [430, 439); bone fractures [800, 830);
appendicitis: [540, 544).
17The latter sample restriction excludes 0.8 percent of the total population that lives in a zip code whose
centroid is within 10km of an airport but has less than 10000 inhabitants.
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we consider the effects of increased levels of airport traffic congestion on local measures of
pollution.
4.4.1 Aggregate Daily Taxi Time and Local Pollution Levels
Ambient air pollution is a function of the distance between a point source and the receptor
location, as well as many other atmospheric variables including, but not limited to, wind
speed, wind direction, humidity, temperature, and precipitation. To model the effects of
increases in aggregate airport taxi time on pollution levels, we adopt the following additive
linear regression model
pzat = α1Tat + WztΦ + weekdayt +montht + yeart + holidayt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ZztΓ
+νza + ezat (4.1)
where pollution pzat in zip code z that is paired with airport a on day t is specified as a
function of taxi time Tat and a vector of zip-code level controls Zzt that include weather
controls Wzt (a quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation and wind
speed).18,19 We also control for temporal variation in pollution by including weekday fixed
effects (weekdayt), month fixed effects (montht), and year fixed effects (yeart) as well holiday
fixed effects (holidayt) to limit the influence of airport congestion outliers.20 In a sensitivity
check (available upon request), we instead include day fixed effects, i.e., one for each of the
1095 days, and the results remain robust. Since there may be time-invariant unobserved
determinants of pollution for any given zip code, all regressions include zip code fixed effects,
νza.
The parameter of interest is α1, which tells us the effect of a 1000 minute increase in
aggregate daily ground congestion on local ambient air pollution levels. Increased airplane
18In principle a zip-code z could be paired with more that one airport a. In practice, our baseline model
uses zip codes whose centroid is within 10km of an airport. Each zip code is assigned to exactly one airport as
none is within 10km of two airports.
19Results are robust to different functional forms of weather control variables. Additionally, we have esti-
mated models that exclude all weather controls, and the coefficients for our primary pollutant of interest (CO
see below) are not significantly affected (although the standard errors increase).
20We include fixed effects for New Year, Memorial Day, July 4th, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas,
as well as the three days preceding and following the holiday.
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taxiing leads to an increase in airplane emissions and presumably increases in ambient air
pollution. Hence, we would expect this coefficient to be positive. Consistent estimation of
α1 requires E[Tat · ezat | Zzt, νza] = 0. If there are omitted transitory determinants of local
pollution levels that also covary with ground congestion, then least squares estimates of α1
will be biased. This could occur, for example, if weather adversely affected airport activity
while also affecting local pollution levels.
To address this potential source of bias, we need an instrumental variable that is correlated
with changes in ground congestion at an airport but is unrelated to local levels of pollution.
A natural instrument comes from delays at major airport hubs outside California, which
propagate through the air network as connecting flights are delayed, leading to more ground
congestion at airports in California. The basic logic is that instead of smoothing out scheduling
over the course of the day, planes now arrive in more distinct blocks of time, leading to more
waiting/taxiing by those planes taking off as the runway space is shared. Specifically, we
instrument taxi time at each California airport with taxi time at major airports outside of
California: Atlanta (ATL), Chicago O’Hare (ORD), and New York John F. Kennedy (JFK).21
Appendix Figure 4.4 shows the location of those airports in relation to the California airports.
We estimate the following system of equations via two-stage least squares (2SLS):





αakTktIa + ZatΘ + ωat (4.2)
Model 1: pzat = α1Tat + ZztΓ + νza + ezat (4.3)
Equation (4.2) regresses taxi time at a California airport on taxi time at each of 3 major air-
ports outside of California: Atlanta (ATL), Chicago O’Hare (ORD), and New York Kennedy
(JFK). We allow the coefficients αak in equation (4.2) to vary by airport a by interacting taxi
time with an airport indicator Ia. These interactions allow for heterogeneity in the impact
of delays from major airports outside of California Tkt on each of the California airports Tat.
This is important as the impact of delays in Atlanta on California airports is likely to differ
21These airports were chosen because they are among the largest airports in the country, they serve dif-
ferent regions, and they are subject to different weather systems. The results are robust to different airport
specifications.
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across airports. Our baseline model utilizes 36 instruments (3 airports outside California
interacted with each of the 12 airports in California). We use two-way cluster robust stan-
dard errors for inference, clustering on both zip code and day. The two-way cluster robust
variance-covariance estimator implicitly adjusts standard errors to properly account for both
spatial correlation across zip codes on a given day, which are all due to the same network
delays, as well as within-zip code serial correlation in air pollution over time.22
The standard conditions for consistent estimation of α1 in the context of our 2SLS esti-
mator are that αak 6= 0 in equation (4.2) and E[Tkt · eazt | Zzt, νza] = 0. Subsequent sections
will show that the first condition clearly holds; taxi time at airports on the East Coast leads
to large increases in taxi time at California airports. The second condition requires that the
error term in the pollution equation (4.3) be uncorrelated with taxi time at major airports
outside of California, Tkt. This condition would be violated if ground congestion in Chicago
somehow co-varied with pollution levels in California through reasons unrelated to California
airport congestion due to network delays.
While the second condition is not explicitly testable, our data and research design permit
several indirect tests. First, we show evidence that taxi time in California is predicted by
weather fluctuations at airports inside and outside of California, but the reverse is not true:
weather at the major airports in California has no significant effect on taxi time at Eastern
airports. Second, we show that network delays propagate East to West rather than West to
East. Taxi time in Atlanta is not higher due to increased taxi time in Los Angeles.23 Further
sensitivity checks show that using only taxi time before noon at Eastern Airports or directly
instrumenting with observed weather variables at airports in the Eastern United States has
little impact on our baseline estimates.
We also estimate models similar to equation (4.3), where we interact taxi time (or instru-
22Standard errors clustering on both airport and day tend to be smaller than those using zip code and day.
We choose the latter when conducting inference, as they tend to be the more conservative of the two. Results
with airport and day clustering are available upon request.
23This issue is largely addressed by the difference in time zones between our instrumental variable airports
and California. Airplane traffic in the United States generally starts around 6am in the morning and slows
down in the evening. Due to the change in time zones, a flight that leaves at LAX in the morning to go to one
of the airports does not reach of the three airports outside California before noon. On the other hand, a flight
that leaves at 6am on the East Coast will reach California by 9am.
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mented taxi time) with the distance between an airport and the monitor, i.e.,





αakTktIa + ZatΘ + ωat
Model 2: pzat = α1Tat + α2Tatdza + ZztΓ + νza + ezat (4.4)
The additional coefficient is α2.24 The effect of taxi time on pollution should fade out with
distance, and we would hence expect this coefficient to be negative. The marginal effect of
taxi time in model 2 is α1 + α2dza.
In a third step we also include interactions with wind direction and wind speed. The
intuition is that both wind direction and speed transport pollutants across space. Thus,
holding speed constant, areas downwind should be relatively more affected by aggregate daily
taxi time relative to areas upwind. To model this relationship formally, we let vat be the wind
speed and czat the cosine of the difference between the wind direction and the direction in
which the zip code is located. The variable czat will be equal to 1 in the case that the angle in
which the wind is blowing equals the direction in which the zip code is located, and czat will
be equal to zero when they are at a right angle (the difference is 90 degrees). We allow for
different impacts upwind and downwind. Allowing for all possible time-varying interactions
we get:25





αakTktIa + ZatΘ + ωat
Model 3: pzat = α1Tat + α2Tatdza + α3TatczatI[czat>0] + α4TatczatI[czat<0]
+α5Tatvat + α6TatdzaczatI[czat>0] + α7TatdzaczatI[czat<0]
+α8Tatdzavat + α9TatczatI[czat>0]vat + α10TatczatI[czat<0]vat
+α11TatdzaczatI[czat>0]vat + α12TatdzaczatI[czat<0]vat
+ZztΓ + νza + ezat (4.5)
24We instrument both Tat and Tatdaz with the taxi time outside California Tkt and Tktdaz, i.e., we now have
72 instruments.
25We also include all possible time-varying interactions between distance, wind speed and angle (up and
downwind) without taxi time as pollution levels might vary if the wind comes from a different direction.
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The new coefficients are α3 through α12.26 The predicted signs of these coefficients are less
intuitive. While higher wind speeds can clear the air they may also carry greater amounts
of the pollutant further distances.27 Moreover, downwind areas should have higher pollution
levels relative to those areas upwind, but aircrafts usually start against the wind. To better
interpret the combination of all of these interactions, we plot the marginal effects of this
particular regression model using contour plots in subsequent sections. These contour plots
provide strong visual evidence of the relationship between daily aggregate airport taxi time,
wind speed, wind direction, and local pollution levels.
4.4.2 Aggregate Daily Taxi Time, Local Pollution, and Health
To estimate the pollution-health association in our data we begin by assuming that the rela-
tionship between health and ambient air pollution can be summarized by the following linear
model:
yzat = βpzat + ZztΠ + ηza + zat (4.6)
where the dependent variable yzat is our observable measure of health in zip code z when
paired with airport a on day t.28 The remaining notation is consistent with the previous
models, Zzt are the same weather and time controls and ηza is a zip code fixed effect. Here,
we have made the additional assumption that the relationship between pollution and health
outcomes (β) is homogenous within the population. We relax this assumption in subsequent
sections.
We focus primarily on respiratory related hospital admissions as defined by International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems ICD-9 (Friedman, Powell,
Hutwagner, Graham, and Teague 2001b, Seaton, Godden, MacNee, and Donaldson 1995).
The dependent variable yzat is the number of admissions to either the emergency room or
26We are now instrumenting all 12 interaction of taxi time Tat at the 12 airports by the taxi time at the
three largest airports outside California Tkt, which results in 12×12×3 = 432 instruments.
27Recall that we are already controlling for overall wind speed in Wzt, but it has so far not been interacted
with taxi time or any other weather measure.
28Our analysis implicitly assumes that we can summarize health responses and behavior at the zip code
level (responses between zip codes are more important than responses within zip codes) and that the effect of
interest, β, is stable over time.
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an overnight hospital stay where either the primary or one of the secondary diagnosis code
fell in one of the following admission categories: asthma, acute respiratory, all respiratory,
or heart related diagnoses. These daily zip code counts are scaled by zip code population so
that the dependent variable represents hospitalization rates per 10 million zip code residents.
We also estimate models for diagnoses unrelated to pollution: strokes, bone fractures, and
appendicitis. These outcomes are meant to serve as an important test for the internal validity
of our research design. Since these health outcomes are unrelated to pollution exposure, they
should not be significantly related to changes in pollution.
The coefficient of interest in this model is β which provides an estimate of the effect of a
one unit increase in pollution levels on daily hospitalization rates in zip code z and time t.
Consistent estimation of β requires E[pzat · zat | Zzt, ηza] = 0. The inclusion of a zip code
fixed effect implicitly controls for any time invariant determinants of local health that also
covary with average pollution levels. For example, if relatively disadvantaged households live
in more polluted areas and have poorer health for reasons unrelated to air pollution, then the
zip code fixed effect will control for this time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. However,
least squares estimation of β will be biased if there are time-varying influences of both health
and pollution (e.g., weather), and/or if there is measurement error in pzat. Since we are
proxying for pollution exposure using the average level of pollution in a zip code on a given
day, measurement error might be substantial (i.e. people’s actual exposure to ambient air
pollution might differ significantly from that which is reported by a monitor).
Instrumental variables provide a convenient solution to the bias from omitted variables as
well as the bias introduced from measurement error in the independent variable.29 We use
airport ground congestion as an instrumental variable for local pollution levels in the following
two stage least squares regression model:
Model 1: pzat = α1T̂at + ZztΓ + νza + ezat (4.7)
yzat = βpzat + ZztΠ + ηza + zat (4.8)
29Instrumental variables only solves the bias from measurement error in the independent variable when the
measurement error is classical, namely mean zero and i.i.d. (Griliches and Hausman 1986).
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The first stage regression, equation (4.7), estimates the degree to which instrumented airport
taxi time T̂at predicts local pollution levels in areas surrounding airports.30
The second stage equation uses the predicted values from the first stage to estimate the
impact of local pollution variation on health. We also estimate versions of equation (4.7) using
models that interact T̂at with distance, wind speed, and wind direction as in equations (4.4)
and (4.5), models 2 and 3, respectively.
Aside from the relationship between pollution and health, we are also interested in the
“reduced form” relationship between health outcomes and taxi time. As such, we estimate
models of the following form:
yzat = α1T̂at + ZztΠ + ηza + zat (4.9)
These “reduced form” estimates are directly policy relevant; namely, how does aggregate daily
taxi time impact the health of nearby residents? Understanding the degree to which variation
in airport runway congestion directly impacts health has implications for both managing
congestion through either demand pricing mechanisms (e.g., a congestion tax) or a more
efficient runway queuing system.
4.4.3 Health Outcomes: Alternative Models
We supplement our baseline health regressions with several alternative models, exploring
model specification and model dynamics in more detail. These various regression models are
described in more detail below.
30We are using predicted aggregate taxi time cTat as an instrumental variable in these regression models.
Taxi time is predicted from an auxiliary regression of California taxi time on Eastern airport taxi time using
equation (4.2). Wooldridge (2002, p. 117) presents a weak set of assumptions for which the standard errors
of 2SLS regressions using generated instruments are unbiased. The key assumption turns on strict exogeneity
between the error term in the structural model and the covariates used to generate the instrument in the
auxiliary regression.
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Health Outcomes: Dynamic Effects and Forward Displacement
By looking at the daily response of health outcomes to contemporaneous pollution shocks,
we may be neglecting important dynamic effects of pollution and health. For example, con-
temporaneous exposure to air pollution may have lagged effects on health, leading people to
seek care one or two days after the initial pollution episode. Our contemporaneous regression
models might miss these important lagged impacts. Alternatively, health estimates may be
driven by various forms of forward displacement. Short-term spikes in pollution might lead
individuals on the brink of an asthma or heart attack to experience an episode that would
have otherwise occurred in the next few days anyway. Such behavior would overestimate the
dose-response function as an increase in hospitalization rates is followed by a decrease once
pollution levels subside. We explore the dynamic effects of pollution on health by estimating




βkpza(t−k) + ZztΠ + ηza + zat (4.10)
Instrumented pollution pzat is again obtained using either model 1, 2, or 3 from previous
sections. In the case of forward displacement, the spike in hospital admissions should be
followed by a decrease in admissions, and hence
∑3
k=0 βk < β, where the latter β comes from
the baseline, contemporaneous regression. In a sensitivity check (available upon request) we
include 6 lags and 3 leads.
Health Outcomes: Heterogeneity and Self-Selection
Our baseline models rely upon the relatively unattractive assumption that the relationship
between pollution and health is the same for everyone in the population. If there is hetero-
geneity in a person’s relative susceptibility to pollution (or in how people respond to adverse
health outcomes), then people may sort themselves into locations based on these observed or
unobserved differences. This heterogeneity may manifest itself through access to medical care
or through biological differences in the pollution-health relationship among certain segments of
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the population. Previous research (e.g., Chay and Greenstone (2003d)) and results presented
in subsequent sections of this paper suggest that health effects differ by observable charac-
teristics of the population. If people sort themselves based on this underlying heterogeneity,
then our estimates may identify the average effect of pollution on health for a nonrandom
subpopulation in the data (Willis and Rosen 1979, Garen 1984, Wooldridge 1997, Heckman
and Vytlacil 1998).
We address these issues in various ways. In a sensitivity check, we limit our estimates to
people 65 and older who have guaranteed health insurance in the form of Medicare. Thus,
any heterogeneity in hospitalization should no longer be driven by access to health insurance.
Another concern is that the severity of the particular health shock determines whether a
person will seek emergency care. We therefore also include heart problems as a category,
which are severe enough that patients will seek medical help independent of their insurance
or financial situation. There may also exist significant heterogeneity based on unobservable
characteristics. Previous research suggests that individuals engage in avoidance behavior on
days where pollution is predicted to be high (Neidell 2009), which implies there is likely
heterogeneity in β as well as correlation between β and pzat. Here we develop a framework to
test whether selection on unobserved heterogeneity leads to bias in our estimates.
We draw upon the control function approach to the correlated random coefficient model
(Garen 1984), which is a generalization of the 2SLS approach to the random coefficients model
under assumptions outlined below (Wooldridge 1997, Card 1999). An attractive feature of the
control function model is that it provides an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect
for the population while also providing a straightforward test as to the relative importance of
self-selection bias for our estimates.31
Following Card (1999), we can write our model in a random coefficients framework,
whereby the health outcome, yzat, is related to pollution, pzat, through a linear regression
31This test for self-selection bias has seen wide application in the fields of labor economics and applied
econometrics. In the context of environmental economics, Chay and Greenstone (2005c) use this approach to
test for self-selection bias in the context of peoples’ marginal willingness to pay for clean air.
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model with random slope coefficient βz:
yzat = β¯pzat + (βz − β¯)pzat + ZztΠ + ηza + zat (4.11)
where β¯ denotes the mean of βz, and E[pzat · zat | Zzt, ηza] 6= 0.
Garen (1984) derives a set of assumptions whereby estimation of the random coefficients
model yields a consistent and unbiased estimate of β¯.32 Specifically, one needs an instrumental
variable Tat (in our case taxi time) such that conditional on the instrument, βz is symmetrically
distributed (E[(βz−β¯)|Tat,Zzt, ηza] = 0). The first stage equation relating aggregate daily taxi
time to ambient air pollution is the same as before: pzat = α1Tat +ZztΓ+νza + ezat. The pri-
mary assumptions used when estimating this model are the standard conditional independence
assumptions pertaining to the first and second stage equations, namely E[ezat|Tat,Zzt, ηza] = 0
and E[zat|pzat, Tat,Zzt, ηza] = 0. We also adopt the assumption in Garen (1984) that the
conditional expectation of βz is linear in pzat and Tat, i.e., E[(βz − β¯)|pzat, Tat,Zzt, ηza] =
µppzat +µTTat. Using these assumptions, one can write the conditional expectation of yzat as
E[yzat|pzat, Tat,Zzt, ηza] = β¯pzat + ZztΠ + ηza + γ1êzat + γ2(pzat · êzat) (4.12)
which implies that we can recover consistent estimates of β¯ using control functions for the
last two parameters, respectively êzat and pzat · êzat, where êzat is simply the residual from the
first stage regression of pzat on Tat.33 The advantage of using the control function approach,
relative to the approaches outlined in both Wooldridge (1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil
(1998), is that the parameter estimate of the second control function (γ̂2) provides an implicit
test as to the relative importance of self-selection bias in our model. This model is simply a
more general version of 2SLS, whereby the last term is not normally accounted for in a 2SLS
model. Since the two control functions are generated regressors from a first stage regression,
we use a two-step, block-bootstrap procedure to obtain our standard errors. Specifically, we
32Alternative assumptions necessary to recover unbiased and consistent estimates of β¯ are derived in
Wooldridge (1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil (1998).
33See Card (1999) for details of the derivation.
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sample zip codes with replacement and estimate the full two-stage model for each of the 100
bootstrap draws.34
Health Outcomes: Poisson Model
Since our dependent variable is measured as hospital visits in a given zip code day (before we
convert it to a sickness rate), we also estimate regression models that account for the non-
negative and discrete nature of the data. Specifically, we use a conditional (“fixed effects”)
quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984, Wooldridge
1999).35 To account for the endogeneity of pollution exposure, we generalize the standard
conditional Poisson model into an instrumental variables setting. To do this, we adopt a
control-function approach to the conditional Poisson model (see e.g., Wooldridge (1997) and
Wooldridge (2002)), whereby we include the residual (êzat) from our first stage regression
(i.e., the effect of taxi time on pollution) in our regression equation of interest:
E[szat|pzat, Tat,Zzt, ηza] = ηza exp (βpzat + γ1êzat + ZztΠ) (4.13)
where szat are sickness counts (no longer rates), pzat is the observed pollution level in a county,
and êzat is the residual from one of the first-stage regression of pollution on taxi time using
model 1, 2, or 3. The fixed effect model allows the marginal effect of pollution to differ by
zip code. The model accounts for the fact that zip codes have different number of residents
through the fixed effects ηza.
While including the first-stage error purges the estimates of the various selection biases
outlined above (Wooldridge 2002, p. 663), the standard errors need to be corrected for the
variation coming from the first stage estimation. To account for the first stage sampling error
34Here, the block-bootstrap is equivalent to cluster robust standard errors at the zip code level. We forego
two-way clustering for the random coefficients model presented here to limit the computation burden. In
principal it is possible to block-bootstrap standard errors accounting for two-way clustering at the cost of a
substantial increase in computer time. See for example, Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011). In addition,
as we discuss in subsequent sections, clustering standard errors by zip code gives us comparable results to
two-way clustering by zip code and day.
35The Poisson model is generally preferred to alternative count data models, such as the negative binomial
model, because the Poisson model is more robust to distributional misspecification provided that the conditional
mean is specified correctly (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, Wooldridge 2002).
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in the ezat, we again bootstrap the regression using a block-bootstrap procedure where we
randomly draw the entire history of a zip code with replacement.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Aggregate Daily Taxi Time and Local Pollution Levels
We start by examining the effect of airport congestion on pollution levels in surrounding
areas. Since a significant portion of these pollutants are emitted during airplane taxiing
(Transportation Research Board 2008), we begin by examining the impact of aggregate daily
taxi time on ambient CO and NO2 levels surrounding airports. Taxi time is instrumented using
runway congestion at the three major airports outside of California.36 Appendix Table 4.13
gives the first-stage results of columns (1a) and (2a). There is one noteworthy result: For
major hubs in California, an increase in taxi time at East Coast airports increases taxi time as
delays propagate through the system. On the other hand, the sign reverses for smaller airports:
an increase in taxi time at East Coast airports decreases local taxi time. As Pyrgiotisa,
Maloneb, and Odoni (Forthcoming) point out, propagation through the system can have
“counter-intuitive results.” If planes bunch up at one hub, the effects on close-by commuter
airports can be the opposite as the connectors now arrive more evenly spread. The fact that
congestion increases at some, but not all, airports due to network delay provides evidence that
the research design is absorbing up common shocks. Table 4.1 presents regression estimates
using the specifications outlined in equation (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5), presented in columns a,
b, and c, respectively. Each column represents a different regression, where the dependent
variable in the columns (1a)-(1c) is the daily mean CO measured in parts per billion (ppb).
Columns (2a)-(2c) report regression estimates for daily mean NO2, while columns (3a)-(3c)
report estimates for ozone O3. Taxi time is reported in thousands so that the coefficients in
Table 4.1 report the marginal effect of a 1000 minute increase in taxi time on local pollution
levels. All regressions report robust standard errors, clustering on both zip code and day.37
36OLS estimates are presented in Appendix Table 4.14.
37The heavily over-identified models from equation (4.5) impose significant computational burdens when
estimating IV models containing two-way, cluster-robust standard errors. To circumvent this issue, we report
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Column (1a) suggests that a 1000 minute increase in taxi time increases ambient CO
concentrations in zip codes within 10km of an airport by 40.37ppb (an 8% increase relative to
the mean, or 13% of the day-to-day standard deviation). Since the standard deviation of taxi
time at LAX in Table 4.10 is 1852, a one-standard deviation increase in taxi time leads to 0.23
standard deviation increase in CO pollution of the zip codes around LAX. Column (1b) of
Table 4.1 includes an interaction of taxi time with distance to the airport. The non-interacted
taxi time coefficient now reports the effect of airplane idling on pollution levels directly at
the airport. The point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in taxi time
at LAX leads to 0.32 standard deviation increase in CO levels in areas adjacent to LAX. The
interaction term shows how this effect decays linearly with distance.
Lastly, column (1c) reports the coefficients from the estimated version of equation (4.5)
that interacts taxi time with wind speed and wind angle from an airport. The F-test for the
joint significance of these coefficients is given in the last two rows of the table and shows that
they are highly significant. Since individual coefficients are difficult to interpret, we plot the
marginal effect of an extra 1000 minutes of taxi time for four wind speeds in the first row of
Figure 4.3. Wind speeds increase from left to right. The color indicates the marginal impact
ranging from low (blue) to high (red). If a zip code is directly downwind, it is on the positive
x-axis, while areas upwind are on the negative x-axis. Areas downwind are more affected by
taxi time than areas upwind. For the very highest wind speeds, the largest marginal impact
of taxi time can be found just upwind from the centroid of the airport (although the average
marginal impact remains highest downwind). This is possibly due to the fact that airplanes
start against the wind and mostly line up in the opposite direction, i.e., the direction in which
the wind is blowing. Local wind is highly predictive of congestion. When local wind is strong
and the average local taxi time is high and the queue is long, an additional unit of congestion
due to network delays will hence “add” an additional plane that is idling upwind from the
the results from running the first stage and then using the predicted values in the second stage without
accounting for the fact that we are using generated regressors in the second stage. To understand the likely
magnitude of this bias, Appendix Table 4.15 reports two sets of standard errors for equations (4.3) and (4.4):
(i) the IV results; and (ii) running the first stage and using the predicted values in the second stage with
two-way clustered errors but no other adjustments. The results suggest that the standard errors from the IV
are quite similar to those from manual 2SLS.
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airport centroid. For example, the four runways of LAX are between 2.7km and 3.7km long,
which is significant as we are examining monitors within 10km of the airport centroid.
Columns (2a)-(2c) of Table 4.1 give estimates pertaining to the effect of taxi time on NO2
levels. The results are comparable to those from CO, although the linear decrease in distance
from the airport is not significant. A one standard deviation increase in taxi time at LAX
increases NO2 concentrations by roughly 1ppb, or 10% of the day-to-day standard deviation.
The second row of Figure 4.3 shows again that downwind areas are much more impacted
than upwind areas. Both Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3 show that the relative impact of NO2 is
different than CO: the range of marginal impacts for CO in Figure 4.3 is between -90% and
+50% relative to the average impact from column (1a) in Table 4.1. In contrast, the marginal
effect of taxi time on NO2 varies between -100% and +100% relative to the average effect
from column (2a) of Table 4.1. The spatial pattern is also slightly different. In subsequent
sections, we use these relative differences in pollutant dispersion to jointly estimate the effect
of both CO and NO2. Recall from Section 4.2 that CO emissions are higher during low power
operation, while NOx is higher during high power operation. Larger wind speeds require more
thrust during takeoff and hence change the mix of CO and NOx emissions.
Finally, columns (3a)-(3c) replicate the same analysis for ozone (O3), a pollutant that
is not directly emitted from airplanes.38 The results in Table 4.1 suggest that airport taxi
time has little significant impact on ozone levels, although some of the interaction terms are
significant. The significance of the interaction terms likely stems from the fact that airplanes
also emit VOC’s during low power engine operation, where VOC’s are precursors to ozone
formation. In the remainder of the analysis we focus on CO and NO2, the two criteria air
pollutants for which airplanes are large emitters, while acknowledging that we may be picking
up the health effects of other pollutants that are correlated with airplane emissions.
Our baseline pollution estimates presented above come from models in which airport taxi
time is instrumented with taxi time at large airports outside of California. We instrument
taxi time because delays and runway congestion might be correlated with local weather, which
38Ozone is formed through a complicated chemical reaction between both nitrogen dioxides and VOC’s in
the presence of sunlight.
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in turn might impact pollution levels. In addition, there is likely measurement error in our
taxi time variable as it only includes domestic, commercial flight activity. While we control
for weather in our regressions, there might be unobserved weather (or other) variables that
jointly impact both pollution and taxi time. Appendix Table 4.14 replicates the baseline IV
analysis of Table 4.1 using local taxi time at California airports, which is not instrumented.
The estimated effect is generally half as big for CO and NO2. The smaller OLS estimates are
consistent with adverse weather (e.g., precipitation) causing both airport delays and at the
same time reducing ambient air pollution. Alternatively, these results could be driven by the
well known attenuation bias stemming from measurement error in fixed effects models. In the
remainder of the paper we rely on instrumented taxi time stemming from network delays.
We use taxi time at three major airports in our baseline regressions: Atlanta (ATL),
Chicago (ORD), and New York (JFK). Appendix Table 4.15 presents first-stage F-statistics if
we instrument taxi time at California on up to four airports outside of California. Recall that
we allow the coefficients to vary by airport, as network congestion will have different absolute
effects on California airports. Irrespective of whether we use 1, 2, 3, or 4 airports outside of
California, the F-statistic is well above 10. In our baseline model we use three airports that
cover weather patterns in three regions of the Eastern United States: Southeast (Atlanta),
Midwest (Chicago), and Northeast (New York JFK), and the first-stage F-stat is 42.82. The
fourth largest airport outside of California is Dallas Fort Worth (DFW). While results are not
particularly sensitive to including DFW, we exclude it from our baseline specifications as it
is significantly closer to California airports and thus may be more endogenous than the other
three airports. Dallas Fort Worth may be delayed because California airports are delayed.
Reverse causality is less of a concern for the other three airports: A flight that leaves a
California airport at 6am will not reach Atlanta, Chicago, or New York until roughly noon
due to the change in time zones. Table 4.16 in the appendix tests for reverse causality directly
by regressing taxi time at an airport on the eight weather measures we generally include as
controls: a quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, as well as wind
speed. The column heading gives the airport at which the congestion is measured while the
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row indicates the airport at which the weather variables are measured.39 The table reports
p-values of a hypothesis test pertaining to the joint significance of the weather variables. The
diagonal is highly significant as local weather measures impact airport taxi time. However,
while weather at the eastern airports (ATL, ORD, or JFK) sometimes impacts taxi time at the
two largest airports in California (LAX and SFO), the reverse is not true. This is consistent
with weather at Eastern airports causing local network delays that propagate through the
airspace and impact taxi time in California. The reverse direction does not hold. California
airports do not affect East Coast airports on the same day. This result is not simply an
artifact of there being less weather variation in California, as weather at LAX significantly
impacts taxi time at SFO.
We have also run two sensitivity checks to further rule out endogeneity through reverse
causality, the results of which are reported in the subsequent section on health section. First,
we only utilize the combined taxi time between 5am and noon at the three major Eastern
airports to rule out California feedback effects. This reduces the F-stat in model 1 from 42.82
to 28.50, but the results remain similar to baseline estimates. Second, instead of using taxi
time at the three major Eastern airports, we use the eight weather variables at each of these
airports. Since this effectively increases the number of instruments by a factor of eight, we
no longer estimate model 3 (which had 432 instruments to begin with). The F-statistic for
the weather-instrumented regression is 22.31. Again, results remain similar to our baseline
estimates but the standard errors in the second stage increase. The model with the highest
F-statistic is the one which uses the overall taxi time at each of the three large East Coast
airports as instrumental variables. Going forward we instrument using the overall measure.
Finally, since the variation in pollution due to delays outside of California should be
uncorrelated with weather in California, we have estimated models (not reported) that exclude
California weather controls altogether. Reassuringly, our baseline estimates for the most
important pollutant (CO, see below) are similar whether we include or exclude California
weather controls, but the error terms increase.
39If we pair airport taxi time with weather from another airport, we also include the local weather measure
as control. The local weather measures are not included in the joint test of significance.
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To put the magnitude of these effects into perspective, it is useful to consider the current
ambient air standards in place for CO as regulated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act.
The current one hour carbon monoxide standard specifies that pollution may not exceed 35
ppm (or 35000 ppb) more than once per year. California has their own CO standard which is
20ppm. A one standard deviation increase in LAX airplane idling (1852 minutes) translates
into an 75 ppb increase (40.37 × 1.852) in carbon monoxide levels for areas within 10km of
LAX using estimates from column (1a) of Table 4.1. Adding this number to the average daily
maximum CO level at zip codes from Panel A of Table 4.11 (1235 ppb), the estimated increase
in pollution concentrations is far below the current EPA standard. Similarly, for NO2, the
current EPA 1-hour standard is 100 ppb. Using estimates from column (2a) of Table 4.1, a
standard deviation increase in LAX taxi time would lead to a 1ppb increase in NO2 levels.
Evaluated relative to the average daily maximum NO2 levels of 35.5 ppb, these are again well
below the ambient criteria standard. Note, however, that the maximum of the maximum daily
NO2 levels is above the standard as some areas are out of attainment. The remaining sections
estimate the social costs of these congestion related increases in ambient air concentrations
by focusing on heath outcomes of the populations most affected by these emissions.
4.5.2 Effects of Taxi Time on Local Measures of Health
We begin by investigating the “reduced form” health effects of airports, relating aggregate
daily taxi time to local measures of health. Namely, how does variation in airport congestion
predict local health outcomes? Table 4.2 presents the results from a regression relating daily
measures of airport taxi time to local hospital admissions for the overall population as well
as two susceptible subgroups: people below 5 as well as people ages 65 and above. The
dependent variable is measured as the daily sum of hospital and emergency room visits for
persons living in a particular zip code scaled by the population (per 10 million individuals)
in that particular zip code. The regressions are weighted by zip code population size, and
taxi time is instrumented using taxi time at three major airports in the East. The estimated
coefficient on the taxi time variable corresponds to the increased rate of hospitalizations per
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10 million individuals in a zip code for an extra 1000 minutes of taxi time. Using various
diagnosis codes, we examine the impact of taxi time on asthma, respiratory, and heart related
admissions separately. As a falsification exercise, we also estimate the incidence of taxi time
on strokes, bone fractures, and appendicitis rates. The reported standard errors are clustered
on both zip code and day.
For the overall population (Panel A), all respiratory sickness rates as well as heart problems
are significantly impacted by taxi time, while the placebo effects for stroke, bone fractures,
and appendicitis are not significantly affected. Results become larger in magnitude for the
at-risk age groups. For the population 65 years and above, the incidence of stroke and bone
fractures is marginally significant at the 10% level. This may be do to statistical chance or may
be explained by the fact that senior citizens may also be more susceptible to sicknesses that
covary with one another (e.g., a respiratory problem might make them fall and break a bone).
Additionally, Medicare provides doctors implicit incentives to add additional diagnosis codes
to receive higher reimbursement rates. Consistent with this explanation, models for which
the dependent variable is measured only using the primary diagnosis code, the placebo effects
for 65 and older are no longer significant.
4.5.3 Hospital Admissions and Instrumented Pollution Exposure
Results thus far have shown that aggregate airplane taxi time generates variation in pollution
levels of nearby communities. We exploit this variation to examine the relationship between
pollution and health explicitly. Table 4.3 summarizes regression results for various pollutants
and illnesses using a variety of traditional econometric specifications. Each entry corresponds
to a different regression, where the dependent variable is measured as hospital admission
rates, and the independent variable is the daily mean ambient pollution concentration in a
particular zip code. As before, regression estimates are weighted by zip code population and
standard errors are clustered on both zip code and day.40
The first row within each panel presents estimates from a pooled OLS version of equa-
tion (4.6) without any controls Zzt, which suggests that increased ambient air concentrations
40Unweighted regressions yield similar results and are available upon request.
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lead to adverse health outcomes for respiratory and heart problems. Since various pollutants
are often correlated with one another, these estimates should be interpreted with caution,
as the pollutant of interest will proxy for other correlated air pollutants. Each consecutive
row adds more controls. The the second row uses time controls (year, month, weekday, and
holiday fixed effects), and the third row additionally adds weather controls (quadratic in min-
imum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed). To control for unobserved,
time-invariant determinants of health, the fourth row of Table 4.3 reports regression estimates
from a model using zip code fixed effects. The model is identified by examining how within
zip code changes in pollution are related to hospitalization rates of that particular zip code.
Again, pollution is often strongly correlated with health, although the estimates in the fourth
row are usually smaller than those in the first three. These smaller point estimates are consis-
tent with time-invariant omitted variables introducing bias into the estimates from rows one
through three. Alternatively, classical measurement error in the pollution variable may lead
to significant attenuation bias in fixed effects models (Griliches and Hausman 1986), and this
may be responsible for the smaller point estimates in the last row.
Aside from attenuation bias, fixed effects models may also suffer from biases introduced by
any unobserved, time-varying determinants of both pollution and health (e.g., weather). To
explore this issue further, Table 4.4 presents instrumental variable estimates of the pollution-
health relationship, using instrumented aggregate airport taxi time as an instrumental variable
for daily mean pollution. Table 4.4 presents results for both the overall population in Panel
A as well as children below 5 in Panel B and people aged 65 and above in Panel C.41 The
three rows (labeled model 1-3) use (i) taxi time, (ii) taxi time interacted with distance, and
(iii) taxi time interacted with distance, wind speed, and wind direction, respectively. These
are the specifications outlined in equation (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) above.
The estimates in Table 4.4 are usually an order of magnitude larger than the OLS, fixed-
effects estimates from Table 4.3. To put the magnitudes into perspective: The average asthma
41Results for the two remaining groups: children ages 5-19 and adults ages 19-64 are given in Appendix
Table 4.17. Children between 5 and 19 years of age show no sensitivity to pollution shocks. Conversely, the
estimated dose-response for adults are roughly comparable to the baseline estimates, which is not surprising
since they are the largest share of the overall population.
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sickness rate for the overall population is 339 per 10 million inhabitants (Panel A1 and A2 of
Table 4.12). The asthma coefficient for CO (model 1) in Table 1 implies that a one standard
deviation increase in CO pollution leads to an additional 0.341×368 = 125 asthma attacks
per 10 million people,42 which is 37% of the daily mean.43 This suggests that fluctuations in
air pollution are a major cause of asthma related illnesses. For heart related problems, the
relative magnitude is 20% of the daily mean.
Model 2 and 3 in Table 4.4 estimate over-identified models instrumenting pollution with
both taxi time and taxi time interactions. While estimates in model 2 are similar to those from
model 1, estimates from model 3 are generally smaller. The reason for the difference in mag-
nitudes between models 2 and 3 is not entirely clear. There are several possible explanations.
First, recall that model 3 uses distance as well as wind direction and wind speed. Marginal
impacts of airport congestion vary greatly across space as shown in Figure 4.3, much more
than in a model that only includes distance. While we know the exact location of a monitor,
we only know the zip code of a person’s residence, and the person might be staying outside
the home zip code for work. This will induce great measurement error. Strikingly, model 3
in Panel B gives comparable point estimates to model 1 and 2 for children under the age of
5, which are more likely to be at home or in a close-by day care. Second, another possible
explanation is the well-known bias of 2SLS estimators when instruments are weak and when
there are many over-identifying restrictions (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). While the re-
sults from Table 4.1 suggest that model 3 is a strong first-stage predictor of local pollution
levels with a F-statistic that is 12 for CO pollution and 6 for NO2 pollution, the first stage
is not as strong as models 1 and 2, and the model is highly over-identified with 12 excluded
instruments. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) show how the bias of 2SLS increases in the
number of instruments and decreases in the strength of the first stage. The bias of 2SLS in
the case of weakly identified or over-identified models is towards the OLS counterpart. This is
42Panel A of Table 4.11 in the appendix shows that the standard deviation for CO is 368.
43This back-of-the-envelope calculation increases the pollution level in each zip code by the average overall
standard deviation of pollution fluctuations. Moreover, the average sickness rate is not population weighted.
In a later part, we increase pollution in each zip code by the zip-code specific standard deviation in pollution
fluctuations and calculate the population-weighted average sickness count. The relative impact decreases to
30% of the daily mean under the linear probability model and 33% under a Poisson count model.
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consistent with model 3 estimates in Table 4.4 being smaller than both model 1 and 2 but still
above the OLS estimates. Table 4.18 in the appendix estimates models 2 and 3 using Lim-
ited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), which is median-unbiased for over-identified,
constant-effects models (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). Results remain similar. Finally, a
third alternative explanation for why model 3 gives lower point estimates is that the hourly
wind data represent snapshots of the wind speed and direction and include significant mea-
surement error. Although, this is at odds with the fact that we find such significant spatial
patterns in the pollution regressions.
Panels B and C of Table 4.4 present estimates for children and senior citizens. While the
sensitivity is higher, so are average sickness rates. In relative terms, a one standard deviation
increase in CO pollution now causes a 40% increase in asthma cases for children under 5
compared to the average daily mean. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase
in CO pollution causes a 26% increase in heart problems for people 65 and above. The higher
absolute sensitivity in Panel B and C suggests that there may exist significant heterogeneity
in the population response to ambient air pollution exposure. Since the population aged 65
and older has guaranteed access to health insurance through Medicare, they may be more
inclined to visit the emergency room or hospital relative to the rest of the population, leading
to larger estimated effects. On the other hand, the relative magnitude compared to average
sickness rates are only slightly larger than for the overall population.
Columns (3)-(5) of each panel includes results for one of three placebos: strokes, bone
fractures, and appendicitis. Both strokes and appendicitis are severe enough that people
should go to the hospital. None of the results are significant for the overall population in
Panel A. Consistent with the reduced form evidence in Table 4.2, some of the coefficients in
Panel C are significant at the 10% level. In Appendix Table 4.19 we replicate the analysis
using only the primary diagnosis code. None of the placebo regressions remain significant.
However, since we are interested in the overall effect of pollution on hospitalization rates,
our baseline models continue to count total sickness counts for both primary and secondary
diagnoses.
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Appendix Table 4.20 further investigates the sensitivity of our IV estimates to different
choices of instrumental variables. As a point of comparison, Panel A replicates the baseline
results of Table 4.4 for all ages. Panel B instruments for pollution using only the taxi time
between 5am and noon at Eastern airports to rule out endogeneity through reverse causality.
The results remain robust to this change. Panel C goes one step further and instruments for
taxi time at California airports using only weather measures at the three major airports in
the Eastern United States. While the point estimates remain comparable, the standard errors
generally increase.44
Inpatient versus Outpatient Data
Traditionally, studies have relied on Inpatient data sets to examine health responsiveness to
various external factors such as pollution. One limitation of such data is that a person only
enters the Inpatient data set if they are admitted for an overnight stay in the hospital. Many
ER visits result in a discharge the same day and hence never result in an overnight stay.
Starting in 2005, California began collecting Outpatient (Emergency Room) data. To better
understand the differences between these two datasets as well as compare our results to those
from the previous literature, we replicate the analysis using sickness counts from only the
Inpatient data in Table 4.21 of the appendix. By the same token, Table 4.22 of the appendix
only uses the Outpatient data.45 Not surprisingly, there is a significant relationship between
pollution and heart problems (column 2) in the Inpatient data for patient ages 65 and above (as
these conditions usually require an overnight stay), but no or very limited sensitivity of asthma
or overall respiratory illnesses (column 1a and 1c) to pollution. Conversely, the Outpatient
(ER) data shows a much larger sensitivity of respiratory problems to changes in pollution,
even among the general population. These results show the importance of Outpatient (ER)
data when studying the morbidity effects of ambient air pollution on health outcomes.
44We do not estimate model 3 using weather variables as it would include 3456 instruments.
45Patients that enter the ER and are later admitted for an overnight stay are dropped from the ER data to
avoid double counting.
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Jointly Estimating the Effect of Ambient Air Pollutants
A common challenge in studies linking health outcomes to pollution measures is that ambient
air pollutants are highly correlated. It is therefore difficult to determine empirically which
pollutant is the true cause of any observed changes in health. Our research design provides one
possible solution to the identification problem. Wind speed and wind direction differentially
affect both CO and NO2 dispersion patterns. Moreover, the rate of CO and NOx emissions
depend on the thrust produced by the engine, and higher wind speeds require more engine
thrust. Wind speed hence impacts both the rate at which pollutants are produced and how
they disperse. Table 4.5 estimates the joint effect of both CO and NO2 on health using our
first stage model with wind speed and wind direction interactions (model 3).46 Table 4.5
shows that the coefficient for CO remains significant and is comparable in size to our baseline
estimates from Table 4.4. This is true for all age groups, including children below 5, where
model 3 gave comparable estimates to model 1 and 2. Conversely, the coefficients on NO2
sometimes switch sign and are mostly insignificant. We see this as evidence that returns from
regulating CO exceed those from regulating NO2.
It is also unlikely that ozone O3 is causing the observed relationship. Table 4.23 in the
appendix estimates the relationship separately for the summer (April-September) and the
winter (October-March). Ozone is higher during the summer, while CO and NO2 are higher
during the winter. The observed health effects are larger and more significant during the
winter time when ozone is not a big problem. The fact that the estimated coefficients are larger
when pollution levels are larger is consistent with increasing marginal impacts of pollution.
However, the standard errors are also much larger for the summer, especially in the case of
acute respiratory problems and overall respiratory problems. This is not surprising, because
other pollutants like ozone also impact health outcomes, which will be part of the error term.
46It is not possible to include both CO and NO2 measures in our baseline model 1 as they are both linear
functions of the same instrument and thus perfectly collinear.
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Temporal Displacement and Dynamics
Our baseline regression models examine only the contemporaneous effect of pollution on
health. Contemporaneous estimates may lead to underestimates of the total effects of air
pollution on health if health effects respond sluggishly to changes in pollution. Conversely,
estimates may overstate the hypothesized effect due to temporal displacement: if spikes in
daily pollution levels make already sick people go to the hospital one day earlier, contem-
poraneous models overestimate the true effect associated with permanently higher pollution
levels. If temporal displacement is important, the contemporaneous increase in sickness rates
should be followed by a decrease in sickness rates in subsequent periods.
We investigate both of these issues by estimating a distributed lag regression model, in-
cluding three lags in the pollution variable of interest. Table 4.6 presents the distributed lag
results of pollution for the overall population. We present individual coefficients as well as
the combined effect (the sum of the four) in the last row of each panel. To preserve space,
we only list the results for the sickness categories that are impacted by changing pollution
levels. Since regulatory policy is concerned with the health effects of a permanent change in
pollution, we focus on cumulative effects of the model over the estimated 4 day horizon. The
cumulative effect is slightly larger than the comparable baseline results in Table 4.4. This
might be because some individuals delay hospital visits, although the exact dynamics are hard
to determine empirically given the lack of significance of the individual coefficients. We have
also experimented with different leads/lags (available upon request). For example, in a model
with 3 leads and 6 lags, the sum of the six lags and contemporaneous terms are similar in
magnitude. The three leads, on the other hand, are not jointly significant.
Random Coefficient Estimates of Self-Selection Bias
The baseline health results from Table 4.4 show a substantial amount of heterogeneity in
health responsiveness to air pollution; those over 65 years of age and below five years of age
show larger health responses. There may also be other forms of heterogeneity in the dose-
response function unobserved to the econometrician. In either case, if this heterogeneity is
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correlated with ambient air pollution exposure, our estimates will be biased by self-selection.
This type of selection is plausible, as we know that people non-randomly sort into locations
based on levels and changes to air pollution (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008a), and these preferences
may also be correlated with responsiveness to or health effects of air pollution. We test for the
presence of this non-random assortative behavior using equation (4.12) for various pollutants
and health outcomes. The results are presented in Table 4.7. Each column of each panel
represents a separate regression. To account for the first stage variation from the the two-step
estimation procedure, we use a block-bootstrap procedure, resampling entire zip codes with
replacement.47
The first row of each column and panel provides the unbiased estimates of the average
treatment effect associated with increasing the specific pollutant by 1ppb. The second row
of Table 4.7 provides a simple test as to the importance of our instrumental variable in
accounting for omitted variable bias or measurement error in the context of a fixed-effects,
OLS regression model. The large and significant results suggest that failing to account for
either of these issues will lead researchers to downwardly bias estimates pertaining to pollution
and health.
The test for self-selection bias in the 2SLS regression is shown in the third row of each
panel. These estimates are the coefficients from the last term in equation (4.12), interacting
the first stage errors with pollution variable. We fail to detect biases arising from self-selective
behavior. This lack of self-selective behavior may be in part due to our relatively homogenous
sample within 10km of an airport.
Count Model
Our baseline health estimates consist of linear probability models, relating the population-
scaled hospital admission rates to changes in pollution. To account for the non-negative and
discrete nature of the hospital admission data, Table 4.8 presents estimates from a quasi-
maximum likelihood, conditional Poisson IV estimator given in equation (4.13). In contrast
47This is equivalent to clustering by zip code instead of twoway clustering by zip code and day. Clustering
by zip code (not reported) gives comparable results to the two-way cluster procedure.
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to the baseline linear probability health models, these models are not weighted. In addi-
tion, since we use a control function to address issues pertaining to measurement error and
omitted variables, we adjust standard errors for the first stage sampling variation using a
block-bootstrap sampling procedure, resampling zip codes.48 Analogous to the linear proba-
bility model, we find that respiratory illnesses and heart problems are sensitive to pollution
fluctuations, while the three placebos are not (with the usual caveat applying to sickness
counts for people aged 65 and above).
The coefficients no longer give marginal impacts and are difficult to interpret. In order to
compare the marginal impacts of pollution exposure and congestion across all of our models,
Table 4.9 presents the predicted increase in sickness counts from (i) a one standard deviation
increase in taxi time, and (ii) a one standard deviation increase in pollution levels in each
zip code. The results are then added for all zip codes that are within 10km of an airport.
The table also summarizes population surrounding airports. Various admission categories are
given in rows, while the columns show the results for each of the 12 airports. The last column
gives the combined impact among all 12 airports.
Panels A, B, and C give the predicted increase in hospital admissions using estimates
from the baseline linear probability model whereby pollution is instrumented using model
1 (pollution instrumented with taxi time - no interactions with distance or wind direction).
These results are presented for the overall population (Panel A), children below 5 years (Panel
B), and senior citizens 65 and above (Panel C). Panel D gives the results for the overall
population using the count model shown in Table 4.8. Impacts are evaluated at the sample
mean for the nonlinear Poisson model. The results from the Poisson model are similar to
those from the linear probability model in Panel A. Panel E gives the average daily sickness
count in 2005-2007 for the overall population for comparison.
Pollution fluctuations have a large effect on the 6 million people living within 10km of one
of the 12 airports: A one standard deviation increase in a zip-codes specific pollution fluctua-
tions increases asthma counts for the overall population by 30% under the linear probability
48This is equivalent to clustering by zip code instead of twoway clustering by zip code and day. An unweighted
regression (not reported) that clusters by zip code gives comparable results.
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model and 33% under the Poisson count model.49 Overall, a one standard deviation increase
in zip-code specific daily pollution levels results in 157 additional admissions for respiratory
problems and 90 additional admissions for heart problems, which are 18% and 17% of the
daily mean. For respiratory problems, infants only account for roughly one fourth of the over-
all impacts. Studies focusing only on the impact on infants therefore would miss a significant
portion of the overall impacts. Not surprisingly, the elderly are responsible for the largest
share of heart related impacts.
Airport congestion significantly contributes to the overall impacts: a one standard de-
viation increase in taxi time increases respiratory and heart admissions by 11 and 6 cases,
respectively. At LAX, the largest airport in California, a one standard deviation increase in
taxi time is responsible for roughly one-fourth of the effect of a one-standard deviation in-
crease in pollution. On the other hand, smaller airports (e.g., Santa Barbara or Long Beach)
are responsible for a much lower share of the overall pollution impacts.
Economic Cost
In order to monetize the health impacts associated with both pollution exposure as well
as airport congestion, we use the diagnosis-specific reimbursement rates offered to hospitals
through medicare.50 We view this measure as a lower bound on the total health costs for sev-
eral reasons: first, our methodology measures limited impacts on both a temporal and spatial
scale. By focusing on day-to-day fluctuations, we do not address the long run, cumulative
effect of pollution on health. If these are sizable relative to the contemporaneous effects, the
overall cost estimate will be higher. Similarly, our focus has been on individuals living within
10km of an airport. Some of our estimates suggest the marginal impact of taxi time extends
beyond the 10km radius, in which case we would be understating the overall effect. Second,
49Recall that these estimates are smaller than what we reported under Table 4.4, where we increased pollution
levels in each zip code by the average overall standard deviation in pollution levels and took an average baseline
sickness rate that was not population weighted.
50This information comes from a translation between our hospital diagnosis codes (ICD-9) and Diagnosis
Related Group (DRG) codes. We used the crosswalk from the AMA Code Manager Online Elite. Using the set
of DRG codes, we calculate the medicare reimbursement rates using the DRG Payment calculator provided by
TRICARE (http://www.tricare.mil/drgrates/). In accordance with medicare reimbursement policy, we adjust
the DRG payments using the average wage index in our sample. The average cost for respiratory problems
and heart related admissions are US$ 2702 and 6501, respectively.
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we only count people that are sick enough to go to the hospital - anybody who sees their
primary care physician or stays home feeling sick will not be counted. Recent work by Hanna
and Oliva (2011) finds that pollution decreases labor supply in Mexico City, imposing real
economic costs on society not measured in our analysis. Third, and most importantly, the
marginal willingness to pay to avoid treatment is likely higher than the cost of treatment. For
example, severe heart related problems that are not treated within a narrow time frame will
likely result in death. The statistical value of life that EPA uses for its benefit-cost analyses is
around 6 million dollars, which is 1000 times as larger as our medical reimbursement cost for
heart-related problems. Individuals might be willing to pay significantly more than medical
reimbursement rates to avoid illnesses that, if not adequately treated, have dire consequences.
Using the predicted increase in hospital visits under the linear probability model given
in Table 4.9, a one standard deviation increase in pollution levels amounts to about a $1
million increase in hospitalization payments related to respiratory and heart related hospital
admissions.51 Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in taxi time at California airports
results in 70 thousand dollars of additional health expenses in a given day. For comparison,
the average time cost of a one standard deviation increase in taxi time at the 12 airports
is 726 thousand dollars.52 The increased hospitalization costs for local residents amounts to
about 10 percent of the total time cost of congestion for affected airline passengers. The ratio
varies between 0.8% for Sacramento and 16% for Burbank and Santa Ana airport. The ratio
of health cost to time cost is highest for the last two airports as pollution impacts a large
number of people living around the airport (0.8 million) yet the average number of passenger
per plane, which impacts the time cost, are low. For the reasons mentioned above, the health
cost are likely a lower bound, and the ratio of congestion-related health cost to time cost is
hence likely even higher.
51This figure is calculated by taking the estimated increase in hospital visits and multiplying it by the average
medicare reimbursement for each of the respective diagnoses.
52This figure is calculated by dividing average boardings at each airport in 2005-2007 by the average number
of departures to get the average number of passengers per flight. We then transform additional taxi time into
people-hours of added travel time. We use the estimated cost of added travel time by Morrison and Winston
(1989) ($34.04 in 1983 dollars) and transform it into 2006 dollars.
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4.6 Conclusions
This study has shown how daily variation in ground level airport congestion due to network
delays significantly affects both local pollution levels as well as local measures of health. In
doing so, we develop a framework through which to credibly estimate the effects of exogenous
shocks to local air pollution on contemporaneous measures of health. Daily local pollution
shocks are caused by events that occur several thousand miles away and are arguably ex-
ogenous to the local area. We address several longstanding issues pertaining to non-random
selection and behavioral responses to pollution. Our results suggest that ground operations
at airports are responsible for a tremendous amount of local ambient air pollution. Specif-
ically, a one standard deviation change in daily congestion at LAX is responsible for a 0.32
standard deviation increase in levels of CO next to the airport that faces out with distance.
The average impact for zip codes within 10km is 0.23 standard deviations.
When connecting these models to measures of health, we find that admissions for res-
piratory problems and heart disease are strongly related to these pollution changes. A one
standard deviation increase in zip-code specific pollution levels increases asthma counts by
30% of the baseline average, total respiratory problems by 18%, and heart problems by 17%.
Infants and the elderly show a higher sensitivity to pollution fluctuations. At the same time,
adults age 20-64 are also impacted. For respiratory problems, the general adult population
accounts for the majority of the total impacts despite the lower sensitivity to fluctuations as
they are the largest share of the population. A one standard deviation increase in pollution
levels is responsible for 1 million dollars in hospitalization costs for the 6 million people living
within 10km of one of the 12 airports of our study. This is likely a significant lower bound as
the willingness to pay to avoid such illnesses will be higher than the medicare reimbursement
rates.
Examining various mechanisms for the observed pollution-health relationship, we find
that CO is primarily responsible for the observed health effects as opposed to NO2 or O3. We
find no evidence of forward displacement or delayed impacts of pollution. We also find no
evidence that people in areas with larger pollution shocks are less susceptible or less responsive
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to pollution.
These estimates suggest that relatively small amounts of ambient air pollution can have
substantial effects on the incidence of local respiratory illness. While EPA recently decided
against lowering the existing carbon monoxide standards due to lack of sufficient evidence of
the harmful effects of CO at levels below current EPA mandates, we find significant impacts on
morbidity. Recent research suggests that the rates of respiratory illness in the United States
are rising dramatically, even as ambient levels of air pollution have continued to fall (Center for
Disease Control 2011). Why asthma rates continue to rise is an open question, but the increase
in asthma rates is most pronounced amongst African Americans who disproportionately live
in densely populated, congested areas. At the same time, traffic congestion in cities has been
rising dramatically. Results presented here suggests that at least part of the increased rate of
asthma in urban areas can be explained by increased levels of traffic congestion. The exact
mechanism remain beyond the scope of the current study, but this remains an interesting area
for further research.53
53Currently, the highest rates of asthma incidence in the United States are found in Bronx, New York (Garg,
Karpati, Leighton, Perrin, and Shah 2003). This area of northern New York City is bisected by 5 major
highways, that rank among the most congested in the United States (Bruner 2009).
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Figure 4.1: Location of Airports, Pollution Monitors, and Zip Codes
Notes: The 12 largest airports in California are shown as blue dots. The location of CO pollution monitors in
the California Air Resource Board (CARB) data base are shown as X, the location of NO2 monitors as +. Zip
code boundaries are shown in grey. They are shaded if the centroid is within 10km (6.2miles) of an airport.
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of Daily Wind Direction At Airports
Notes: Histogram of the distribution of daily directions in which the wind is blowing (2005-2007). Plot is
normalized to the most frequent category. The four circles indicate the quartile range. Airport locations are
shown in Figure 4.1.
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Table 4.4: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 1: CO 0.341∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.059 -0.031 0.007
(0.072) (0.179) (0.230) (0.148) (0.042) (0.069) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.330∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.032 0.002
(0.066) (0.179) (0.234) (0.137) (0.040) (0.070) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.203∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.041 0.003
(0.049) (0.130) (0.172) (0.082) (0.031) (0.042) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 29.2
∗∗∗ 52.0∗∗ 70.9∗∗∗ 40.7∗∗∗ 5.1 -2.7 0.6
(8.0) (20.7) (26.4) (13.1) (3.7) (6.1) (1.4)
Model 2: NO2 28.7
∗∗∗ 51.3∗∗ 70.3∗∗∗ 39.0∗∗∗ 4.4 -2.7 0.3
(7.8) (20.6) (26.6) (12.9) (3.6) (6.3) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 11.9
∗∗∗ 16.2 19.4 16.0∗∗ 0.6 -0.8 0.5
(4.0) (10.5) (13.7) (7.2) (2.2) (2.9) (0.9)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 1: CO 0.606∗∗ 2.137∗ 2.956∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.019 0.047 -0.009
(0.262) (1.232) (1.485) (0.088) (0.023) (0.147) (0.035)
Model 2: CO 0.621∗∗ 2.095∗ 2.846∗ 0.124 0.021 0.069 -0.019
(0.252) (1.202) (1.476) (0.082) (0.025) (0.141) (0.038)
Model 3: CO 0.727∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗∗ 0.076 0.023 -0.030 -0.009
(0.173) (0.800) (0.990) (0.058) (0.015) (0.126) (0.023)
Model 1: NO2 48.8
∗ 172.0 237.9∗ 13.3∗ 1.5 3.8 -0.7
(25.0) (115.8) (143.5) (7.5) (1.9) (11.7) (2.8)
Model 2: NO2 50.0
∗∗ 168.9 229.5 10.1 1.7 5.5 -1.5
(24.2) (113.0) (142.3) (7.1) (2.1) (11.1) (3.0)
Model 3: NO2 47.9
∗∗∗ 116.9∗ 132.1∗ 4.6 2.8∗∗ 1.6 0.8
(14.8) (64.9) (78.9) (4.7) (1.2) (9.6) (2.1)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 1: CO 0.930∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 2.523∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 0.551∗ 0.478∗ 0.019
(0.341) (0.485) (0.710) (1.098) (0.321) (0.262) (0.030)
Model 2: CO 0.864∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 0.503 0.417 0.017
(0.298) (0.451) (0.695) (1.035) (0.326) (0.260) (0.030)
Model 3: CO 0.529∗∗ 0.734∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ 0.187 0.182 -0.031
(0.213) (0.326) (0.545) (0.642) (0.259) (0.169) (0.028)
Model 1: NO2 78.0
∗∗∗ 135.9∗∗∗ 211.6∗∗∗ 326.1∗∗∗ 46.2 40.1∗ 1.6
(26.8) (41.9) (65.5) (93.2) (28.5) (21.4) (2.6)
Model 2: NO2 77.9
∗∗∗ 135.6∗∗∗ 211.5∗∗∗ 326.0∗∗∗ 46.1 39.9∗ 1.6
(26.8) (42.0) (65.7) (93.4) (28.5) (21.4) (2.6)
Model 3: NO2 35.3
∗∗ 35.4 66.2 122.8∗∗∗ 0.9 9.5 -1.3
(14.4) (24.3) (41.7) (47.7) (16.1) (12.1) (1.8)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis codes per 10
million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate regression.
Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time) that is caused by network delays (taxi time at
three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model 1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion on
pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while model 2 adds an interaction with the distance
to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c)
in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature,
precipitation, and wind speed), temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed effects), and
zip code fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way
clustered by zip code and day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.5: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Joint Estimation
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 3: CO 0.239∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 0.183 0.046 -0.109∗ -0.008
(0.091) (0.243) (0.352) (0.114) (0.045) (0.065) (0.015)
Model 3: NO2 -3.216 -34.165
∗ -48.974∗ 4.399 -2.310 6.104 0.938
(6.489) (18.781) (26.680) (9.804) (2.928) (4.756) (1.221)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 3: CO 0.842∗ 4.703∗∗∗ 5.519∗∗∗ 0.114 -0.050 -0.243 -0.093
(0.481) (1.824) (2.092) (0.128) (0.042) (0.290) (0.062)
Model 3: NO2 -9.776 -205.580 -246.384 -3.250 6.183
∗ 18.267 7.148
(35.044) (139.758) (158.472) (10.077) (3.290) (22.111) (5.384)
Panel C: Age 65 and Above
Model 3: CO 0.346 0.851∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗ 0.439 0.192 -0.041
(0.314) (0.410) (0.735) (0.767) (0.376) (0.256) (0.043)
Model 3: NO2 16.601 -10.548 -36.416 35.119 -22.780 -0.890 0.895
(20.161) (29.941) (56.274) (54.776) (23.046) (18.476) (2.730)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis codes per 10
million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. The effect of the two pollutants
is jointly estimated for the over-identified model 3. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi
time) that is caused by network delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). All
regressions include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and
wind speed), temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed effects), and zip code fixed effects.
Regressions are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way clustered by zip code and
day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.8: Sickness Counts Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Poisson Model
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 1: CO 0.915∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.276 -0.118 0.357
(0.180) (0.119) (0.123) (0.139) (0.198) (0.198) (0.485)
Model 2: CO 0.923∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.237 -0.121 0.237
(0.180) (0.123) (0.129) (0.140) (0.198) (0.203) (0.493)
Model 3: CO 0.522∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.096 -0.196 0.172
(0.148) (0.105) (0.097) (0.102) (0.165) (0.136) (0.357)
Model 1: NO2 82.6
∗∗∗ 58.6∗∗∗ 56.4∗∗∗ 47.8∗∗∗ 24.9 -10.6 32.4
(22.8) (15.1) (15.0) (14.3) (18.3) (19.5) (45.3)
Model 2: NO2 82.9
∗∗∗ 58.5∗∗∗ 56.4∗∗∗ 47.8∗∗∗ 24.5 -10.6 31.0
(22.1) (15.2) (15.3) (14.5) (18.8) (19.5) (45.0)
Model 3: NO2 35.3
∗∗∗ 23.6∗∗∗ 19.9∗∗∗ 19.7∗∗∗ 0.6 3.4 32.5
(9.5) (6.6) (5.6) (6.9) (10.5) (9.1) (25.5)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 1: CO 1.295∗∗∗ 0.268 0.339 2.209∗ 3.501 0.181 -0.838
(0.414) (0.191) (0.222) (1.227) (3.029) (0.611) (3.202)
Model 2: CO 1.287∗∗∗ 0.234 0.299 1.939∗ 3.539 0.253 -1.402
(0.425) (0.192) (0.222) (1.172) (2.919) (0.605) (3.242)
Model 3: CO 0.851∗∗∗ 0.202 0.199 1.675 3.924 -0.078 -2.191
(0.307) (0.143) (0.159) (1.046) (2.456) (0.577) (2.783)
Model 1: NO2 116.5
∗∗∗ 23.3 29.6 200.6 314.6 17.9 -76.8
(43.5) (18.1) (21.2) (123.8) (310.2) (58.4) (309.0)
Model 2: NO2 116.6
∗∗∗ 22.9 29.3 198.3 315.7 18.7 -84.1
(43.2) (17.6) (21.0) (131.0) (300.8) (57.9) (316.8)
Model 3: NO2 60.3
∗∗∗ 28.1∗∗∗ 28.8∗∗∗ 111.4 337.6∗∗ 10.9 30.0
(15.1) (9.6) (9.3) (75.4) (165.3) (35.4) (173.8)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 1: CO 1.411∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.412∗ 0.673∗∗ 1.280
(0.395) (0.227) (0.190) (0.180) (0.235) (0.334) (1.326)
Model 2: CO 1.364∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.394 0.607∗ 1.218
(0.362) (0.218) (0.189) (0.181) (0.243) (0.337) (1.393)
Model 3: CO 0.849∗∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.214 0.231 -0.562
(0.322) (0.201) (0.160) (0.150) (0.200) (0.253) (1.309)
Model 1: NO2 127.9
∗∗∗ 75.4∗∗∗ 60.1∗∗∗ 61.8∗∗∗ 37.2 60.8∗∗ 115.9
(34.9) (22.2) (18.8) (18.0) (22.8) (30.8) (121.7)
Model 2: NO2 127.7
∗∗∗ 75.3∗∗∗ 60.2∗∗∗ 61.9∗∗∗ 37.1 60.2∗ 115.5
(34.1) (22.7) (19.3) (18.4) (22.8) (31.1) (116.4)
Model 3: NO2 65.9
∗∗∗ 25.8∗ 21.1∗∗ 25.4∗∗ 3.7 26.0 -99.8
(20.5) (13.6) (10.5) (10.4) (12.5) (18.9) (111.9)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates the results of Table 4.4 except that we use a Poisson count model instead of a linear
probability model. Further difference are that the regressions are unweighted and standard errors are obtained
from 100 clustered bootstrap draws (drawing entire zip code histories with replacement). Significance levels
are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.9: Impact of CO Pollution on Health (Model 1)
LAX SFO SAN OAK SJC SMF SNA ONT BUR SBA LGB PSP Total
Panel A: Linear Probability Model - All Ages
Population 812 182 540 448 910 41 822 454 794 59 875 93 6028
One Standard Deviation Increase in Taxi Time
Asthma 2.07 0.26 0.50 0.25 0.37 0.02 0.45 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.17 0.02 4.49
Acute Respiratory 3.68 0.47 0.88 0.45 0.67 0.03 0.80 0.30 0.38 0.01 0.30 0.03 8.00
All Respiratory 5.02 0.64 1.20 0.61 0.91 0.04 1.10 0.40 0.51 0.02 0.41 0.05 10.92
Heart Disease 2.88 0.37 0.69 0.35 0.52 0.03 0.63 0.23 0.29 0.01 0.23 0.03 6.26
One Standard Deviation Increase in Pollution
Asthma 8.45 0.91 7.03 2.41 10.49 0.31 9.03 3.48 10.42 0.31 11.36 0.26 64.47
Acute Respiratory 15.05 1.63 12.52 4.29 18.67 0.55 16.08 6.19 18.56 0.56 20.23 0.47 114.80
All Respiratory 20.53 2.22 17.08 5.86 25.47 0.75 21.93 8.45 25.31 0.76 27.60 0.64 156.60
Heart Disease 11.77 1.27 9.80 3.36 14.61 0.43 12.58 4.84 14.52 0.44 15.83 0.37 89.81
Panel B: Linear Probability Model - Ages 5 and Below
Population 54 11 33 32 68 4 58 35 55 3 65 6 424
One Standard Deviation Increase in Taxi Time
Asthma 0.25 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.54
Acute Respiratory 0.87 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.01 1.92
All Respiratory 1.20 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.01 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.01 2.66
Heart Disease 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15
One Standard Deviation Increase in Pollution
Asthma 1.03 0.10 0.76 0.30 1.39 0.05 1.13 0.48 1.28 0.03 1.52 0.03 8.11
Acute Respiratory 3.64 0.36 2.69 1.06 4.92 0.18 3.97 1.70 4.52 0.09 5.36 0.10 28.60
All Respiratory 5.03 0.50 3.72 1.47 6.80 0.26 5.49 2.36 6.26 0.13 7.41 0.14 39.57
Heart Disease 0.28 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.38 0.01 0.31 0.13 0.35 0.01 0.42 0.01 2.22
Panel C: Linear Probability Model - Ages 65 and Above
Population 82 26 54 51 88 3 79 34 79 12 89 18 615
One Standard Deviation Increase in Taxi Time
Asthma 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 1.26
Acute Respiratory 1.00 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.02 2.20
All Respiratory 1.56 0.28 0.37 0.21 0.27 0.01 0.32 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.03 3.42
Heart Disease 2.40 0.43 0.56 0.32 0.41 0.01 0.50 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.04 5.27
One Standard Deviation Increase in Pollution
Asthma 2.32 0.35 1.92 0.74 2.75 0.05 2.40 0.72 2.85 0.17 3.18 0.14 17.60
Acute Respiratory 4.03 0.62 3.34 1.29 4.79 0.09 4.19 1.25 4.96 0.29 5.54 0.25 30.65
All Respiratory 6.28 0.96 5.21 2.01 7.46 0.14 6.52 1.94 7.73 0.46 8.63 0.38 47.72
Heart Disease 9.68 1.48 8.02 3.10 11.50 0.22 10.05 2.99 11.91 0.71 13.29 0.59 73.54
Panel D: Poisson Model - All Ages
One Standard Deviation Increase in Taxi Time
Asthma 2.32 0.31 0.55 0.38 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.02 4.65
Acute Respiratory 4.29 0.60 0.96 0.67 0.56 0.03 0.69 0.33 0.43 0.01 0.38 0.05 8.99
All Respiratory 5.73 0.81 1.31 0.87 0.74 0.04 0.92 0.45 0.57 0.01 0.52 0.07 12.03
Heart Disease 2.89 0.46 0.71 0.40 0.39 0.02 0.48 0.21 0.30 0.01 0.25 0.04 6.15
One Standard Deviation Increase in Pollution
Asthma 10.99 1.13 9.28 3.84 8.73 0.37 6.24 3.40 10.92 0.14 15.00 0.23 70.28
Acute Respiratory 19.55 2.26 15.35 6.64 17.46 0.56 15.51 7.55 24.06 0.32 28.91 0.64 138.82
All Respiratory 26.01 3.01 21.02 8.62 23.06 0.70 20.48 10.13 31.79 0.47 39.74 0.95 185.99
Heart Disease 12.68 1.61 11.14 3.95 11.92 0.29 10.63 4.63 16.41 0.42 19.12 0.55 93.34
Panel E: Baseline Average - All Ages
Asthma 33.1 7.9 22.3 25.4 24.2 1.6 18.1 14.9 26.0 0.9 36.0 3.0 213.6
Acute Respiratory 87.4 21.7 55.2 63.2 71.8 3.6 66.9 48.0 85.8 3.1 104.3 11.8 623.0
All Respiratory 121.3 30.3 78.2 85.2 98.7 4.7 91.6 67.2 117.9 4.6 149.0 18.0 866.8
Heart Disease 72.8 20.3 50.0 46.4 61.7 2.4 56.9 36.9 73.4 5.0 86.1 12.3 524.2
Notes: Table gives population as well as daily hospital admissions for all zip codes that are within 10km
(6.2miles) of one of the 12 major California airports. Panels A-D give predicted changes in sickness counts,
while Panel E gives baseline averages. Panels A-C use the linear probability model 1 for CO from Table 4.4,
while panel D uses the Poisson model 1 for CO from Table 4.8. Panel E gives average daily sickness counts
in the data. The first 12 columns give impacts by airport, while the last column gives the total for all 12
airports. Population is in thousand. Predicted changes in hospitalization are for both inpatient as well as
outpatient admissions.
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4.7 Online Appendix
Figure 4.4: Location of Airports in Study
Notes: Figure displays the location of the 12 airports in California as well as the three Eastern airports used
to instrument taxi time in California.
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Figure 4.5: Boxplots of Taxi Time By Hour and Airport
Panel A: Airports in California
Panel B: Airports Outside California
Notes: Boxplots of taxi time by hour of day 2005-2007. The box spans the 25%-75% range, while the median
is shown as black solid line. Whiskers extend to the minimum and maximum.
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Table 4.10: Summary Statistics: Airports
Airports in Southern California
LAX SAN SNA ONT BUR SBA LGB PSP
Average Flight Time (min) 125.60 108.55 102.74 80.28 77.45 56.70 185.16 79.27
[s.e.] [4.40] [4.15] [3.22] [4.83] [6.02] [2.50] [58.32] [12.41]
Average Flight Distance (miles) 974 815 748 562 520 303 1256 537
[s.e.] [26] [26] [18] [36] [36] [11] [181] [109]
Arrival Delays (min) 6.48 6.27 4.81 6.79 7.49 4.27 3.93 8.22
[s.e.] [7.09] [6.89] [5.85] [7.02] [7.77] [7.90] [11.10] [8.45]
Average Departure Delays (min) 7.77 6.64 6.12 6.89 7.78 4.89 4.70 6.49
[s.e.] [5.19] [5.77] [5.59] [5.78] [7.42] [8.13] [8.49] [8.44]
Average Taxi Time after Landing (min) 8.09 3.73 6.26 4.37 2.78 4.12 4.87 4.34
[s.e.] [1.06] [0.40] [0.82] [0.37] [0.46] [0.43] [0.91] [0.51]
Average Taxi Time to Takeoff (min) 15.00 13.50 13.28 10.63 11.61 9.75 14.34 10.68
[s.e.] [1.47] [1.83] [1.32] [1.27] [1.21] [1.44] [1.94] [1.51]
Daily Number of Arrivals 641.60 255.02 139.76 104.07 86.09 37.80 35.00 34.21
[s.e.] [31.58] [17.29] [13.58] [11.67] [8.63] [3.75] [3.91] [7.86]
Daily Number of Departures 641.33 255.13 139.77 104.02 86.07 37.84 34.99 34.18
[s.e.] [32.59] [17.48] [12.53] [11.74] [8.50] [3.78] [3.89] [7.88]
Daily Taxi Time All Flights (min) 14691 4369 2712 1553 1231 519 673 515
[s.e.] [1852] [666] [399] [266] [193] [83] [140] [151]
Northern California Eastern United States
SFO OAK SJC SMF ATL ORD JFK
Average Flight Time (min) 135.10 104.54 95.11 94.22 88.00 101.95 164.18
[s.e.] [5.08] [6.38] [3.74] [2.71] [11.14] [4.28] [11.56]
Average Flight Distance (miles) 1061 749 678 687 649 719 1212
[s.e.] [40] [35] [21] [19] [14] [30] [80]
Arrival Delays (min) 11.40 5.68 5.84 7.78 10.73 14.71 15.25
[s.e.] [14.44] [7.51] [6.79] [7.14] [16.62] [24.17] [19.29]
Average Departure Delays (min) 10.38 8.50 6.44 8.27 14.27 17.11 13.81
[s.e.] [9.81] [6.33] [5.77] [6.08] [12.98] [16.72] [16.08]
Average Taxi Time after Landing (min) 5.64 5.37 4.06 4.31 9.80 8.58 9.98
[s.e.] [0.49] [0.74] [0.31] [0.40] [1.55] [1.65] [2.66]
Average Taxi Time to Takeoff (min) 16.46 10.84 11.64 10.33 19.44 19.73 32.88
[s.e.] [1.73] [1.15] [0.93] [0.86] [3.48] [4.74] [9.99]
Daily Number of Arrivals 364.58 201.03 167.78 148.47 1140.18 992.96 309.53
[s.e.] [24.04] [14.24] [13.52] [13.74] [85.16] [75.09] [35.32]
Daily Number of Departures 364.66 201.01 167.73 148.43 1146.63 992.92 309.48
[s.e.] [24.46] [14.09] [13.61] [13.74] [90.51] [75.93] [34.51]
Daily Taxi Time All Flights (min) 7979 3235 2614 2166 33081 27170 13059
[s.e.] [1061] [409] [298] [324] [5743] [4735] [3804]
Notes: Table lists average flight characteristics by airport in 2005-2007. Airports are ordered by geographic
area and then by decreasing number of flights. The first six variables in each panel are characteristics per
flight, while the last three variables are average characteristics per day.
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Table 4.12: Summary Statistics: Sickness Rates by Distance From Airport
Within [0,10]km of Airport Within [0,5]km of Airport Within (5,10]km of Airport
Mean (Std) Min Max Mean (Std) Min Max Mean (Std) Min Max
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Panel A1: Outpatient Sickness Rates - All Ages
Asthma 184 (268) 0 4162 170 (265) 0 3185 189 (270) 0 4162
Acute Respiratory 608 (568) 0 6243 594 (586) 0 5843 614 (561) 0 6243
All Respiratory 756 (653) 0 7012 748 (680) 0 7012 760 (641) 0 6243
Heart Disease 168 (254) 0 3396 172 (267) 0 3396 166 (247) 0 2775
Stroke 23 (90) 0 1456 22 (92) 0 1454 23 (89) 0 1456
Bone Fracture 208 (273) 0 2909 208 (282) 0 2909 208 (269) 0 2775
Appendicitis 2 (26) 0 903 2 (27) 0 903 2 (26) 0 875
Panel A2: Inpatient Sickness Rates - All Ages
Asthma 155 (237) 0 2775 153 (241) 0 2547 156 (235) 0 2775
Acute Respiratory 373 (379) 0 4377 372 (387) 0 3396 373 (376) 0 4377
All Respiratory 626 (522) 0 5253 635 (538) 0 5224 622 (514) 0 5253
Heart Disease 728 (589) 0 7879 747 (612) 0 5214 720 (579) 0 7879
Stroke 149 (235) 0 4183 151 (242) 0 2709 148 (231) 0 4183
Bone Fracture 92 (181) 0 2510 95 (189) 0 1829 90 (177) 0 2510
Appendicitis 32 (103) 0 1806 32 (105) 0 1806 32 (101) 0 1751
Panel B1: Outpatient Sickness Rates - Ages Below 5
Asthma 413 (1503) 0 33178 383 (1575) 0 33036 425 (1471) 0 33178
Acute Respiratory 2739 (4262) 0 90992 2777 (4621) 0 90992 2724 (4104) 0 66357
All Respiratory 3084 (4567) 0 90992 3113 (4930) 0 90992 3072 (4407) 0 66357
Heart Disease 12 (263) 0 21358 11 (255) 0 15165 12 (266) 0 21358
Stroke 1 (63) 0 10860 1 (74) 0 7651 1 (57) 0 10860
Bone Fracture 165 (963) 0 33036 160 (1031) 0 33036 166 (933) 0 27785
Appendicitis 2 (81) 0 13148 2 (75) 0 7651 2 (84) 0 13148
Panel B2: Inpatient Sickness Rates - Ages Below 5
Asthma 147 (883) 0 23697 138 (922) 0 23697 150 (866) 0 21358
Acute Respiratory 404 (1485) 0 25562 403 (1572) 0 24155 405 (1447) 0 25562
All Respiratory 483 (1635) 0 33036 483 (1734) 0 33036 483 (1592) 0 26810
Heart Disease 55 (568) 0 22701 54 (592) 0 22701 56 (557) 0 21358
Stroke 6 (186) 0 21834 7 (225) 0 21834 5 (168) 0 16589
Bone Fracture 31 (415) 0 23697 29 (420) 0 23697 31 (412) 0 21358
Appendicitis 7 (177) 0 15684 7 (181) 0 12077 7 (175) 0 15684
Panel C1: Outpatient Sickness Rates - Ages 65 and Above
Asthma 142 (696) 0 20730 127 (675) 0 12358 148 (705) 0 20730
Acute Respiratory 349 (1109) 0 38168 332 (1117) 0 38168 356 (1106) 0 20730
All Respiratory 752 (1636) 0 41459 736 (1655) 0 38168 759 (1628) 0 41459
Heart Disease 910 (1803) 0 41459 889 (1816) 0 38168 919 (1797) 0 41459
Stroke 136 (684) 0 20730 129 (686) 0 15108 138 (683) 0 20730
Bone Fracture 289 (1004) 0 38168 284 (1053) 0 38168 291 (984) 0 20730
Appendicitis 1 (46) 0 9705 1 (45) 0 4950 1 (46) 0 9705
Panel C2: Inpatient Sickness Rates - Ages 65 and Above
Asthma 488 (1342) 0 41459 496 (1426) 0 38168 485 (1305) 0 41459
Acute Respiratory 1579 (2406) 0 41459 1582 (2530) 0 38168 1578 (2353) 0 41459
All Respiratory 3143 (3472) 0 76336 3170 (3654) 0 76336 3132 (3395) 0 62189
Heart Disease 4696 (4257) 0 76336 4746 (4502) 0 76336 4675 (4152) 0 41543
Stroke 1018 (1895) 0 41459 1013 (1973) 0 38168 1020 (1861) 0 41459
Bone Fracture 392 (1151) 0 38168 402 (1183) 0 38168 387 (1138) 0 29721
Appendicitis 22 (283) 0 38168 23 (323) 0 38168 21 (265) 0 20730
Notes: Table lists summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) of variables in
the data set. Admissions are counted if either the primary or one of the 24 other diagnosis codes include the
ICD-9 classification for an illness. Sickness rates are measured in cases per 10 million people. The first four
columns (1a)-(1d) use all zip codes, while columns (2a)-(2d) only use zip codes within 5km of an airport, and
columns (3a)-(3d) use zip codes 5-10km from an airport.
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Table 4.16: Taxi Time Regressed on Weather at Airport
Taxi Time Taxi Time Taxi Time Taxi Time Taxi Time
at LAX at SFO at ATL at ORD at JFK
Weather at LAX [1.3e-33]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗ [0.321] [0.594] [0.484]
Weather at SFO [0.272] [7.2e-21]∗∗∗ [0.357] [0.113] [0.730]
Weather at ATL [3.1e-04]∗∗∗ [7.1e-05]∗∗∗ [2.0e-09]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.338]
Weather at ORD [0.538] [3.8e-04]∗∗∗ [7.9e-06]∗∗∗ [2.0e-25]∗∗∗ [0.275]
Weather at JFK [0.123] [0.013]∗∗ [0.048]∗∗ [0.709] [5.5e-09]∗∗∗
Notes: Table gives p-values of the joint significance of the eight weather variables (a quadratic in minimum
and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) used to explain taxi time at an airport. Each entry
in the Table is from a separate regression. The taxi time is from the airport given in the column heading while
the weather variables are from the airport given in the row heading. Regressions that include weather from
another airport also control for local weather measures (not included in joint p-value). P-values are obtained
using robust standard errors. All regressions include temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday
fixed effects). Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.17: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Ages 5-64
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ages 5 - 19
Model 1: CO -0.019 0.037 0.119 0.013 -0.001 -0.135 -0.000
(0.124) (0.315) (0.331) (0.035) (0.013) (0.155) (0.033)
Model 2: CO -0.018 0.068 0.155 0.011 0.002 -0.083 -0.003
(0.109) (0.279) (0.296) (0.034) (0.011) (0.156) (0.032)
Model 3: CO -0.006 0.004 -0.025 -0.002 -0.005 -0.056 0.022
(0.090) (0.202) (0.225) (0.029) (0.012) (0.085) (0.024)
Model 1: NO2 -1.4 2.9 9.2 1.0 -0.1 -10.4 -0.0
(9.4) (24.4) (26.2) (2.7) (1.0) (12.8) (2.5)
Model 2: NO2 -1.4 4.7 11.4 0.9 0.1 -7.5 -0.2
(8.7) (22.6) (24.4) (2.6) (0.9) (12.8) (2.5)
Model 3: NO2 -5.2 -7.6 -11.5 -1.3 -0.9 -0.8 1.2
(7.7) (16.1) (17.7) (2.0) (0.9) (6.5) (1.9)
Panel B: Ages 20 - 64
Model 1: CO 0.291∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.379∗∗ 0.082 0.001 -0.090∗ 0.008
(0.080) (0.132) (0.184) (0.096) (0.031) (0.053) (0.022)
Model 2: CO 0.285∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.369∗∗ 0.070 -0.008 -0.092∗ 0.003
(0.076) (0.127) (0.179) (0.093) (0.030) (0.053) (0.021)
Model 3: CO 0.129∗∗ 0.167∗ 0.191∗ 0.058 0.011 -0.067∗ 0.005
(0.051) (0.085) (0.115) (0.061) (0.024) (0.035) (0.013)
Model 1: NO2 26.1
∗∗∗ 27.9∗∗ 34.0∗∗ 7.4 0.0 -8.1 0.7
(7.8) (12.0) (16.2) (8.2) (2.8) (5.6) (2.0)
Model 2: NO2 25.8
∗∗∗ 27.3∗∗ 33.3∗∗ 6.6 -0.6 -8.3 0.4
(7.6) (11.6) (15.8) (8.1) (2.7) (5.7) (1.9)
Model 3: NO2 9.1
∗∗ 9.0 7.2 5.0 1.6 -2.9 0.6
(3.7) (7.1) (9.4) (4.9) (1.7) (2.2) (1.0)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates Table 4.4 for the two remaining age groups: 5-19 and 20-64. Table regresses zip-code
level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis codes per 10 million people) on daily instru-
mented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate regression. Pollution is instrumented
on airport congestion (taxi time) that is caused by network delays (taxi time at three major airports in the
Eastern United States). Model 1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes
surrounding an airport, while model 2 adds an interaction with the distance to the airport, and model 3
furthermore adds interactions with wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions
include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed)
and temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed effects) and are weighted by the total
population in a zip code. Errors are two-way clustered by zip code and day. Significance levels are indicated
by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.18: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - LIML
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 2: CO 0.331∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.032 0.002
(0.066) (0.179) (0.234) (0.137) (0.041) (0.070) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.207∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.041 0.003
(0.050) (0.134) (0.178) (0.084) (0.031) (0.042) (0.011)
Model 2: NO2 28.8
∗∗∗ 51.5∗∗ 70.4∗∗∗ 39.8∗∗∗ 4.5 -2.7 0.3
(7.9) (20.7) (26.7) (13.2) (3.7) (6.3) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 12.9
∗∗∗ 18.8 23.4 16.9∗∗ 0.6 -0.8 0.5
(4.5) (12.6) (17.2) (7.8) (2.2) (3.0) (0.9)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 2: CO 0.621∗∗ 2.096∗ 2.848∗ 0.125 0.021 0.069 -0.019
(0.252) (1.202) (1.477) (0.082) (0.025) (0.141) (0.038)
Model 3: CO 0.733∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.683∗∗∗ 0.077 0.023 -0.030 -0.009
(0.175) (0.814) (1.009) (0.059) (0.015) (0.127) (0.023)
Model 2: NO2 50.0
∗∗ 169.0 230.1 10.3 1.7 5.5 -1.5
(24.3) (113.1) (142.8) (7.3) (2.1) (11.2) (3.0)
Model 3: NO2 49.7
∗∗∗ 127.5∗ 145.2 4.8 2.8∗∗ 1.6 0.8
(15.6) (72.7) (89.3) (4.9) (1.3) (9.9) (2.1)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 2: CO 0.867∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗ 3.712∗∗∗ 0.504 0.418 0.017
(0.299) (0.453) (0.696) (1.039) (0.327) (0.261) (0.030)
Model 3: CO 0.534∗∗ 0.743∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 2.046∗∗∗ 0.188 0.184 -0.031
(0.215) (0.331) (0.549) (0.655) (0.261) (0.170) (0.028)
Model 2: NO2 78.4
∗∗∗ 136.5∗∗∗ 211.7∗∗∗ 327.0∗∗∗ 46.2 40.2∗ 1.6
(27.0) (42.4) (65.8) (93.8) (28.6) (21.6) (2.6)
Model 3: NO2 36.2
∗∗ 37.0 68.5 130.4∗∗ 0.9 9.7 -1.3
(14.9) (25.4) (43.4) (51.1) (16.4) (12.4) (1.8)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates models 2 and 3 of Table 4.4 except that the IV regression is done using limited
information maximum likelihood instead of 2-stage least squares. Model 1 is dropped as it is exactly identified,
in which case LIML is identical to twos-stage least squares. Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts
for primary and secondary diagnosis codes per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb)
in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time)
that is caused by network delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model
1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while
model 2 adds an interaction with the distance to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with
wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic
in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month,
weekday, and holiday fixed effects) and are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way
clustered by zip code and day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.19: Sickness Rates (Primary Diagnosis Code) Regressed On Instrumented Pollution
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 1: CO 0.039 0.260∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.086 0.006 -0.075 0.008
(0.043) (0.150) (0.206) (0.057) (0.024) (0.063) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.050 0.274∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.080 -0.002 -0.073 0.004
(0.040) (0.145) (0.202) (0.059) (0.023) (0.064) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.045 0.206∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.052 0.010 -0.062∗ 0.004
(0.031) (0.107) (0.145) (0.034) (0.018) (0.037) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 3.4 22.3 39.7
∗ 7.3 0.5 -6.4 0.7
(3.9) (14.7) (21.3) (5.1) (2.1) (6.1) (1.4)
Model 2: NO2 4.1 23.2 41.0
∗ 7.0 0.0 -6.3 0.5
(3.8) (14.5) (21.2) (5.3) (2.0) (6.2) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 0.3 2.3 7.6 6.9
∗∗ 1.0 -2.2 0.4
(2.2) (7.6) (10.7) (3.2) (1.3) (2.8) (0.9)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 1: CO 0.393∗∗ 2.274∗∗ 2.919∗∗ 0.005 0.005 -0.017 0.000
(0.173) (0.950) (1.253) (0.040) (0.013) (0.145) (0.033)
Model 2: CO 0.438∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗ 2.895∗∗ 0.002 0.009 0.007 -0.009
(0.162) (0.921) (1.238) (0.039) (0.015) (0.137) (0.035)
Model 3: CO 0.388∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗∗ 2.226∗∗∗ -0.020 0.003 -0.060 0.000
(0.113) (0.630) (0.861) (0.027) (0.009) (0.121) (0.022)
Model 1: NO2 31.6
∗∗ 183.0∗∗ 234.9∗ 0.4 0.4 -1.3 0.0
(15.7) (90.3) (122.0) (3.2) (1.1) (11.8) (2.6)
Model 2: NO2 35.2
∗∗ 187.1∗∗ 233.4∗ 0.2 0.7 0.5 -0.7
(15.1) (86.9) (120.3) (3.2) (1.3) (11.0) (2.8)
Model 3: NO2 21.1
∗∗∗ 92.3∗ 110.0 -1.9 0.4 -1.4 1.3
(7.9) (51.0) (69.7) (2.4) (0.9) (9.1) (2.1)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 1: CO 0.189∗ 0.499∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 0.109 0.274 0.005
(0.105) (0.250) (0.420) (0.402) (0.197) (0.246) (0.029)
Model 2: CO 0.185∗ 0.471∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 0.048 0.222 0.000
(0.103) (0.235) (0.405) (0.400) (0.197) (0.241) (0.028)
Model 3: CO 0.114∗ 0.334∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 0.523∗ 0.122 0.085 -0.028
(0.064) (0.145) (0.301) (0.285) (0.147) (0.155) (0.023)
Model 1: NO2 15.8
∗ 41.8∗∗ 113.0∗∗∗ 89.5∗∗ 9.2 23.0 0.5
(8.6) (20.3) (39.9) (36.7) (16.8) (19.9) (2.4)
Model 2: NO2 15.8
∗ 41.8∗∗ 113.2∗∗∗ 89.5∗∗ 8.8 22.8 0.4
(8.6) (20.3) (39.8) (36.9) (16.8) (19.9) (2.4)
Model 3: NO2 7.7
∗ 19.3∗ 52.2∗∗ 53.5∗∗∗ 5.2 2.0 -0.9
(4.5) (10.3) (22.5) (20.4) (9.7) (11.2) (1.6)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates Table 4.4 except that sickness counts are based on primary diagnosis codes only. Table
regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels
(ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi
time) that is caused by network delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model
1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while
model 2 adds an interaction with the distance to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with
wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic
in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month,
weekday, and holiday fixed effects) and are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way
clustered by zip code and day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.20: Sickness Rates of All Ages Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Sensitivity of
IV
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Baseline: Tax Time at Eastern Airports
Model 1: CO 0.341∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.059 -0.031 0.007
(0.072) (0.179) (0.230) (0.148) (0.042) (0.069) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.330∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.032 0.002
(0.066) (0.179) (0.234) (0.137) (0.040) (0.070) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.203∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.041 0.003
(0.049) (0.130) (0.172) (0.082) (0.031) (0.042) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 29.2
∗∗∗ 52.0∗∗ 70.9∗∗∗ 40.7∗∗∗ 5.1 -2.7 0.6
(8.0) (20.7) (26.4) (13.1) (3.7) (6.1) (1.4)
Model 2: NO2 28.7
∗∗∗ 51.3∗∗ 70.3∗∗∗ 39.0∗∗∗ 4.4 -2.7 0.3
(7.8) (20.6) (26.6) (12.9) (3.6) (6.3) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 11.9
∗∗∗ 16.2 19.4 16.0∗∗ 0.6 -0.8 0.5
(4.0) (10.5) (13.7) (7.2) (2.2) (2.9) (0.9)
Panel B: Tax Time 5am to noon at Eastern Airports
Model 1: CO 0.383∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.055 0.014
(0.104) (0.176) (0.225) (0.177) (0.046) (0.068) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.365∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.038 -0.060 0.011
(0.096) (0.173) (0.223) (0.166) (0.045) (0.070) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.208∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.053 0.005
(0.055) (0.119) (0.154) (0.084) (0.030) (0.038) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 31.3
∗∗∗ 46.5∗∗∗ 57.4∗∗∗ 42.9∗∗∗ 3.7 -4.5 1.1
(9.1) (16.3) (20.5) (15.1) (3.7) (5.9) (1.3)
Model 2: NO2 30.4
∗∗∗ 45.2∗∗∗ 55.7∗∗∗ 41.6∗∗∗ 3.3 -4.8 1.0
(8.8) (16.2) (20.5) (14.8) (3.7) (6.0) (1.3)
Model 3: NO2 12.6
∗∗∗ 15.7 16.1 15.9∗∗ -0.3 -1.9 0.7
(4.5) (9.7) (12.3) (7.3) (2.1) (2.8) (0.9)
Panel C: Weather at Eastern Airports
Model 1: CO 0.359∗ 1.057∗ 1.406∗ 0.557∗ 0.168∗ 0.278∗ -0.002
(0.195) (0.622) (0.807) (0.339) (0.098) (0.168) (0.029)
Model 2: CO 0.396∗∗ 1.122∗ 1.538∗ 0.514 0.100 0.200 -0.023
(0.200) (0.628) (0.832) (0.327) (0.084) (0.144) (0.029)
Model 1: NO2 25.4
∗ 74.8 99.5 39.4 11.9 19.7∗ -0.2
(15.0) (50.5) (64.9) (24.4) (7.8) (11.6) (2.1)
Model 2: NO2 27.7
∗ 77.8 107.4∗ 34.0 5.4 11.9 -2.0
(15.6) (48.6) (63.7) (22.0) (5.5) (8.4) (2.1)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table lists the results for all ages from Table 4.4 in Panel A. Panel B instruments taxi time at
California airports on the taxi time between 5am and noon of each day at the three Eastern Airports. Panel
C uses the weather at each of the three Eastern airports as instrument (quadratic in minimum and maximum
temperature, precipitation, and wind speed). We do not estimate model 3 in panel C as it would include
3456 instruments. Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis
codes per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a
separate regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time) that is caused by network
delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model 1 assumes a uniform impact
of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while model 2 adds an interaction
with the distance to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with wind direction and speed
(columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum
temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed
effects) and are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way clustered by zip code and
day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.21: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Inpatient Data
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 1: CO 0.048 0.129∗∗ 0.133 0.179∗ 0.020 0.043 0.008
(0.044) (0.065) (0.097) (0.101) (0.033) (0.032) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.043 0.120∗ 0.125 0.162 0.012 0.042 0.003
(0.041) (0.064) (0.099) (0.099) (0.032) (0.033) (0.015)
Model 3: CO 0.020 0.069 0.058 0.074 -0.009 -0.002 0.004
(0.028) (0.044) (0.073) (0.058) (0.026) (0.023) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 4.1 11.1
∗ 11.4 15.4∗ 1.7 3.7 0.7
(3.8) (6.3) (8.8) (8.7) (2.9) (2.5) (1.4)
Model 2: NO2 3.8 10.6
∗ 11.0 14.4∗ 1.2 3.7 0.4
(3.6) (6.3) (8.9) (8.7) (2.8) (2.6) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 0.8 0.9 -0.9 3.2 -1.4 0.3 0.4
(2.0) (3.5) (5.7) (5.2) (1.9) (1.6) (0.8)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 1: CO 0.002 0.213 0.058 0.097 0.013 -0.032 -0.014
(0.159) (0.315) (0.404) (0.075) (0.021) (0.058) (0.026)
Model 2: CO 0.010 0.209 0.039 0.063 0.016 -0.014 -0.021
(0.149) (0.299) (0.393) (0.068) (0.023) (0.056) (0.028)
Model 3: CO 0.126 0.331∗ 0.172 0.063 0.016 -0.019 -0.004
(0.097) (0.191) (0.269) (0.047) (0.014) (0.042) (0.018)
Model 1: NO2 0.2 17.1 4.7 7.8 1.0 -2.5 -1.1
(12.8) (27.0) (33.0) (6.2) (1.7) (4.8) (2.1)
Model 2: NO2 0.8 16.9 3.2 5.1 1.3 -1.2 -1.7
(12.1) (25.8) (32.0) (5.7) (1.9) (4.6) (2.2)
Model 3: NO2 8.4 16.8 3.9 2.3 2.3
∗ 0.3 1.0
(7.6) (14.4) (19.5) (4.0) (1.2) (2.7) (1.5)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 1: CO 0.362 0.865∗∗ 0.990∗ 2.020∗∗ 0.257 0.267 0.017
(0.231) (0.381) (0.540) (0.829) (0.273) (0.169) (0.030)
Model 2: CO 0.313 0.794∗∗ 0.982∗ 1.935∗∗ 0.215 0.235 0.015
(0.204) (0.376) (0.552) (0.820) (0.277) (0.167) (0.029)
Model 3: CO 0.158 0.225 0.486 0.970∗ -0.005 -0.012 -0.035
(0.144) (0.264) (0.426) (0.512) (0.218) (0.126) (0.028)
Model 1: NO2 30.4
∗ 72.5∗∗ 83.0∗ 169.4∗∗ 21.5 22.4 1.4
(18.2) (31.8) (46.3) (70.5) (23.6) (13.7) (2.5)
Model 2: NO2 30.2
∗ 72.4∗∗ 83.2∗ 169.5∗∗ 21.3 22.3 1.4
(18.1) (31.9) (46.5) (70.7) (23.7) (13.7) (2.5)
Model 3: NO2 8.9 -1.8 2.9 45.8 -8.1 -0.6 -1.2
(9.8) (19.5) (32.8) (39.1) (14.5) (9.5) (1.8)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates Table 4.4 except that sickness counts only use Inpatient Data (i.e., patients stay
overnight). Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis codes
per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate
regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time) that is caused by network delays (taxi
time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model 1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion
on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while model 2 adds an interaction with the distance
to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c)
in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum temperature,
precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed effects) and are
weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way clustered by zip code and day. Significance
levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.22: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution - Outpatient Data
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Ages
Model 1: CO 0.293∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ -0.074 -0.002
(0.059) (0.149) (0.185) (0.076) (0.016) (0.050) (0.004)
Model 2: CO 0.287∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ -0.074 -0.002
(0.058) (0.148) (0.185) (0.068) (0.015) (0.050) (0.004)
Model 3: CO 0.183∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.001
(0.044) (0.111) (0.140) (0.049) (0.011) (0.028) (0.003)
Model 1: NO2 25.1
∗∗∗ 40.9∗∗ 59.5∗∗∗ 25.3∗∗∗ 3.4∗∗ -6.4 -0.2
(6.9) (16.8) (21.6) (6.9) (1.4) (4.9) (0.4)
Model 2: NO2 24.9
∗∗∗ 40.8∗∗ 59.4∗∗∗ 24.6∗∗∗ 3.2∗∗ -6.4 -0.1
(6.9) (16.8) (21.7) (6.7) (1.4) (4.9) (0.4)
Model 3: NO2 11.0
∗∗∗ 15.3∗ 20.4∗ 12.8∗∗∗ 2.0∗∗ -1.1 0.1
(3.8) (8.8) (11.1) (4.1) (0.9) (2.1) (0.2)
Panel B: Ages Below 5
Model 1: CO 0.604∗∗∗ 1.924∗ 2.897∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.006 0.079 0.005
(0.205) (1.048) (1.223) (0.036) (0.006) (0.129) (0.018)
Model 2: CO 0.611∗∗∗ 1.886∗ 2.807∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.006 0.083 0.002
(0.204) (1.033) (1.224) (0.035) (0.006) (0.123) (0.019)
Model 3: CO 0.602∗∗∗ 1.969∗∗∗ 2.467∗∗∗ 0.014 0.006∗ -0.011 -0.005
(0.166) (0.698) (0.827) (0.024) (0.004) (0.111) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 48.6
∗∗ 154.8 233.2∗ 5.5∗ 0.5 6.3 0.4
(20.0) (97.6) (119.5) (3.1) (0.5) (10.3) (1.5)
Model 2: NO2 49.2
∗∗ 152.1 226.4∗ 4.9∗ 0.4 6.7 0.2
(20.0) (95.9) (119.0) (3.0) (0.4) (9.8) (1.6)
Model 3: NO2 39.5
∗∗∗ 100.1∗ 128.2∗ 2.3 0.5∗ 1.3 -0.2
(12.2) (57.5) (69.7) (1.8) (0.3) (8.7) (1.0)
Panel C: Ages 65 and Older
Model 1: CO 0.568∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.211 0.002
(0.161) (0.246) (0.357) (0.444) (0.117) (0.156) (0.004)
Model 2: CO 0.550∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.182 0.003
(0.146) (0.229) (0.332) (0.402) (0.119) (0.153) (0.005)
Model 3: CO 0.371∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.004
(0.111) (0.157) (0.234) (0.310) (0.091) (0.094) (0.004)
Model 1: NO2 47.7
∗∗∗ 63.4∗∗∗ 128.6∗∗∗ 156.6∗∗∗ 24.7∗∗ 17.7 0.2
(13.8) (21.9) (34.7) (37.1) (10.2) (13.0) (0.3)
Model 2: NO2 47.7
∗∗∗ 63.2∗∗∗ 128.3∗∗∗ 156.5∗∗∗ 24.7∗∗ 17.6 0.2
(13.8) (21.9) (34.7) (37.1) (10.3) (13.0) (0.3)
Model 3: NO2 26.3
∗∗∗ 37.2∗∗∗ 63.3∗∗∗ 77.0∗∗∗ 9.1 10.1 -0.1
(7.8) (10.8) (18.4) (21.7) (6.3) (8.4) (0.3)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Zip Codes 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Days 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095
Notes: Table replicates Table 4.4 except that sickness counts only use Outpatient Data (i.e., patients do not
stay overnight). Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts for primary and secondary diagnosis
codes per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb) in 2005-2007. Each entry is a
separate regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time) that is caused by network
delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model 1 assumes a uniform impact
of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while model 2 adds an interaction
with the distance to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with wind direction and speed
(columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic in minimum and maximum
temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month, weekday, and holiday fixed
effects) and are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way clustered by zip code and
day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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Table 4.23: Sickness Rates Regressed On Instrumented Pollution (Season)
Acute All Heart Bone Appen-
Asthma Respiratory Respiratory Problems Stroke Fractures dicitis
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Months
Model 1: CO 0.341∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.059 -0.031 0.007
(0.072) (0.179) (0.230) (0.148) (0.042) (0.069) (0.016)
Model 2: CO 0.330∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.032 0.002
(0.066) (0.179) (0.234) (0.137) (0.040) (0.070) (0.016)
Model 3: CO 0.203∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.041 0.003
(0.049) (0.130) (0.172) (0.082) (0.031) (0.042) (0.011)
Model 1: NO2 29.2
∗∗∗ 52.0∗∗ 70.9∗∗∗ 40.7∗∗∗ 5.1 -2.7 0.6
(8.0) (20.7) (26.4) (13.1) (3.7) (6.1) (1.4)
Model 2: NO2 28.7
∗∗∗ 51.3∗∗ 70.3∗∗∗ 39.0∗∗∗ 4.4 -2.7 0.3
(7.8) (20.6) (26.6) (12.9) (3.6) (6.3) (1.4)
Model 3: NO2 11.9
∗∗∗ 16.2 19.4 16.0∗∗ 0.6 -0.8 0.5
(4.0) (10.5) (13.7) (7.2) (2.2) (2.9) (0.9)
Observations 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580 179580
Panel B: Summer (April-September)
Model 1: CO 0.295∗∗ 0.086 0.328 0.431∗∗ 0.100 0.062 0.002
(0.123) (0.244) (0.301) (0.180) (0.073) (0.131) (0.030)
Model 2: CO 0.297∗∗ 0.087 0.338 0.416∗∗ 0.095 0.068 0.000
(0.120) (0.245) (0.305) (0.181) (0.073) (0.133) (0.030)
Model 3: CO 0.255∗∗ 0.002 0.156 0.304∗ 0.098 0.059 0.009
(0.105) (0.201) (0.262) (0.169) (0.067) (0.109) (0.030)
Model 1: NO2 30.4
∗ 8.8 33.7 44.4∗ 10.3 6.4 0.2
(15.9) (25.9) (34.7) (23.2) (8.1) (13.0) (3.1)
Model 2: NO2 29.5
∗∗ 8.8 35.8 36.0∗ 8.0 8.4 -0.3
(14.3) (25.1) (34.9) (21.4) (7.4) (13.2) (2.8)
Model 3: NO2 5.3 -13.0 -12.0 7.2 4.6 5.1 1.0
(4.8) (8.4) (10.7) (9.6) (3.4) (4.8) (1.5)
Observations 90036 90036 90036 90036 90036 90036 90036
Panel C: Winter (October-March)
Model 1: CO 0.377∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.038 -0.152∗∗ 0.022
(0.113) (0.195) (0.239) (0.213) (0.046) (0.063) (0.020)
Model 2: CO 0.346∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.151∗∗ 0.016
(0.102) (0.184) (0.226) (0.188) (0.045) (0.063) (0.020)
Model 3: CO 0.156∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.249∗ 0.215∗∗ -0.011 -0.087∗∗ 0.005
(0.060) (0.106) (0.147) (0.100) (0.035) (0.038) (0.012)
Model 1: NO2 34.2
∗∗∗ 62.9∗∗∗ 72.6∗∗∗ 50.1∗∗ 3.4 -13.7∗∗ 2.0
(12.3) (23.1) (26.8) (22.3) (4.2) (6.8) (1.9)
Model 2: NO2 35.1
∗∗∗ 64.0∗∗∗ 74.2∗∗∗ 50.9∗∗ 3.9 -13.5∗∗ 2.3
(12.6) (23.2) (26.9) (22.9) (4.2) (6.7) (2.0)
Model 3: NO2 14.2
∗∗ 21.5∗ 20.1 23.6∗∗ 1.4 -6.7∗ 1.4
(6.5) (11.4) (13.5) (11.8) (3.0) (3.6) (1.1)
Observations 89544 89544 89544 89544 89544 89544 89544
Notes: Table lists the results for all ages from Table 4.4 in Panel A and then splits the sample into the
summer months (Panel B) and winter months (Panel C). Table regresses zip-code level sickness rates (counts
for primary and secondary diagnosis codes per 10 million people) on daily instrumented pollution levels (ppb)
in 2005-2007. Each entry is a separate regression. Pollution is instrumented on airport congestion (taxi time)
that is caused by network delays (taxi time at three major airports in the Eastern United States). Model
1 assumes a uniform impact of congestion on pollution levels at all zip codes surrounding an airport, while
model 2 adds an interaction with the distance to the airport, and model 3 furthermore adds interactions with
wind direction and speed (columns (a)-(c) in Table 4.1). All regressions include weather controls (quadratic
in minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed) and temporal controls (year, month,
weekday, and holiday fixed effects) and are weighted by the total population in a zip code. Errors are two-way
clustered by zip code and day. Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
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